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In finance, the systemic risk can be defined as the probability that a given set of events and 
circumstances undermines the stability of an interconnected financial system. In this regard, 
three basic elements that characterize the systemic risk can be identified: 
• Probability: it is a number between 0 and 1 associated to a given event, trying to describe 
its likelihood of occurrence. 
• Triggering event: it is the unexpected unfavorable event that hits a single component of 
the financial chain and then stretches throughout the entire process. It can be derived 
from the public system (e.g. a liquidity constraint imposed by the central bank), from 
an external shock (e.g. a natural disaster) or from an internal endogenous shock (e.g. the 
failure of a bank). 
• Propagation dynamic: it is a phenomenon that depends on the structure of the financial 
system and it is strictly related to the level of interconnection among institutions; hence, 
to the intensity of contagion and to the depth of spillover effects, through a sequence of 
consequent events (e.g. a cascading failure). 
The importance of the systemic risk is high and ever increasing for at least three categories of 
subjects. 
• Policy makers and financial regulators deal with this topic in order to implement 
restrictive measures and provide instructions to the agents, pursuing the minimization 
of the probability of unexpected systemic occurrence, and therefore the impact of 
adverse events on the system. 
• Academic researchers have recently channeled their attention to the systemic risk as an 
object of study, in order to identify its deep determinants and to elaborate increasingly 
complicated models for the phenomenon description and for the forecasting. 
• Business practitioners, i.e. risk managers and institutional investors, need to measure, 
monitor and manage the exposures to systemic risk, and all that it is related to, given 
that this kind of risk tends to reduce the benefits of diversification, and may bring 
painful financial experiences. 
It is important for all these subjects to measure, control and manage systemic risk, and further 
understand the dynamic of occurrence of risk spillovers across institutions and markets. For 
this purpose, it is pertinent to make a distinction about the notion of systemic risk:  
• first of all, the systemic risk contribution, i.e. the negative externality that a large and 
strongly interconnected financial institution may exert on other institutions by just 
undertaking additional risk, and then by undermining the financial stability; 
• second of all, the financial system risk, which refers to the overall dimension of risk, 
i.e. the probability to experience a systemic event. 
It is also useful to frame the systemic risk in accordance with its specific source. 
• Firstly, an internal idiosyncratic problem of a big single institution may easily spread to 




• Secondly, we could observe a group of institutions that share a common risky exposure 
toward a product, a market or a country, and that may materialize itself in an adverse 
event, striking the whole system.  
• Lastly, systemic risk can arise endogenously inside the financial market because of 
financial imbalances, and unfold itself in a sudden and harmful way for the system (i.e. 
the case of a speculative market bubble, or the same circumstance which led to the 2008 
financial crisis).  
Naturally, a source of systemic riskiness is not independent from other sources and a systemic 
financial disruption can have more sources or can be the ultimate point of a sequence of more 
scenarios. 
Taking into account all these features, the main involved institutions have recently concentrated 
their efforts in the deepening of this topic. In particular, since the 2008 financial crisis, new 
definitions and new measures of systemic risk have been implemented, as well as new tools in 
risk management and risk modeling have been created. We have witnessed significant 
developments about the ways in which systemic risk is being measured and assessed by public 
and private institutions.  
The need and the usefulness to employ accurate and complete tests and reliable early warning 
indicators to assess the presence and the intensity of systemic risk is out of the question. Using 
reliable indicators is very helpful to gauge the early warning signals. In this case, the test 
reliability can be defined as the ability of a given model to issue signals with relatively limited 
out-of-sample forecast errors. In other words, the reliability of a model can be tested by 
comparing its forecasting performance against other models through an out-of-sample 
validation, which means using the known sample data to get the model parameters, and then 
proceeding to using the model to make predictions about unknown data, independent from the 
sample. These procedures are essential for assessing systemic risk, and then to implement the 
right corrections in the portfolios of customers, or to timely implement macro-prudential 
policies.  
The aim of the latest research has been to create and to identify those indicators, risk measures 
and risk modeling that provide the best early warning signals about systemic financial risk. 
The impossible challenge is to implement a comprehensive model that manages to capture and 
to disclose any detail and any signal of possible increasing systemic risks inside a system, like 
the economic and financial one, which is highly interconnected with a very complex structure 
that is rapidly and constantly evolving. 
Considering these points, the purpose of this thesis is to try to develop and to apply a test 
procedure to evaluate the presence of systemic risk inside the financial markets at a given time. 
Especially, for the identification of signals related to systemic risk, an early warning model will 
be built by combining two different statistical tools: the quantile regression analysis (whose 
reference contribution comes from the American econometrician Roger William Koenker, 
which published in 1978, together with Gilbert Bassett, the book “Regression Quantiles”, a 
work in turn based on other past ideas and approaches not yet been explored in depth until then) 
and the mixed frequency data sampling regression model (MIDAS model was firstly introduced 
by Eric Ghysels et al. in 2002, in its “The MIDAS touch: Mixed data sampling regression 
models”, and then developed in depth by Elena Andreou et al. in 2010, in its “Regression 
Models With Mixed Sampling Frequencies”). 
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Each one of these approaches produces some advantages and brings specific characteristics 
which allow a unique and differentiated analysis of systemic risk. 
Quantile regression analysis is performed for the estimation of the conditional quantiles (i.e. 
the median and any other percentile of the population distribution) of the variable of interest 
through a set of predictor variables, differently from the famous Ordinary Least Square method 
used to estimate simple linear regression models, and as a result, to get the conditional mean of 
dependent variable. Hence, quantile regression models the conditional quantile of a dependent 
variable, such as the first decile (q=0,10) or the ninety-ninth percentile (q=0,99), describing the 
impact of a set of explicative variables on different points of the conditional distribution of the 
same dependent variable. This analysis provides many advantages. 
• First of all, quantile regression allows the evaluation of the impact of a shock on each 
specific part of the dependent variable distribution, while the OLS estimates give us 
information linked to the change of the conditional mean of the distribution. Moreover, 
the quantile approach is more appropriate to estimate the asymmetric impact of a shock 
on a distribution: it is used to investigate the relation between systemic risk and 
macroeconomic framework.  
• Secondly, the quantile estimates are known to be more robust to extreme values with 
respect to OLS estimates, for the same reason the median is not sensitive to extreme 
values of the sample distribution, as opposed to the mean. This is very useful in the 
financial analysis: since heavy financial stresses are rare events, we can model linkages, 
interdependences and any other financial pattern in a more reliable and stable way. 
Rather than running a regression among data sampled at the same frequency, MIDAS allows to 
combine data with different sampling frequencies, especially for those cases in which the 
variable of interest is sampled at a lower frequency and the relevant explicative data is sampled 
at high frequency. An example can be seen in some macroeconomic models, based on variable 
of interests sampled quarterly or annually, like the GDP growth, and explicative variables 
sampled monthly, such as inflation. Other examples can be found in financial economics, as we 
deal with abundant data at intra-daily sampling frequencies, like stock returns or daily 
volatilities, used to explain data with lower frequencies. The most significant advantage of 
MIDAS approach is to allow to efficiently exploit all available information extractable from 
sampling data, whatever the sampling frequency, and then avoiding the series aggregation. 
By combining these two approaches, the target is to implement and to fine-tune a procedure to 
test the presence of systemic risk in a reliable way. 
The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 1 provides an overview of the systemic risk in every 
basic aspect: its definition, its origin and the relevant literature. Chapter 2 presents a description 
of the most important tools to measure systemic risk, by providing a categorization of them. 
Chapter 3 will describe the theoretical framework of the main tools needed for the empirical 
analysis: all the conceptual and mathematical characteristics of the two basic approaches used 
to implement the test, that is the MIDAS regression model and the quantile regression. The 
detailed description of the methodology for the empirical analysis will be described as well. 
Chapter 4 will show the application of the theoretical knowledge with an empirical analysis, 
that is the presentation of the main results. The conclusion is a brief summary of the work, with 
other possible extensions. The detailed description of dataset and all MATLAB codes will be 
reported in the Appendix A and Appendix B, respectively. The very last section will be 




Systemic Risk: An Overview 
 
 
This chapter provides an overview about the nature of the systemic risk, in each main aspect: 
its definition, its origin and the relevant literature. 
 
 
1.1  Definition of Systemic Risk 
Defining systemic risk might be difficult, as the circumstances in which it materializes itself 
vary so much that identifying common patterns and common characteristics among situations 
is quite difficult. For this reason, the systemic risk lacks a univocal interpretation, and its 
underlying concept is wide and not clearly definable. 
At the same time, the importance to find a useful and comprehensive definition is out of 
question. A unique and overall operating definition of systemic risk would allow the 
implementation of coherent models, requirements, measures and monitoring systems from 
regulators and financial managers, and then providing a common standard for all agents. More 
homogenous and more precise measures of risk in turn allow a more optimal portfolio 
management and the implementation of less ambiguous public policies. It would be the best 
target for public authorities, who, over the past two decades, introduced the financial stability 
of the whole financial system among the principal macroeconomic objectives. 
A first definition comes from the Bank of International Settlement, which in 1994 defined the 
systemic risk as “the risk that failure of a participant to meet its contractual obligations may in 
turn cause other participants to default with a chain reaction leading to broader financial 
difficulties”. Kaufman in 1995 defined systemic risk as the "probability that cumulative losses 
will accrue from an event that sets in motion a series of successive losses along a chain of 
institutions or markets comprising a system […], that is, systemic risk is the risk of a chain 
reaction of falling interconnected dominos". In both these definitions, there are at least three 
common elements which should characterize any other definition of risk: some financial 
difficulties which hit an entity, the failure of the same entity and the spreading of all negative 
financial consequences as a chain reaction to other interconnected entities. 
In 2000, Freixas, Parigi and Rochet related the concept of systemic risk to that of spreading of 
financial crisis from one country to another. They analyzed the role of the payment systems and 
the response of the central banks in dealing with financial distress due to lack of liquidity. 
Furthermore, in 2000, Allen and Gale highlighted the key role of contagion in the spreading of 
adverse events, stating that a shock “may cause a bank to go bankrupt and liquidate its assets. 
This causes other banks which have deposits in it to also go bankrupt and so on. Eventually all 
banks are forced to liquidate their assets at a considerable loss”. 
The first authors to ever provide a structured schematization of all possible scenarios of 
systemic crisis were De Bandt and Hartmann. They defined systemic risk as “the risk of 
experiencing systemic events in strong sense”, i.e. those events which cause the failure of some 
institution inside the market. In particular, they pointed out the two main components of the 
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systemic risk: the initial unexpected shock and the propagation mechanisms. They very clearly 
explained the difference between the idiosyncratic shock (which affects only a single clearly a 
single institution) and the systematic shock (which affects the whole market, e.g. a sudden 
increase of inflation rate, a stock market crash or a sudden liquidity shortage in a given financial 
market), and provided a clear description of the propagation mechanism, that is the mechanism 
through which shocks propagate through the entire system. They stated that “the transmission 
of shocks is a natural part of the self-stabilizing adjustments of the market system to a new 
equilibrium”.  
In 2004, Kupiec and Nickerson defined the systemic risk in relation to the negative financial 
consequences of its materialization, that is, the possibility that an economic shock could bring 
a substantial increase in the volatility of stock prices, significant reduction in corporate 
liquidity, potential failures and loss of efficiency. 
In 2005, Chan et al. described systemic risk as “the possibility of a series of correlated defaults 
among financial institutions (typically banks) that occurs over a short period of time, often 
caused by a single major event”. The correlated defaults are the demonstration of the contagion, 
a direct consequence of the level of interdependence and of the intensity of network among 
financial institutions. For that, authors report the typical example of the bank run, i.e. the 
banking panic for which most depositors decide to simultaneously withdraw their funds from 
the bank, creating a run that can ultimately cause bank failures. 
Similarly, Billio et al. in 2010 argued that “systemic risk can be realized as a series of correlated 
defaults among financial institutions, occurring over a short time span and triggering a 
withdrawal of liquidity and widespread loss of confidence in the financial system as a whole”. 
In this definition, the new element is the loss of confidence, which in the financial system might 
cause a violent break of the whole financial market (as it has happened in the interbank market 
during the recent financial crisis), with consequent reset of exchanged volumes and consistent 
losses for actors. 
As we can see, each definition of systemic risk adds some details and some additional 
characteristics that mark the specific concept. In all cases, the common points are two: an 
unfavorable event, that is the shock, and a set of consequent negative impacts, that is the 
propagation dynamic, which in turn puts in trouble the whole financial system.  
Figure 1.1: Systemic events in the financial system                 




The systemic risk is the probability that all the above-mentioned situations will take place, or 
more in general, the probability that an entire market or financial system collapses, as a 
consequence of the materialization of some specific risk combined with a strongly 
interconnected system, with many interdependencies and interlinkages. 
At this point, it is useful to make some distinctions across different facets of the argument. 
The first distinction to keep in mind is between uncertainty and risk. The uncertainty is a 
situation in which one does not have a background information of the event. Hence, the 
distribution of the phenomenon is unknown. The risk, on the contrary, is the known probability 
of a phenomenon, derivable from a known probability distribution. A Knight’s publication of 
1921 stated that “risk is present when future events occur with measurable probability”, while 
“uncertainty is present when the likelihood of future events is indefinite or incalculable”. This 
distinction is relevant because the research of Epstein and Wang in 1994 proved that 
uncertainty, unlike risk, may lead to indeterminate equilibria, that is a set of continuum 
equilibria for some given fundamentals. In this context, actually not so rare, the final 
equilibrium price is determined by “animal spirits”, and this might explain the wide volatility 
of stock prices. 
The second basic distinction is between systemic risk and specific (or idiosyncratic) risk. As 
described earlier, systemic risk is the overall, not diversifiable, risk which characterizes the 
entire financial system, that can be summarized with the beta measure of the activity. Specific 
risk is the risk inherent to a specific individual asset (a particular company’s stock or other 
security), group of securities or at most to a given asset class. This last component of risk can 
always be eliminated by portfolios diversification, since investors do not need to be rewarded 
to bear that. Therefore, this type of risk is not a crucial determinant of the expected portfolio 
return. It depends on the specific characteristics of the issuer company, and it is essential to 
appreciate its capital solidity and its economic prospect, as well as taking into account the 
characteristics of the sector. Therefore, specific risk should be based on the fundamental 
analysis of the issuer company, and it is relevant in equity pricing and in the interest rate 
determination of corporate bonds. 
The last distinction is between systemic risk and systematic risk. Duan and Zhang, in 2013, 
made the following distinction: “systematic risk arises from exposures to common risk factors, 
and systemic risk is purely due to interconnections” and “although large systematic risk may 
lead to systemic risk, they are not synonymous”. Consequently, the systemic risk is the 
probability to have a shock at company level with relative contagion due to connection and 
consequent break of the system, while the systematic risk can be thought as the market risk, 
that is the probability of experiencing losses due to common factors, including the economy 
(recession and expansion), interest rates change, natural disasters, geopolitical issues. For 
instance, in 2008, the failure of Lehman Brothers (the shock) caused a wave of financial distress 
throughout the whole financial system (the propagation), because of its high integration and 
connection. This was the realization of a systemic risk. As a consequence of the financial 
markets’ break, a huge recession involved the world, so that whoever invested in risky assets 
during the previous years underwent a heavy reduction of investments value, whatever the 
portfolio combination. This was the realization of a systematic risk. It is evident that the 
realization of a systematic risk could determine an increase of systemic risk, because of the 
lower cash flows for firms and the lower possibilities to get funds in the financial markets. 
Nevertheless, as it happened in 2008, depending on the intensity of the financial break, systemic 
risk might lead to an increase of systematic risk as well. 
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1.2  Origins of Systemic Risk 
The understanding of the fundamentals of systemic risk is crucial for any setting of risk 
management and test procedure. In this section, we will try to identify those basic factors from 
which systemic risk originates, involving all other institutions.  
As seen, systemic risk involves two joint components: the shock and the transmission 
mechanism. In 2012, Billio, Getmansky, Lo and Pelizzon identified four sources of systemic 
risk, known as “the 4 Ls”: losses, leverage, liquidity and linkages. While from an alteration of 
the first three Ls could stem a shock, the last L expresses the potential of a systemic involvement 
through a transmission mechanism.  
Losses of a company are an important vehicle of idiosyncratic risk, which can easily trigger a 
self-fulfilling mechanism of instability spreading. For instance, a bank that takes a lot of 
downside risk through investments in risky assets, with highly volatile returns and unstable 
price dynamics, may face a consistent increase in the probability of losses. Losses must be 
cushioned within the bank: a reduction in the credit supply, an increase of the debt issue or the 
reduction of the bank capital value. When these types of imbalances come up, the probability 
of materialization of a systemic risk considerably increases (Lang and Forletta, 2019). 
Leverage is a central component of systemic risk, and it must be continuously monitored, as 
the financial risk it entails is huge. Financial history shows that most financial systemic crisis 
erupted in a context of highly leveraged institutions and excessive optimism. The systemic 
crisis caused by an excessive systemic leveraging could lead to a consistent and persistent 
deterioration of the systemic health and of living standard of agents. This is due to the very 
strong pro-cyclicality of the leverage. When everything goes well for companies and 
households, the healthy balance sheet incentives the landing expansion for asset purchases, the 
increased asset demand push up prices and, as a result, the assets value in the balance sheet. 
When asset prices are widely above the intrinsic value of the asset, i.e. that explained by its 
fundamentals, the release of some news about the presence of the bubble or about the real 
solidity of a company is sufficient to trigger harmful deleveraging processes, in which massive 
assets sales and assets prices drop and impairments of balance sheets cause the stoppage of 
financial markets. This is the materialization of a systemic risk, in accordance with the basic 
scheme, shock and propagation. However, the financial leverage of a firm roughly measurable 
as the ratio between its total assets and its equity remains an easy way to increase the business 
profitability and the investment opportunities. 
Lastly, liquidity plays a central role in the explanation of systemic risk. Generally speaking, 
liquidity can be defined as the possibility of an economic agent to exchange part of their existing 
wealth with cash, financial assets or other types of goods. In particular, there exists a standard 
classification of the concept of liquidity. 
• Monetary liquidity is the liquidity delivered by the central bank to the financial system, 
in accordance with its need. In other words, it is the monetary base of the economy, 
given by the sum of cash and bank reserves. Through the central bank operations, 
monetary liquidity is provided in order to balance the eventual lacks of liquidity of the 
system.  
• Funding liquidity is the ability to settle obligations with immediacy when due. The 
International Monetary Fund defines it as “the ability of a solvent institution to make 
agreed-upon payments in a timely fashion”. Generally speaking, funding liquidity may 
also refer to the capacity of financial operators to get financing in a timely fashion in 
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terms of cash and capital. The two concepts are related. In general, as long as a company 
manages to maintain cash inflow higher than cash outflow at any instant of time, this 
company will be considered a liquid company. For a bank, cash inflow sources are new 
deposits, new assets sales, securitization, new debt issue or equity issue, new lending 
from interbank markets or directly from the central bank. 
• Market liquidity is a measure of the liquidity of an entire market. A market is liquid 
whenever trades can be executed at very low costs, in a timely manner and with limited 
impacts on prices. So, time needed for the conclusion of the operation, burden of 
transaction costs and exchangeable amount at a given moments are the three basic 
components to define the market liquidity. An asset is liquid when it can be quickly sold 
in the market without high costs, and then “liquidated” in cash. As far as market 
liquidity, there is a set of stylized facts: market liquidity can suddenly dry up; market 
liquidity has some commonality across securities, and it is strictly related to the 
volatility; market liquidity is subject to ‘flight to quality’, that is the movement of 
capitals from risky assets issued by distressed companies (less liquid) towards safer 
assets issued by solid companies; finally, market liquidity co-moves with the market, 
and in particular, a negative relationship between the market liquidity and the assets 
returns exists (Acharya and Pedersen, 2005). 
Therefore, low liquidity is a source of price volatility and market failure, and an early indicator 
for market stress. From that, liquidity risk is defined as the probability to become illiquid, and 
in particular it is a function of the availability of financing sources and of immediacy in the 
assets exchange. As a result, the liquidity risk is included in the asset pricing as a premium, 
called liquidity premium, and in the overall final yield of a security as a spread, called liquidity 
spread. When an asset is expected to be highly liquid, the liquidity spread will be very low, and 
this reduces the overall return rate and increases the price of the security. 
Actually, there is evidence that the liquidity risk is stably present but has a limited impact on 
the return rate, and relatively much less relevant than the credit risk. Anyway, situations in 
which this risk is high are as rare as potentially disruptive for the whole system: when it 
materializes itself, the resources allocation undergoes many inefficiencies, the lack of liquidity 
increases the systemic risk, and the consequent financial instability could turn into a systemic 
financial crisis. Therefore, illiquidity and systemic risk are strictly linked: holding an illiquid 
portfolio entails a large price impact of a potential forced liquidation, and this affects the 
company’s own capital. If the phenomenon involves many parties, all of them will suffer the 
consequences of a high correlation and of a potential global financial crisis. This is the essence 
of the systemic risk: the involvement of more institutions in the bearing of a shock, which aligns 
the correlations among assets and among equities. That is the reason why, when a systemic risk 
materializes itself, the “flight to quality” occurs, i.e. portfolios and wealth adjustments 
consisting of massive sales of more risky assets and purchase of safer assets like valuables, 
unrelated to the financial markets (just think of the strong increase in the gold price during a 
systemic distress). For that reason, market liquidity is the first alarm that reports to authority 
some shortcomings inside the market, and that could degenerate in a systemic distress.  
With that being said, the real danger behind the liquidity risk is the default risk. A financial 
institution is insolvent when it can no longer entirely meet its financial obligations when due, 
and in particular unable to pay its medium and long-term bonds. It happens when the value of 
total assets becomes irredeemably lower than the value of total claims, and the cash generated 
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by activities is insufficient to repay debtors. The endpoint is the closing of the involved 
company. The issue consists in distinguishing institutions that are just illiquid from those that 
are insolvent. During the period of economic expansion and financial stability of the market, it 
is quite easy to identify insolvent institutions and to understand when a company is facing just 
a temporary problem of liquidity. But when the recession comes and the financial market 
crashes, the widespread liquidity problems that many companies must face make it very 
difficult to identify the real insolvent firms from those which have no problem with long-term 
cash flows and repayments. There is no clear separation between liquidity problems and 
insolvency cases, and the systemic risk becomes more intense and heavier. 
At the basis of liquidity shortages for a firm there is a mixture between market illiquidity and 
the so called “maturity mismatching”: it is the situation in which a firm holds more short-term 
liabilities than short-term assets, and equivalently more long-term liabilities than long-term 
assets. A related concept is the “liquidity mismatching”, when at any time cash flows generated 
by financial assets does not match with cash flows needed to repay financial liabilities when 
due. As long as a company manages to repay any debt whenever it is due, it means that there is 
no internal liquidity problem, and no financing problem, even though the leverage is high. The 
real problem comes up when financing becomes too costly and the market liquidity quickly 
dries up. An interesting case is the liquidity management of a bank. A bank borrows funds from 
deposits, that are short-term liabilities, and lends funds in the long term, asking a higher interest 
rate which allows an interest spread: this is the net interest margin, and it is an important source 
of profit for a bank. Hence, the only maturity mismatch is not a danger for the system, but 
problems arise when market liquidity dries up and depositors demand all their funds back. This 
is the case of a bank run, that can heavily undermine the solidity of a bank and triggers a 
systemic crisis. Diamond and Dybvig explained in a famous model how liquidity mismatch 
may cause a self-fulfilling panic. 
Taking into consideration the above-mentioned points, the capacity to get financing is a crucial 
aspect for an institution, and it is a decisive factor to monitor in order to maintain financial 
stability. 
The last fundamental element, in order to have a complete general understanding about the 
origins of systemic risk, is the linkage. There would not be any systemic risk in a context 
without linkages among institutions, because the propagation mechanism would be missing. 
About this last component, the starting point of the analysis is the financial contagion theory. 
The financial system can be imagined as a very interwoven chain, where assets of an institution 
towards others correspond to liabilities from the same institutions, issued to finance other 
activities. If a bank undergoes a reduction in the value of its asset, it will probably have a more 
prudent behavior, by reducing further exposures and risks, in order to maintain itself financially 
solvent. This means to reduce loans granted to other institutions, to sell or securitize some 
assets, to convert deposits and other liquid assets in cash, and finally to cushion a loss on equity. 
Each one of these operations produces a simultaneous effect on the balance sheets of institutions 
which are in some way linked to the bank. For example, if a bank declares default on its 
obligations, then all claim-holders will face a loss equal to the total amount lent to the bank; if 
one of them undergoes such a high loss that its own capital is insufficient to absorb it, the 
solution is in turn to declare default. The transmission mechanism could easily involve the 
whole system, as a consequence of a so-called “domino effect”. 
The concept of contagion has a basic role in this dynamic. The interdependence among 
institutions of the financial chain is related to both payments system and direct loans. Studies 
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have been conducted on the mechanism of contagion and what emerges is that its impact is not 
necessarily strong, but it is mitigated by the fact that financial institutions do not sit and watch, 
rather, they obviously counteract to the incoming distress. Methods to predict and respond to 
potentially systemic shocks are constantly being developed and updated. Therefore, although 
they cannot entirely eliminate the risk of contagion, they still provide tools for risk mitigation. 
A contagion can stem from a default, but also from the variability of asset prices. Fluctuations 
of asset prices can entail losses big enough to create a shock to some institutions, and trigger a 
propagation, even without direct reciprocal loans among them. The consequent losses may 
make it more difficult to get financing, forcing further constriction in the activities and in the 
assets value. Reductions in the equity value are equivalent to reductions in the assets value of 
other financial intermediaries, and asset sales may bring to lower prices, which will cause 
further balance sheet effects, and then higher losses for an increasing number of institutions 
(Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2008). In general, a leveraged institution faces a stronger 
reduction in its value: when its assets value decreases by a given percentage, the net value of 
the institution might decrease by an even higher percentage, because of a greater reduction for 
the equity, that is for that part of balance sheet available to absorb losses. 
There are three main ways to recapitalize the bank and to restore a sustainable leveraging: it is 
possible to ask for a capital infusion by stockholders, therefore increasing the capital; it is 
possible to ask for a debt restructuring, which means reducing the liabilities; it is possible to 
sell part of own assets, by selling them and getting liquidity to repay liabilities. This last action 
can trigger the so-called asset price effects and the above-mentioned balance sheet effects, and 
if these negative impacts are discounted in the market valuation by economic agents, the 
chances for a materialization of a systemic risk increase considerably. 
As earlier mentioned, the initial condition of leveraged institution may amplify the asset price 
effects on the balance sheets. The two basic financial mechanisms which describe these 
systemic distressed situations are named “loss spiral” and “margin spiral”, and both identify the 
more general “liquidity spiral”. 
In a loss spiral, an initial external shock, like a loss, a default or an unexpected cost increase, 
could cause important liquidity problems inside the internal liquidity circuit of a company. As 
said, liquidity problems may force the asset liquidation, which may trigger some downward 
price fluctuations and further losses on existing positions, then generating a systemic 
involvement. 
The margin spiral strengthens the loss spiral. When an investor buys an asset, they can use this 
asset as collateral and borrow money against it. The difference between the security’s price and 
its value taken as collateral (because a loan is never granted for the total price) is called margin, 
and must be covered by the equity. Equivalently, the total asset value of a firm is financed by a 
given amount of debt, but not completely, because a part must be covered by its own capital. 
Hence, the total margin can never exceed the total own capital at any time, and it determines 
the maximum leverage. When a loss, as a default, overwhelms a company, along with the loss 
spiral, the margin spiral triggers as well: the assets reposition got through sales causes an overall 
price reduction, making prices move away from their fundamentals; this process, other than to 
make losses on existing assets increase, (causing further funding problems) causes an increase 
of the margin, which forces a leverage reduction and further asset sales. Moreover, when 
funding liquidity becomes stricter, institutions becomes more adverse to taking long positions 
in high-margin securities, because of the high capital required. But lower market liquidity leads 
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to more price fluctuations, higher volatility, higher financing costs and consequently higher 
financing risk. 
In this context, risk managers are more likely to wish a dejection of their leveraging, but when 
many institutions de-leverage their positions, the market liquidity suddenly dries up. Losses 
spiral and margin spiral are self-perpetuating pro-cyclical processes that heavily amplify an 
initial shock like a default, as well as the burden of the systemic risk. In particular, Adrian and 
Shin show that leverage is pro-cyclical in a financial system in which balance sheets are 
continuously marked to market, because assets’ prices fluctuations stimulate continuous 
adjustments, corrections and reactions by financial institutions. In this framework, aggregate 
liquidity can be seen as the growth rate of the aggregate financial sector balance sheet: when 
asset prices increase, balance sheets quickly become stronger and the leverage degree declines; 
the accumulated surplus capital is progressively employed in expanding balance sheets, through 
more asset purchases and loans and more short-term debt. When the borrowers research is very 
intense, the risk to deal with sub-prime borrowers considerably increases, up to the downturn 
of the credit cycle and the materialization of the systemic risk. 
Finally, there is one last more theoretical issue that is strictly related to the propagation of a 
systemic risk. It concerns the externality, which plays a key role in the risk spreading. In 
economics, an externality is a negative or positive impact on the wealth of someone of an action 
performed by a third party. In finance, negative externalities due to the behavior of an institution 
can more easily affect the wealth of other institutions, their actions and the overall financial 
stability.  
There are many examples about financial externalities and their dynamics.  
One of them is the rapid and generalized spreading of negative information about the solidity 
of an institution, in a context of strong information asymmetry. The only failure of a bank could 
trigger a bank run towards other banks, even if performing and totally solid, for the sole reason 
that depositors fear the real solidity of their own bank, perceived as a failing bank as well. A 
correct, transparent and continuous communication between the financial intermediaries and 
their customers could reduce the fear because it would reduce the asymmetric information.  
The same goes for those clients who were debtors of the failing bank: it may become more 
difficult for them to get financing by other banks, because a bank failure causes more 
burdensome restrictions on credit lines, and less trust towards former failed bank’s clients. The 
failure of a bank leads to a loss of information on relationships and creditworthiness, and alert 
the entire network that the failed bank was not doing a correct screening and monitoring of its 
own clients. The consequence is a negative externality on former clients and stakeholders.  
Another example is the individual decision of a financial intermediary to become universal and 
to sell any kind of financial product and financial service for any type of clientele. This decision 
implies the necessity to enter the financial chain in such a way that it can forge the highest 
number of relationships and contacts. The expansion, the internationalization and the 
universalization of a company and of its activities may create a focal point inside the financial 
system, so that the well-being of such institution determines the stability of the entire system. 
It is the so-called “too big to fail” and “too interconnected to fail” situation, and the complexity 
of these linkages considerably increases the systemic risk. On this specific matter, there are 
important monitoring policies and moral hazard issues for public authorities, whose main target 
is financial stability. 
A last example is provided by the strict relation between the financial system and the real 
productive economy. When a bank faces a shock, rather than selling assets, it can decide to 
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perform a credit rationing and increase interest rates on new debts; this decision unavoidably 
falls back on consumption, saving and investment possibilities and desires of firms and 
households. The result is a probable reduction of transactions, output and prices. The 
consequent recession involves the entire system, and this is a very big negative externality 
which in turn hits the financial markets. It is a task of public authorities to mitigate both the 
intrinsic systemic risk of the system (through a set of provisions and regulations and through a 
correct setting of monetary policies by the central bank), and the possible vicious cycle that a 
recession may cause on financial safety of economic agents, through a right implementation of 
economic policy and public intervention. 
 
  
1.3  Brief Literature Review on Systemic Risk 
This section presents a review of the main contributions and the main conclusions concerning 
systemic risk in the literature of the past decades. It is important to note that the more consistent 
progress about this topic have come true over the last two decades, and this is probably due to 
a deeper understanding of financial dynamics, to the introduction of more complicated and 
complete econometric tools and to the necessity to provide explanations on relatively recent 
global phenomena and events, such as the global financial crisis.  
The introduction of systemic issues dates back to the Great Depression, when the classical 
economic theory faced some difficulties in explaining the persistence and the harmfulness of 
the crisis. Keynes first, in his General Theory, found a possible interpretation of the crisis, and 
first dealt with the topic of basic uncertainty and its role in the disequilibrium of the capitalistic 
systems. Later, other authors, such as Kindleberger and Minsky, argued that the financial 
structure endogenously leads to the increase of the fragility of the system, with an increase in 
the probability of crisis; these authors implicitly pointed out the endogeneity of systemic crises 
and, therefore, the presence of a systemic risk component. During the ’70s and ‘80s, due the 
occurrence of a sequence of international economic instabilities and further financial crisis over 
the world, more contributions to the theory on systemic risk were provided by economists. In 
particular, adjustments mechanisms of financial systems to external shocks was analyzed, in 
order to formalize an overall view about crisis, which can be generated either endogenously 
and exogenously. The investigation about behavioral aspects and about their role in the 
materialization of a systemic crisis began and made progress. Nonetheless, up to 1980s, the 
research about systemic issue remained limited to a few pieces of work, and mostly focused on 
descriptive economic and historical analysis of systemic events, such as crisis.  
From the ‘80s onwards, contributions increased in number and improved in quality. The 
systemic phenomenon was studied by economists from different perspectives, without 
necessarily a common direction of interest, and through the usage of different backgrounds and 
different methodologies. The massive application of new mathematical and econometric 
models and the analysis performed by means of financial data and empirical evidence gave a 
strong boost in this field. The consequent proliferation of working papers about systemic risk 
over the last twenty years of the XX century was very heterogenous. 
It is possible to follow three directions of investigation in the literature about systemic risk (as 
suggested by Bazzana and Debortoli, 2002), identifiable in accordance with the origin place of 
the systemic event: the payment system, the financial system and the banking system. 
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The decision to use a given payment system and settlement procedure for the financial 
transactions has been seen as an important characteristic for systemic events. Authors have 
focused on the features of settlement structures and of payment systems as determinants of 
systemic crisis. The study of these systems implies a deep analysis of the network of 
relationships among financial institutions, and the investigation of basic concepts as the shock 
propagation and contagion. In particular, the payment system can be a source of systemic risk 
because of a direct and fast transmission of shocks to others or because of an unexpected 
malfunction of the same payment system. Therefore, researchers focused on the definition and 
identification of some types of risk, whose monitoring and measuring nowadays are essential 
for risk managers: the credit risk, the liquidity risk, the operational risk and the legal risk. 
Simultaneously, the financial system began to be analyzed as a vehicle of systemic shocks that 
lead to systemic crisis. Contagion models derived starting from investors’ portfolio decisions 
and asset price dynamic models have been implemented. 
In general, the discussion developed on the fact that the financial market constitutes a mean of 
propagation, but also a source of systemic events. For example, as it has been mentioned before, 
large price fluctuations and market liquidity crisis can affect single financial institutions, and 
from that spread through the whole market, or can directly affect large part of the market, as a 
large number of operators are involved. 
Researches of Calvo and Mendoza showed that the globalization of risky assets markets may 
reduce incentives to collect costly country-specific information and increase incentives to hold 
an arbitrary market portfolio. All of this strengthens the contagion among investors, and 
therefore the systemic risk; with short-selling constraints, the gain to get information at a fixed 
cost could reduce as markets grow.  
Schinasi and Smith found that the role of leverage and of diversification is essential and 
sufficient to explain the contagion: for investors it is optimal to sell risky assets when a shock 
comes up, and the portfolio rebalancing leads to the spreading along the financial chain. 
Therefore, contagion can be explained without assumptions of market imperfections, but just 
through the standard portfolio theory. 
Kodres and Pritsker argued that the contagion is due to the portfolio rebalancing on 
international markets after a macroeconomic shock, and the information asymmetries amplify 
this impact. Moreover, they provide explanations and evidence about the particular suffering 
state of emerging countries (at that time, many crises were involving emerging countries, above 
all Russia, Mexico and Argentina).  
Allen and Jagtiani studied the effects of bank portfolio diversification. When an institution 
includes non-banking activities in its asset portfolio, it reduces its exposure to sectorial 
idiosyncratic risk but increases exposure to systemic risk. This reduces the same potential of 
diversification, and since this risk does not appear in the risk premium, the systemic risk 
exposures are enhanced. 
Das and Uppal found that the effect of systemic risk on the composition of the portfolio is 
limited, and that systemic risk slightly reduces the benefits of diversification suggested by 
standard theory. They started from two stylized facts: returns on international equities are 
characterized by jumps; the jumps simultaneously occur across countries, creating the systemic 
risk. They implemented a model of equity returns through a multivariate system of jump-
diffusion processes, where the arrival is simultaneous across assets. They concluded that 
systemic risk does affect the allocation between the riskless and risky assets, but there is a small 
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impact on the composition of the risky portfolio, and this reduces the benefits from international 
diversification. 
A fundamental contribution to the economic and financial theory has been given by that line of 
research that tried to overcome all those unrealistic assumptions of “perfection” and 
homogeneity of the world in the standard theory. During ‘80s, many authors discovered 
important features used to elaborate more realistic assumptions and models, in order to catch 
the imperfections of the world. In particular, the causes of the assets price dynamics were 
investigated, as a sudden fall or unjustified growth, with models based on the hypothesis of 
heterogeneous agents instead of representative agent, and the pieces of work that emphasized 
psychosocial and cognitive aspects. 
Grossman and Stiglitz proved that prices just partially reflect all the information available, and 
for that reason markets are not always efficient. Haltiwanger and Waldman pointed out that 
agents are heterogenous in preferences and in ability to analyze information, and formulate their 
own expectations with limited rationality for the most. Hart and Kreps demonstrated that the 
idea that rational speculative activity should bring to more stable price is not always correct.  
As a result of these new important economic principles, following researches in finance focused 
on the real and evident discrepancies between theory and evidence: many investors don’t follow 
the advice of financial theory, don’t hold the market portfolio, don’t diversify correctly and buy 
a limited number of stocks, selected after a personal deepening, a given public announcement, 
or after seeing a mass phenomenon, then combining the rational approach with the emotionality. 
Authors defined these investors as noise traders: they act on the basis of partial information and 
in general of what they consider useful to give some individual advantages, when in reality it 
is imprecise and irrelevant information.  
De Long et al. highlighted the importance of these agents because they are the majority, and 
their actions heavily affect the price formation process. Based on this hypothesis of “noise”, 
many models on prices dynamics have been implemented.  
An important conclusion has been provided by Calvo and Mendoza in 1999: within a financial 
market, investors can be divided between informed and uninformed, where uninformed ones 
tend to imitate the informed ones; therefore, causing a problem of signal extraction when 
informed investors act in accordance with information not related to fundamentals, and this 
favors the propagation of eventual shocks through the financial markets.  
Brock and Hommes implemented a model based on the assumptions of heterogenous agents 
and with limited rationality, and they demonstrate how their choices affect the price fluctuations 
and the market trends. 
Camerer provided important contributions on the distancing of assets prices from their 
fundamental value. In particular, he defined three phenomena: growing bubbles, information 
bubbles and fads. Growing bubbles are explosive trends of assets prices in a context of rational 
expectations, where investors, in a social mechanism of coordinated opinions, expect further 
increases. Information bubbles are price deviations from fundamentals due to some market 
failures which impede the price to correctly embed all available information. Fads are price 
deviations from fundamentals due to social and psychological forces following a change in risk 
perceptions or in the perceived utility. In general, a financial bubble is a powerful and dangerous 
vehicle of instability and systemic risk. Though there is a wide literature about causes and 
consequences of bubbles, and the mechanisms that lead to their formation and explosion, in this 
context it sufficient to say that possible causes of bubbles are: excessive monetary liquidity in 
the financial system, which incentives inconsiderate leveraging and excessive credit supply by 
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the bank, causing more asset price volatility; social and psychological factors as investors’ herd 
behavior, investors’ irrationality and incapacity to derive the exact assets’ fundamental value, 
moral hazard (which induces agents to undertake an excessive level of risk). 
The last line of investigation on systemic risk is linked to the banking system, and in particular 
to the transmission mechanisms of a shock from a single bank to the whole system. 
Generally speaking, systemic risk is an unavoidable and intrinsic part of the financial sector, 
which is more susceptible to shocks and contagions than other sectors of an economy, mainly 
at banking level. The vulnerability of the banking system unfolds in those cases of run, and it 
is due to the intrinsic nature of the banking activity: savings collection through deposits and 
funds lending, which consists mainly of illiquid and long-term operations. 
With this structure, a sudden and unexpected increase in the withdrawals would force the bank 
to liquidate its assets, incurring in significant losses. As said, the difficulty of a single bank may 
involve the entire banking system by transmitting it through some channels, and from that it 
may reach the entire economy. These propagation channels, which have been widely studied 
throughout years, are the same ones as the priorly mentioned: the direct exposure channel, from 
which the domino effect occurs, and the information channel, from which the bank run. 
In this framework, the reference point is the work by Diamond and Dybvig, who, in a famous 
model, tried to explain how the banks' holding of illiquid assets like loans, and liquid liabilities 
like deposits, may cause a self-fulfilling panic among depositors. In fact, banks hold only a 
fraction of the deposits and lend the remaining part, while a sudden increase in withdrawal 
requests, met on the basis of the first-come-first-served rule, may prompt all bank’s depositors 
to withdrawal as well, because of the increased fear about bank's insolvency. Potentially, the 
liquidity shortage could drag the bank into a deep crisis.  
Gorton confirmed the same intuitions: a banking crisis occurs when, due to informative 
problems, depositors decide to withdraw their funds and use them in alternative and more 
profitable way, fearing a poor performance of the bank's assets. 
Chen made remarks saying that banking panic and contagion occurs when, in a situation of 
first-come-first-served rule, and under information lack and imprecisions about the bank’s 
patrimonial health, depositors get scared and decide to withdrawal.  
Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee went even further and discovered that, when a bank is unable 
to find funds necessary to satisfy the higher withdrawal requests, the probability of bankruptcy 
raises; this triggers panic because of the spreading of beliefs of lack of liquidity, and this boosts 
contagion.  
Allen and Gale deepened the liquidity shock transmission among banks. In particular, they 
explained how the strength of a contagion depends on the structure of intermediaries’ 
relationships in the various regions. Since liquidity shocks are not perfectly correlated across 
regions, an optimal practice for a bank is to hold assets from institutions located in other regions. 
This would provide an insurance against liquidity preference shocks. It is proved that the more 
interwoven the network of connections, and the more complete the structure of interregional 
claims, the more stable and robust the system. Theoretically, this important conclusion, later 
confirmed by the financial network theory, is a way out from a systemic point of view, with the 
purpose of reducing the systemic risk. 
Freixais, Paris and Rochet argued that banks face liquidity needs as depositors do not know the 
place where they will need to consume. This encourages the creation of interbank credit lines 
in order to better cope with liquidity shocks. Unfortunately, this interbank exposition increases 
systemic exposition due to coordination failure, even if all banks are solvent. A bankruptcy due 
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to some kind of shock will affect the entire system in accordance with the pattern of payments 
across areas, and this can also affect healthy banks.  
Peek and Rosengren demonstrated that, while in the past local shocks were more contained 
within the country of origin, today, due to globalization, advanced technology and new 
structures, they quickly spread at an international level. 
Over the last twenty years, the literature about every faceting of systemic risk has grown 
rapidly, involving many different aspects, methodologies and interpretations. 
A line of investigation tried to develop new mathematical and statistical measures of the 
intensity of systemic risk, by inferring it directly from assets prices and their correlations. 
A great contribution in this regard has been given by Adrian and Brunnermeier. At first, they 
elaborated the concept of Conditional Value at Risk (CoVaR), that is the value at risk of 
financial institutions conditional on an entire distressed financial system. Then, they measured 
the institution’s marginal contribution to systemic risk as the difference between CoVaR and 
the financial system’s VaR. Finally, they proposed a measure of the overall systemic risk by 
taking the difference in the VaR of the financial system conditional on a distressed institution 
with respect to median state: the ∆CoVaR. They showed that all the main determinants of 
systemic risk, as foreseen by the theory, (leverage, liquidity, maturity mismatching, dimension 
and price bubbles) are significant in the explanation of ∆CoVaR; this also implied a strong 
predictive power. 
Billio, Lo, Pelizzon and Getmansky edeveloped several econometric measures of 
connectedness, and then useful proxies for systemic risk, based on Granger-causality networks 
theory and principal-components analysis applied to financial institutions’ monthly returns. 
They discovered that all financial sectors have become increasingly connected over the last 
decades, therefore increasing the systemic risk with complicated varying network of 
relationships; moreover, there is an evident asymmetry toward the banking sector, which turns 
out to be a core element in the transmission of shocks.  
Acharya et al. defined useful measures regarding each financial institution’s contribution to 
systemic risk: the systemic expected shortfall (SES) is the tendency of an institution to be 
undercapitalized when the whole system is undercapitalized; SES increases with its Marginal 
Expected Shortfall (MES), that is the expected loss in the tail of systemic loss distribution. 
Recently, Brownlees and Engle presented a measure of systemic risk contribution for a 
company, called SRISK. It measures the firm’s capital shortfall when a heavy market prices 
decline occurs, as a function of company’s size, leverage and long run marginal expected 
shortfall. Moreover, they proved that it is able to capture early warning sign of a crisis. 
Furthermore, many other researchers developed other important systemic risk, by using market 
and balance sheet information (e.g. by Chan Lau and Gravelle, Avesani, Duan and Wei, 
Huang). 
Meanwhile, the importance of the deepening and modeling at best the role of systemic 
correlations among institutions, prices and assets classes arose. 
Lee, Lin and Yang found that the assets correlations increase with company size but reduce 
with its default probability. Additionally, they proved that assets correlations are industry 
specific, asymmetric and with a pro-cyclical impact on real economy, rising during economic 
downturns and declining during economic upturns. In general, many studies reported that 
financial crisis are associated with increase of both cross-correlations among stocks and the 
level of systemic risk. 
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Allen et al. created a model to show how asset commonality and short-term debt of banks 
interact to generate an excessive systemic risk. In fact, when banks exchange assets to reduce 
individual risks, two asset structures may emerge: a clustered asset structure, where groups of 
banks hold common asset portfolios and default together, or an uncluttered asset structure, 
where defaults are more dispersed. In this framework, information contagion can more likely 
be found in the clustered structure, unless the bank debts are more long-term.  
Das and Uppal created a model to determine the investor’s optimal portfolio through a 
multivariate system of jump diffusion processes. They based this model on a set of confirmed 
stylized facts: returns of international equities are characterized by jumps; jumps tend to occur 
simultaneously, and this generates the systemic risk; systemic risk reduces the benefits of 
diversification and hits more leveraged positions. They found that, while losses from reduced 
diversification may be smaller, the loss from highly leveraged positions may be larger. 
Busse et al. once again confirmed, through a probabilistic approach, that the systemic risk does 
reduce the gain from diversification. In particular, they tried to compute the risk loading on the 
portfolio premium due to the presence of systemic risk, by using measures as VaR and Tail 
VaR.  
A very important historical event, which marked the western economies forever, the political 
institutions, hence the academic research on systemic risk as well, was the 2008 financial crisis. 
This event was taken as an object of study by many authors, as a case either for deepening new 
branches and analysis methodologies, and for further applications to investigate in order to 
fulfill shortcomings of the theory. In particular, indirect spillover effects, common exposures 
and informational contagion played an important role in the crisis, because they triggered 
liquidity spirals and the blackout of the financial system. The failure of such a big, relevant, 
interconnected and central investment bank, as Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., is considered 
one of the strongest shocks ever hitting advanced economies in recent times, and that caused 
the materialization of a huge systemic risk. In general, the 2008 financial crisis demonstrated 
that factors for financial distress of large parts of the economy strongly depend on the 
interconnections among financial institutions. Moreover, an increasingly set of new financial 
instruments emerged in order to maximize returns with minimal specific risk for financial 
institutions. Unfortunately, by acting optimally at an individual level, nobody gave attention to 
the possible effects on the stability of the entire system, and a huge systemic risk grew.  
Diamond and Rajan showed how a bank failure becomes contagious, not through the typical 
channel of bank run, but rather through the consequent liquidity shortage. They proposed a set 
of possible government interventions which take into account the fact that liquidity and 
solvency problems are endogenous and not perfectly identifiable. 
As early as 2009, during the Great Recession, academic research focused all its efforts on the 
study and on a better understanding of the ongoing events. 
Hellwig first tried to analyze the intrinsic causes of the global financial system crisis, and how 
the subprime securities crisis in US turned into a worldwide crisis. The securitization, that is 
the procedure with which a bank pools a set of contractual debts (such as mortgages or other 
assets) into one new security (MBSs, or ABSs, of which CDOs) whose cash flows are linked 
to that of underlying debts, and sells it to other investors, played a basic role in the explanation 
of the huge propagation of the shock in the financial system. The author argued that the 
incidence of systemic risk in the system was huge because of an excessive maturity and liquidity 
transformation operated by financial institutions through the shadow banking system (where 
Structured Investment Vehicles, Special Purpose Entities, Hedge Funds and others operated): 
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when the system broke down in 2007, the overhang of ABS caused additional downward 
pressure on securities prices. When operators began to recognize the defaults in US mortgages, 
a mix of interaction between market malfunctioning and insufficiency of equity capital in 
financial institutions caused a detrimental downward spiral in the global financial system. 
Brunnermeier et al. highlighted the importance of bank’s capitalization and the level of liquidity 
in the detrimental spirals triggered by a crisis. Before the crisis, an asset price boom of housing 
occurred; after the burst, banks faced many difficulties to raise funds: the excessive lack of 
confidence of banks in the downward phase is an explanation of pro-cyclical balance sheet 
movements. Authors tried to investigate the reaction of the banking sector to monetary 
impulses, controlling for level of liquidity and capitalization. The main result is that the less 
capitalized and liquid banks face more pro-cyclical effects. 
Acharya and Merrouche investigated in depth the liquidity issue, both before and during the 
crisis. They found that, just after August 2007, when money markets froze, the liquidity demand 
on the interbank markets faced an increase of 30% for precautionary motives. In particular, this 
increase involved banks with higher credit risk in a period of high payment activity, driving up 
interbank rates. 
More recently, Acharya and Thakor analyzed the “dark side of liquidity creation”. The linkage 
between leverage, liquidity creation and systemic risk gives rise to some questions that their 
study tries to address. They consider a model in which both debt financing and equity financing 
discipline the bank managers in order to create an ex-ante liquidity: debts does it by the credible 
threat that, if the made investments will not earn enough return to cover the expense for 
interests, the company might be forced to inefficiently liquidate its assets, and in extremis it 
fails; instead, equity financing disciplines bank managers by providing compensation-based 
incentives to select the most efficient projects. However, since these incentives involve 
payments from ex-post cash flows, equity financing may reduce the ex-ante bank liquidity. 
Consequently, the optimal capital structure of the bank is affected by the trade-off between the 
ex-ante efficiency of leverage relative to incentives for managers given by equity and the ex-
post cost of inefficient liquidations due to high leverage. With uncertainty about aggregate risks, 
bank creditors take their cue from liquidation decisions of other banks, but this behavior may 
lead to contagious liquidations, such as bank runs. Authors proved that, under given conditions, 
banks choose excessive leverage relative to the socially optimal level, and this justifies the 
public intervention through capital requirements. 
Gai et al., by using a network approach, found that systemic breakdowns of the interbank 
market can be explained with a precautionary provision by banks because of more concerns 
about future liquidity needs, and more fears to undergo a liquidity drying. In fact, during the 
crisis, the interbank markets froze up because banks stopped lending at all, and this led to 
devastating effects on the whole financial system and on the real economy. Authors highlighted 
the contribution that stricter liquidity requirements for SIFI (Systemically Important Financial 
Institutions) can reduce contagion through financial markets. 
Kritzman et al. identified the main drivers of the financial system breakdown in the failure of 
prudent regulation of financial markets and in the excessive risk taking by institutions. 
Moreover, securitization, shadow activities and a flexible accounting prevent researchers from 
directly observing the deep interdependencies of financial institutions, and this made it difficult 
to correctly monitor the systemic risk. For that reason, authors introduced the absorption ratio, 
a measure of implied systemic risk which captures the extent to which markets are unified. 
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When markets are strictly linked, they become more fragile, and negative shocks propagate 
more quickly and broadly. 
Another important case of study was the European debt crisis, in which different patterns and 
different evaluations of the role of systemic risk (in this framework linked to the concept of 
sovereign relevance) were implemented. 
A basic contribution was given by Pagano and Sedunov. They showed the existence of a 
positive correlation between the aggregate systemic risk taken by financial institutions and 
sovereign debt yields of particular European countries. For that, they suggested that the 
systemic risk of a country’s financial system (especially in Europe where there are such 
heterogenous systems) should be included in the sovereign debt return. Moreover, they also 
discovered a flight-to-quality effect towards stronger and safer countries, such as Germany, and 
at the same time a spillover effect across weaker financial systems: this instability inside a 
strong and large commercial and monetary integrated area like the EU led to a heavy and 
dangerous systemic risk. 
A more recent and very successful line of investigation, that can be seen as the natural evolution 
of a branch that was taking into consideration matters such as contagion and 
interconnectedness, is represented by the network theory applied in finance. The network theory 
is a mathematical approach which studies the graphs, namely representations of relations among 
points (individuals), and that introduced new analytical elements, such as social structure, edge, 
vertex, links. In this case, this approach allowed the analysis of the structure of the connections 
among financial institutions, providing new models and new methods for the identification and 
the quantification of the systemic risk.  
Nevertheless, early models of financial risk already put emphasis on networks, describing direct 
domino effects caused by defaults on claims between financial institutions: Furfine (2003) 
studied the network structure of the financial system in the US, Upper and Worms (2004) in 
Germany, Agnes Lubl´oy (2006) in Hungary, van Lelyveld and Liedorp (2006) in the 
Netherlands, Elsinger et al. (2006a) in Austria, Wells (2004) in the UK, Mistrulli (2007) in 
Italy. 
For instance, Elsinger et al. tested a new approach to assess systemic risk by using a network 
model of interbank loans, and found that the correlation among banks’ asset portfolios is the 
main channel of contagion. Even if the systemic contagion is an outstanding event, it can 
heavily strike the financial system, and authors proved that, to prevent contagion, it suffices a 
small amount of fund by a lender of last resort. 
Alentor et al. performed a complete analysis with a network model purpose-built to evaluate 
the financial stability and to understand how the structure of financial system affect the systemic 
risk. They modeled a banking system, where a set of banks (the nodes) are connected by 
interbank linkages (the edges) and then proceeded to evaluate the likelihood of contagious 
defaults by making some key parameters defining the structure vary (such as capitalization 
level, interconnectedness degree, exposures size, systemic concentration). They came to some 
important conclusions: better capitalized banks are more able to face contagious defaults, in a 
non-linear fashion; connectivity degree is non-monotonic, that is at lower levels of connectivity, 
an increase in it makes the contagion effect stronger, but at higher levels of connectivity, a 
further increase in connectivity makes bank more capable to face shocks; the size of the 
interbank liabilities raises the probability of contagious defaults; the higher the systemic 
concentration of the banking systems the larger the systemic risk. 
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Cont and Moussa highlighted the need to use the network structures theory in order to reduce 
the bias of estimates on contagion and systemic risk. Moreover, they proved further basic 
results: contagion is sensitive to changes in the network structure and to the level of 
connectivity; more heterogeneous networks are more resilient to contagion; a double 
conflicting effect when increasing the connectivity of a network exists: on the one hand there 
is a reinforcement of potential channels for the propagation a financial distress, on the other  
hand there is a stabilizing element due to higher risk sharing; the prevailing effect depends on 
the level of capitalization of the whole network: in undercapitalized networks, a higher 
connectivity makes the network more sensible to instable contagions. 
Battiston et al. modeled a network of credit relations among financial agents through a system 
of stochastic processes describing the dynamics of individual financial robustness (that is the 
ability to cope with changes due to some shocks). The density of a network is a proxy of the 
level of diversification within the system, and it is used as an explicative variable for the 
probability of individual default and for the probability of systemic default. Authors proved that 
the risk diversification may create some instability as the number of subjects in the network 
arises. This is due to the fact that more financially fragile actors inside the network do amplify 
an initial shock and this worsens the intensity of a systemic crisis. 
Amini et al. proposed a new framework to test the resilience of a financial network to shocks. 
They used an analytical criterion for resilience to contagion based on the analysis of default 
cascades in heterogeneous networks. It is observed that the size of a default cascade generated 
by a shock may be wide when the depth of the shock achieves a given threshold. 
Battiston et al. defined the systemic risk as the probability of default of a large portion of the 
financial system, and it is a function of the network structure. Under this perspective, they 
identified financial institutions as nodes and edges as lending relations among them, weighted 
by outstanding debt; then created a new measure, the Debt Rank, which is the fraction of the 
total economic value potentially affected by the distress of each single node. This method 
allows to identify the systemically important nodes inside the network, and can be used to 
categorize the so-called SIFIs from not SIFI. Authors were so able to identify the key American 
financial institutions during the 2008 financial crisis. Their result remarked the importance to 
integrate the issue of “too-connected-to-fail” and “too-central-too-fail” to the classical “too-
big-to-fail” by policy makers and academics. 
Poledna and Thurner re-used the Debt Rank measure to assess the systemic risks in the financial 
networks by each bank. They argued that the systemic risk in financial networks may be heavily 
reduced by increasing transparency, i.e. by making public the estimates of Debt Rank of each 
individual bank to all other banks, and then by forcing the reduction of the interbank borrowing 
from risky SIFIs. This ideal framework would favor a more homogeneous risk sharing within 
the system, because of a massive reduction of cascading failures. 
Cellai et al. constructed a financial network model that combines the default-related and the 
liquidity-related contagion mechanisms, such that it was possible to quantify the impact of the 
illiquidity and the default of an institution on the overall systemic level of liquidity and others’ 
defaults. The basic element of this model is the concept of “cascade”: when an institution 
becomes insolvent, this shock on the asset side of creditors may propagate and cause further 
insolvencies to others, generating a “cascade”, i.e. an “accumulation” of defaults of banks in 
the system. The same goes for the liability side: an eventual illiquidity and difficulty to get 
funding for an institution may turn out as a shock for its debtors, and accumulate itself in an 
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“illiquidity cascade”. The conclusion is that, without fire sales, the mean level of defaults in the 
financial network is negatively linked to the capacity of the bank to be liquid. 
Hautsch et al. created the realized systemic risk beta to measure the financial companies 
systemic risk contribution, conditional on network spillover effects and market information. 
This beta is calculated as the total time-varying marginal effect of a firm’s VaR on the total 
systemic VaR. 
Acemoglu et al. investigated the resilience of financial networks to financial contagion under 
different conditions. They found that a more densely connected financial network, which 
undergoes a negative shock, seems to be more financially stable, but only up to a certain point, 
beyond which density may make the propagation more fluid. Then, they pointed out that the 
same determinants that contribute to resilience under certain assumptions, do contribute as well 
to higher systemic risk under other assumptions. 
An advanced approach has been provided by Billio, Caporin, Panzica and Pelizzon in their 2015 
work “Network connectivity and systematic risk”. They defined the “systematic risk” as the 
risk that an investor’s well diversified portfolio is exposed to, due to the dependence of returns 
to common variables. At the same time, the systemic risk is strictly linked to the concept of 
contagion risk and spillover effect, and to the linkages between institutions. They highlighted 
the need to separate channels through which risk can propagate: exposures to common factors 
in case of systematic risk, contagion and spillover in case of systemic risk. For that purpose, 
the most feasible model to capture systemic risk exposures and to describe features of a network 
of connections is just a network model. Their goal was to analyze the strict relation between 
systematic risk and systemic risk, and in particular to estimate the feedbacks among network 
exposures and common factors, by using network-based methods to get information on linkages 
among institutions. Their model is a variant of the CAPM/APT model in which networks are 
used to infer exogenous links among assets. With this framework, authors were able to identify 
four components of the asset risk: the structural idiosyncratic risk, the structural systematic risk, 
the endogenous risk strictly derived from asset interconnections and network exposures which 
is reflected in the systematic risk, and the endogenous risk derived from effects of 
interconnections on the idiosyncratic risk. By using this risk structure, it is possible to identify 
three sources of the risk premium: the common factors exposure, the impact of asset 
interconnections to common factors and the amplification effect of idiosyncratic risk. Authors 
tried to estimate the impact of the network exposures and common factors on risk exposures 
and risk premia of stock. The main results are basically four: the systematic component is the 
prevailing driver of the total risk of a diversified portfolio; the idiosyncratic risk has a low 
impact on the total portfolio risk, while the impact of network exposures on the idiosyncratic 
risk is irrelevant; the risk absorption due to negative correlations among assets has a relevant 
role; a systematic risk component due to network exposures is present but varying over time. 
Roukny, Battiston and Stiglitz showed how the networks structure could make it more difficult 
to assess the real level of systemic risk in the credit markets. They introduced a model to 
compute specific and systemic probability of default in a banking network based on credit 
relations and affected by external shocks. After identifying network conditions that lead to 
multiple equilibria, it is proved how these equilibria increase uncertainty in the estimation of 
the default probability and of the expected losses. 
One final note for the role of systemic risk in policy making. The issue of the financial systemic 
risk has been crucial for policy makers since the 1970s, when the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision was established by advanced economies. Since then, many international 
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institutions, common regulations and policies have been studied and adopted in order to try to 
govern and address the systemic risk and to maintain the financial stability, at least in the first 
world. In general, it is possible to classify preventive policies, that try ex ante to minimize the 
systemic risk, and resolution policies, that try ex post to minimize the negative impacts 
following the materialization of a systemic risk. We can identify macro-prudential policies, 
monetary policies and network infrastructure policies. 
Macro-prudential policies consist of ex-ante targeting measures on the banks’ balance sheets, 
and aim to enhance the resilience of financial institutions to external shocks. They provide a set 
of anti-cyclical capital requirements, leveraging requirements, margin requirements and 
liquidity requirements that have the objective to disincentive excessive risks taking, whatever 
the types of assets classes involved. In particular, the countercyclical capital buffer policy plays 
a crucial role: it requires banks to hold more capital when credit is increasing quickly, and it 
allows them to use it when losses arise in times of recession and credit crunch. These policies 
are very important in order to continue supplying credit to the real economy. In Europe, the 
ultimate responsible for macro-prudential policies monitoring is the European Systemic Risk 
Board, as a part of the European System of Financial Supervision, but there are many other 
institutions, such as the Basel Committee, the Financial Stability Board and national authorities. 
Monetary policies have the basic task to maintain the price stability, but can contribute for 
financial stability through a powerful set of tools, which heavily affect the decisions of 
economic agents and investors. In particular, the definition of reference interest rates, of 
liquidity, of mandatory reserve requirements and the implementation of given purchase 
programs have a strong impact on the systemic risk, both perceived one and actual one within 
the system. In the Eurozone, the European Central Bank, along with the governors of central 
bank of member states, are the ultimate responsible of the monetary policy. 
Network infrastructure policies are a set of rules that all operators within the financial market 
must comply with in order to ensure the correct functioning of markets and infrastructures. 
They provide a wide set of regulations of safe conduct of business and competition policy, such 
as transparency and information requirements for financial intermediaries towards authorities 
and consumers, product quality requirements, reporting and disclosure, client protection, 
bankruptcy procedures, other procedures on clearing, settlement and recording of payments and 
financial transactions. The purpose of these policies is to pursue the systemic stability and the 
soundness of all operators in the financial markets, so that all transaction-related risks can be 
mitigated. At an international level, the general regulatory principles have been published by 
the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems in the “IOSCO Principles for Financial 
Market Infrastructures”. In Europe, there are many regulations and directives on markets 
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The complexity of the financial system consists of deep interconnections among a huge number 
of economic agents with different characteristics and interests, legal contracts with many types 
of provisions and enforcement, economic practices, financial operations and decisions, and in 
general of the market environment built up by authorities and management companies: the 
combination of all these inputs and their simultaneous interactions determine the outputs and 
the outcomes of the financial markets. The necessity to monitor and to evaluate the progress by 
all financial actors, from public authorities, fund’s managers and intermediaries to individual 
investors or households, requires the creation of a very large variety of models and measures, 
in order to make informed and optimal decisions about investments and activities. In particular, 
the monitoring and the correct measurement of systemic risk have always played a central role 
for the institutions, and its modeling, as seen, was affected by the discoveries in the literature, 
based on different evolving assumptions. 
As some studies confirm (Danielsson, Shin and Zigrand, 2010), market participants’ actions 
mostly depend on perceived risk: when they believe that financial trouble is coming, they react 
by taking hedging actions that are reflected by an effective increase of realized volatility. 
Hence, the conclusion is that investors’ preferences and expectations are not independent but 
they affect each other, making a systemic distress come true in a self-fulfilling way. This 
generates an endogenous systemic risk because it arises within the market, and it is opposed to 
exogenous risk, which takes into account a shock that is external to the financial system, and 
prompts investors to react in order to protect themselves. For instance, we can consider the case 
of an endogenous increase of the systemic risk within the financial system, such as a speculative 
bubble. In this case, we can presume the existence of schematic dynamics which periodically 
occur in the system, and that can be modeled and measured, allowing the construction of 
predictive models for systemic risk. It is shown that, as a price bubble builds up, the investors’ 
perceived risk declines and the actual intrinsic risk accordingly increases, while, after the burst, 
the contrary occurs: a quick drop in the intrinsic risk and an unjustified huge rise in the 
perceived risk, which amplifies the disruptive force of the shock. Therefore, there is a double 
result: perceived risk and actual risk have a negative correlation, and the irrational behavior is 
a characteristic of the financial market.  
On the contrary, if we observe an unpredictable exogenous shock hitting the financial market, 
then the previous systemic risk response model would be inadequate, and different settings and 
measures should be considered. In fact, given that these shocks are infrequent, unpredictable 
and unknown, and given that there is no common pattern to be studied and analyzed, it is much 
more difficult to create an empirical and statistical basis on which to build a model for 
measurement of financial risks and for forecasting probable financial crisis. 
Moreover, further elements complicate the evaluation: when a financial crisis occurs, it hits 
economies in different ways, with different triggering factors, different channels of propagation 
and toward different parts of the economy. The huge heterogeneity adds degrees of complexity 
in the implementation of good predictive and systemic risk control system. According to some 
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more pessimist authors, there is not even a possibility to reliably and consistently identify 
actions, dynamics within the financial systems and common schemes that are always valid, 
because of the heterogeneity across systems and over time, and the uniqueness of such events. 
In any case, it is vital for institutions and authorities to perform unbiased evaluations through 
the use of trustworthy tools and measures: the former in order to make optimal decisions for 
own business and own clients, the latter in order to pursue public mandates, such as financial 
stability and consumer protection, but also to limit government bailouts and to implement 




2.1  Classifications of Systemic Risk 
In the literature, the efforts focused on systemic risk assessment developed along two 
dimensions: the time dimension of the systemic risk, that is the pro-cyclicality strictly linked to 
the “aggregation” of risk over time due to systemic factors, and the cross-sectional dimension, 
which analyses how the systemic risk is deployed within the financial system at a given 
moment. This last dimension is strictly related to the network and linkages across institutions, 
and an unbiased evaluation of the systemic risk must include both dimensions. The final 
purpose is to create assessment instruments which are consistently able to capture signals about 
systemic trends that could make financial markets vulnerable to unpredictable shocks. 
About the systemic risk assessment, there are mainly three aspects that an analyst should take 
into account:  
• the first one is based on the study of the risk arising from the asset side of institutions’ 
balance sheets, such as the default risk, country risk and market risk;  
• the second one is based on the study of the risk arising from the liability side, such as 
business risk and funding risk;  
• the last one is based on those risks deriving from interactions between the two sides, 
such as liquidity risk, maturity or currency mismatch. 
For each aspect there are three possible approaches to consider:  
• the first approach focuses on balance sheets’ linkages, trying to discover and to measure 
the size of shocks, the intensity and the direction of propagation; 
• the second approach makes use of market data and tries to exploit the information 
conveyed by returns and assets prices, such as volatility, correlations, credit spreads, 
liquidity spreads, risk premia and so on, to estimate systemic risk and shocks 
correlations; 
• the last approach is based on the analysis of a set of indicators that allows simulations 
in order to evaluate the probabilities that an initial unstable situation combined with 
possible incoming shocks, may result in a heavy systemic crisis. 
Moreover, systemic risk may emerge in the cyclical dimension or in the structural dimensions: 
• the cyclical dimension of the systemic risk is strictly related to the temporary risk 
perceived by institutions at any given moment of the economic cycle, and in particular 
emerges with too much risk appetite during economic growth periods, and too much 
risk aversion during recessions; when this risk materializes, the system will suffer 




• the structural dimension of the systemic risk emerges in case of structural problems in 
the financial infrastructures, in the relationships among institutions, due to lack of 
appropriate regulations, excessive public monetary interventions, financial innovations 
or other country issues; it occurs with more intensity in presence of too-big-to-fail and 
too-interconnected-to-fail companies, and may heavily undermine the financial 
stability. 
It can be useful to keep in mind some distinctions about the relevant economic risks. In general, 
the risk strictly linked to the systemic conditions of the markets, that is to market prices of 
traded securities, is the so-called "market risk", and it is function of systemic factors. It is the 
risk that investors bear because of volatility in the market value of financial assets, and then in 
held portfolios value, and it is due to factors affecting the entire market. Sometimes, market 
risk is referred to the systematic risk, because it cannot be eliminated by diversification, but 
only partially hedged. In accordance with the type of price, there are four different categories 
of this risk:  
• equity price risk: it refers to all those positions affected by changes in the stock prices; 
as equity, it is quite most to any change in the economy, and it is one of the relevant 
parts of the market risk; 
• interest rate risk: it refers to all those positions whose market price is affected by the 
evolution of the long-term interest rates prevailing in the market; it involves assets as 
bonds, forward, futures and swaps, and comprises sub-categories of risk, as yield curve 
risk, basis risk and repricing risk; 
• exchange rate risk: it refers to all those positions whose price is affected by fluctuations 
in the exchange rates between the domestic currency and the foreign currency; it hits 
mainly all those institutions which operate in the international markets; 
• commodity price risk:  it hits all those assets whose price is affected by the fluctuations 
in the prices of commodities traded in the markets, like oil, gold, silver, and it involves 
assets as derivatives and repurchase agreements.  
A last relevant component of market risk is the volatility risk: it is the risk of variations in the 
prices of assets as a consequence of changes in the volatility of other risk components. For 
example, the equity risk is related to the change in the stock price, but these changes do not 
follow a constant standard deviation, since it is possible to face periods with higher market 
volatility of the same stocks. The volatility risk is particularly relevant in portfolios of 
derivatives, where the volatility of the underlying price is a relevant determinant of the 
derivative price. The measure of the sensitivity of asset prices to changes in the volatility of 
underlying asset price is called Vega. 
In the risk assessment and management for the derivatives, there are many other types of useful 
risk measures: Delta measures the sensitivity of the market portfolio value to the change in the 
underlying asset price; Gamma measures the non-linearity between the market derivative price 
and the corresponding underlying asset price; Rho (or discount rate) measures the sensitivity of 
the market portfolio value to the change in the discount rate used to discount the cash flows; 
Theta is the sensitivity of the market portfolio value to the incoming of maturity, therefore to 
the passage of time.  
For a general classification of all measures of systemic risk, the most recent complete work is 
by Bisias, Flood, Lo, Valavanis, who, in 2012, published “A Survey of Systemic Risk 
Analytics”. They provided a review of thirty-one quantitative measures of systemic risk from 
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the literature, focusing on those issues particularly relevant for risk measurement and 
management. It is quite interesting to see the performed classification proposed by them and 
the relative groupings of all measures, that allows to rapidly and efficiently identify measures 
that optimally satisfy the finality and the scope that the reader pursues.  
They performed a classification of the main systemic risk measures by basing it on four criteria 
that reflect four perspectives in the usage of indexes: the supervisory perspective, the research 
perspective, the required datatypes and the reference time horizon.  
We are going to describe briefly each perspective, focusing mainly on those issues of particular 
interest for this thesis. 
 
2.1.1 Systemic Risk Measures by Supervisory Scope 
The classification on the supervisory perspective has been thought for supervision and 
monitoring of systemic risk from government authorities in dealing with public issues. In 
particular, the taxonomy proposed by authors is useful for each public authority that operates 
in a given field or given financial sector, and wants to identify those measures that best suit 
their scope. A given systemic risk measurement system may be more or less appropriate for 
each public supervisor depending on its mandate; and since a financial crisis is always 
characterized by shocks and triggering events affecting specific institutions and specific sectors, 
the existence of customized measurement schemes can help identify the weakness and intervene 
accordingly.  
In this classification, the main distinction is between micro-prudential measures and macro-
prudential measures: this distinction recalls an important international regulatory standard, 
which provides for the partition of levels of supervision. On the one hand, the macro-prudential 
regulation and supervision occurs at a system-level, and aims to mitigate risk for the financial 
system as a whole. Macro-prudential regulators and supervisors need reliable indicators of 
systemic risk to pursue their mandate, and intervene with appropriate macro-prudential tools, 
such as capital requirements, necessary to prevent financial pro-cyclicality. On the other hand, 
the micro-prudential regulation and supervision focuses on specific companies’ activities, and 
operates at a firm-level. The aim is to ensure the robustness of institutions’ balance sheets to 
shocks, and in particular to ensure their solvency, the correct conduit of business and consumer 
protection. While doing that, the micro-prudential authority significantly contributes in keeping 
the systemic risk under control. For that reason, this perspective provides the two mentioned 
categories of measures, macro-prudential and micro-prudential ones. Within this latter, there 
are further sub-categories, pertaining to the reference financial sector to which measures relate: 
securities and commodities, banking and housing, insurance and pensions, in addition to 
“general application” measures.  
About this perspective, Bisias et al. analyses an important aspect relative to the reaction of 
human behavior to economic policies, recalling the famous Lucas critique, according to which 
econometric models’ predictions lose their effectiveness when a new policy is implemented, 
due to the reactions and the self-fulfilling expectations of economic agents. Anyway, the 
monitoring of the level and of the dynamics of the systemic risk is a necessary operation for the 
objectives of authorities.  
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The following figure shows in detail all sub-categories with the list of measures. Further 
explanation about each measure will be provided in the following sections. 
 
2.1.2 Systemic Risk Measures by Research Method 
The classification based on research perspective is focused on theoretical models and 
econometric methods, from which systemic risk measures are developed. The research 
taxonomy as proposed by Bisias et al. has been thought to be user-friendly for researchers, 
allowing them to quickly point out common algorithms and data structures within each 
category. Authors identified in a synthetic and very useful way the origin of systemic risk in 
the already mentioned four “L”: when economic agents overuse leverage to increase returns, 
the volatility of outcome is amplified, because a small loss may easily turn into a heavy liquidity 
shortage, due to a negative loop of fire sale of illiquid positions throughout the linkages 
network. From this scheme of the financial crisis, they classified systemic risk measures into 
Figure 2.1: Classification of systemic risk measures based on the supervisory perspective 
Source: “A Survey of Systemic Risk Analytics” by Bisias, Flood, Lo and Valavanis, 2012 
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five groups: loss probabilities distribution measures, default likelihood measures, illiquidity 
measures, network effects measures, and macroeconomic conditions measures. 
The following figure shows the complete list of measures in accordance to this criterion. Each 
sub-category and the most relevant measures will be described in the next sections. 
 
Probability distribution measures 
The loss probability distribution measures, also called “tail measures”, calculate the systemic 
risk by analyzing the co-dependence among distributions of appropriate variables of interest: 
they are based on the joint distribution of outcomes of a set of financial institutions, and are 
able to provide information from estimates of correlated losses. In particular, these measures 
are cross sectional, since they examine the dependence of a group of financial institutions at a 
given moment of time in a transversal way, and make typically use of equity returns. Anyway, 
measuring the dependency between two distributions requires the overcoming of some hurdles, 
Figure 2.2: Classification of systemic risk measures based on the research perspective 
Source: “A Survey of Systemic Risk Analytics” by Bisias, Flood, Lo and Valavanis, 2012 
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such as the inaccuracy of assumptions on the distribution of returns, the lack of a sufficiently 
large set of historical data, the necessity to deal with extreme values. 
A brief description of some measures, that is CoVaR, Co-Risk, MSE, SES and the Mahalanobis 
distance will follow. 
As we know, the Value at Risk (VaR) is a risk measure of loss for investments, trying to 
estimate with a given probability how much a portfolio may lose over a certain time period. It 
is a measure that quantifies the risk of a portfolio, useful both for regulatory purposes and for 
internal management, in order to limit excessive exposures to losses. Since VaR enables 
comparisons across portfolios and assets classes, it has become a reference measure, that is a 
benchmark for risk managers in the asset allocation processes and for researchers in the creation 
of more structured and complicated risk models. In terms of the measured loss, reference is 
made either to the total value of a position or to the risk per euro invested (return), and the basic 
question VaR answers to is: what is the highest hypothetical loss such that there is a low 
probability (5%) that the effective loss is greater than this amount over a given time horizon? 
Statistically, VaR measures how much a financial institution can lose on a financial asset in 
terms of market value or return rate, with a given probability and over a given time horizon. It 
is therefore defined as the q-quantile of the asset return distribution which satisfies: 
𝑃𝑟൫𝑋𝑖 ≤ 𝑉𝑎𝑅𝛼
𝑖 ൯ = 𝛼 
where X is the return of the institution i, and 𝛼 is the significance level, the prefixed probability 
which usually takes value 0,05. In other terms, the VaR is the quantile of the returns density 





where 𝛼 is the probability that losses will be larger that VaR. 
So, at this point, the first listed measure, that is the Conditional Value at Risk (CoVaR), will be 
more intelligible. While the VaR is referred to the risk of a single institution, the CoVaR 
measures the systemic risk as the VaR applied to the whole financial system conditional on the 
situation of strong common distress of all other institutions. In fact, the risk associated to one 
bank does not necessarily reflect the systemic risk, that is the risk of financial instability in the 
entire system. At the same time, a systemic risk measure should identify the risk brought by 
each institution to the whole system, because of its deep interconnection and consequent 
externalities. Moreover, risk measures are effective if they focus on forms of imbalances, 
bubbles or liquidity constraints, that is the real drivers of systemic risk.  
Given these conditions, 𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅𝛼
𝑗|𝑖
 is the VaR of the institution j (or of the whole financial 
system), conditional on an event G (𝑋𝑖), function of the return X of the institution i. If we 
assume that the event is that the return of institution i achieves its VaR, then  
𝐺൫𝑋𝑖൯ = {𝑋𝑖 = 𝑉𝑎𝑅𝛼
𝑖 }, and CoVaR is explicitly defined as the q-quantile of the joint 




𝑖 ቁ = 𝛼 
Therefore, the CoVaR corresponds to the VaR of the institution j when the return of the 
institution i achieves its VaR, and it allows to study the consequences within a network of 
financial institutions. In fact, when we consider the whole system, the 𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅𝛼
𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚|𝑖
 points 
out which institutions contribute more to the systemic risk.  
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From that, it is possible to get the difference between the VaR of the institution j when the 
return of the institution i is at its VaR (then, conditional on the distress of i) and the VaR of the 
same institution j when the return of the institution i is at its median state.   
Hence, 𝛥𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅𝛼
𝑗|𝑖










Focusing on the systemic dimension, 𝛥𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅𝛼
𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚|𝑖
 is the difference between the VaR of the 
financial system conditional on the situation of distress of institution i, and the VaR of the 
financial system when the performance of the institution i is at its median value of the 
distribution. This measure quantifies spillover effects by measuring how much an institution 
adds to the overall risk of the financial system. 
It can be equally useful to derive 𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅𝛼
𝑗|𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚
: this is the VaR of the institution j when the 
whole system is at its VaR, that is when the return of the market portfolio of all institutions’ 
assets is at its VaR, and the entire financial system is suffering. It helps to identify those 
institutions that are most at risk in case of a financial crisis. Hence, 𝛥𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅𝛼
𝑗|𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚
reflects the 
increase in the VaR of the institution j given a financial crisis, and measures the extent to which 
a single bank is affected by a systemic risk.  
These measures based on the VaR have some shortcomings:  
• they do not provide any information about the size of losses; 
• they are not coherent measures, since they do not fulfill the sub-additivity principle. 
Without going into the mathematical details, Artzner published in 1999 a famous paper in which 
a set of four desirable properties for measures of risk was defined, calling “coherent” all 
measures which comply with them. These properties are:  
• the positive homogeneity: if a position is multiplied by a scalar, the risk measure will 
also be a multiple of that scalar, and it implies that the risk of a position is proportional 
to its size; 
• the monotonicity: if a portfolio has a better value than another portfolio under any 
possible scenario, then the risk of first one must be smaller than the risk of the second 
one; it implies that, if the losses of a portfolio are smaller than the portfolio Y, the risk 
measure of X should be smaller than that of Y;  
• the translational invariance: it implies that addition of a sure amount of capital in a 
portfolio should reduce the risk by the same amount; 
• the sub-additivity: the risk measure of a portfolio should never be higher than the sum 
of the risk measure values of each single position of the portfolio; this means that the 
risk of a portfolio can be lower or at most equal to the sum of the risks of the individual 
positions, and it ensures portfolio diversification principle. 
It has been shown that VaR is not a coherent risk measure as it does not respect the sub-
additivity property: at sufficiently low probability levels, VaR of a portfolio may be lower than 
the sum of the VaR of the single positions, and some works highlighted that this happens 
because the return distribution exhibits fat tails.  
Problems described above are overcome by implementing a risk measure called Expected 
Shortfall (ES), which fulfill all the properties. This is the expected value of losses undergone 
by an institution given the situation of distress (losses beyond the VaR, fixed a level of 
confidence). Therefore, the Expected Shortfall at 𝛼-level is the expected portfolio return in the 
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worst 𝛼% of cases, and it is an excellent alternative to VaR, because more sensitive to the shape 
of the tail of the return distribution. 
Then, ES is the average of returns R of a firm or of a portfolio, when its loss exceeds its VaR:  
𝐸𝑆𝛼 = −𝔼[𝑅|𝑅 ≤ 𝑉𝑎𝑅𝛼] 
ES is either sub-additive and homogeneous measure, and then complies with all properties. This 
makes this risk measure appropriate and very useful, to be used as a criterion for the 
composition of optimal portfolios. It is possible to note that, while the VaR provides the 
expected capital needed for a financial institution to limit the probability of failure, the 
difference between ES and VaR represents the expected value of the cost to face to save the 
bank from bankruptcy, in the case in which its capital is not enough. ES represents also the 
premium that an insurer would ask an institution if he wants to insure against the risk of losses 
higher than the VaR. 
The two tail measures strictly linked to ES are the Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES) and the 
Systemic Expected Shortfall (SES). 
For the derivation of the MES, there is a useful theoretical exemplification. A big financial 
company with a large organizational structure, composed by many territorial units and many 
target markets, could need to know the contribution of each individual operating unit to the 
total firm’s profitability. The similarity is with a financial portfolio: the institution is a big 
portfolio, with assets and liabilities, that is with many positions on different financial products 
traded by units. It is possible to get the total return of the institution, R, as the sum of the returns, 




In this case, the ES of a financial portfolio, with significance level α will be:  
𝐸𝑆𝛼 = −෍𝑦𝑖
𝑖
𝔼[𝑟𝑖|𝑅 ≤ 𝑉𝑎𝑅𝛼] 
Finally, we can take the first derivative of ES with respect the weight y of each institution, and 
this allows us to compute the impact of an increase in the weight of a given asset return on the 
expected total return in case of distress:  
𝛿𝐸𝑆𝛼
𝛿𝑦𝑖
= −𝔼[𝑟𝑖|𝑅 ≤ 𝑉𝑎𝑅𝛼] ≡ 𝑀𝐸𝑆𝛼
𝑖  
This is the generic definition of the Marginal Expected Shortfall for the unit I, given 𝛼.  
So, MES measures the assets’ expected loss when the portfolio returns fall below a certain 
threshold, the VaR, over a given time horizon; likewise, MES measures the expected return of 
a firm’s unit when the whole company has a return below the VaR. Finally, MES can be adopted 
to a systemic context: in this case, it measures a firm’s expected equity loss when market return 
falls below its VaR over a given time horizon. It can be defined as the average return of a firm 
during the worst days for the market, and represents the company's contribution to a systemic 
crisis. Then, the expected marginal loss conditional on a distress case is a proxy of the 
contribution of a bank to the overall systemic risk. Bisias et al. calculates MES as the mean of 
the returns of a firm’s equity during the 5% worst cases for the overall market return, proxied 
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A little more complicated fashion is required to implement the Systemic Expected Shortfall 
(SE) measure. SES provides another way to measure the contribution of single institution to the 
systemic risk, by calculating the propension of a firm to be undercapitalized when the whole 
system is undercapitalized. Let 𝑒0
𝑖  be the equity of the firm i at time zero, 𝑒1
𝑖  the equity at time 
one; 𝑘𝑖 a fraction of the total asset 𝑎𝑖; 𝐸1 = σ 𝑒1
𝑖𝑁
𝑖  the total market capitalization at time zero, 
in a market with N institutions; 𝐴 = σ 𝑎𝑖𝑁𝑖  the value of the total assets in the market. Hence, it 
is possible to define the SES of firm i as the expected amount of equity capital falling below a 
given target threshold, that is the fraction of total assets of institution i, all conditional on the 
systemic crisis, that is the situation of systemic undercapitalization, when the total market 
capitalization is less than a fraction of total market assets: 
𝑆𝐸𝑆𝑖 = 𝔼[𝑒1
𝑖 − 𝑘𝑖𝑎𝑖|𝐸𝑖 ≤ 𝑘𝐴] 








𝑖  be the leverage of firm i;  𝑅 =
𝐸1
𝐸0
 be the total return of the market; 𝐿 =
𝐴
𝐸0
 be the aggregate leverage of the whole system. It is 
possible to calculate the percentage return measure of SES: 
𝑆𝐸𝑆𝑖ሺ%ሻ = 𝔼[𝑟𝑖 − 𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑖|𝑅 ≤ 𝑘𝑙] 
It has been shown that SES increases with the degree of leverage l of a financial institution and 
with its expected loss, calculated in the tail of the losses distribution of the system. 
Since SES is a theoretical construct, it requires some proxies (on equity, expected falls for a 
firm and for the system and so on) and leading indicators (as MES, leverage) in order to be 
implemented and estimated. 
An interesting systemic risk measurement, based on stochastic processes, networks and 
conditional probability of default, is the CoRisk (Giudici and Parisi), which measures the 
change in the institutions’ probability of default due to spillovers and contagion effect. To 
derive this measure, three steps have been implemented:  
• first of all, the countries’ economy is divided in three macro-economic sectors, 
sovereign sector, productive sector and financial sector; 
• secondly, for each sector, a spread measure is linearly modelled as function of an 
country-related idiosyncratic component and a common systematic component, in order 
to control for different sources of risk;  
• thirdly, these spreads are used to derive correlation networks, identifying the most 
relevant contagion channels, and to calculate the probabilities of default for each 
economic sector in each country; 
• finally, the default probabilities are combined with the correlation network in order to 
get the CoRisk. 
In particular, the CoRisk-in measures the change in the default probability of an economic agent 
due to the contagion from an external shock, while the CoRisk-out measures the impact of this 
change towards other external firms and sectors.  




Without going into the analytical details in depth, here the two main formulas for this measure 
will be provided. 
We define 𝑃𝐷𝑡
𝑚
 as the probability of default for the institution m at time t, and 𝑇𝑃𝐷𝑡+1
𝑚
 the total 
probability of default at time t+1 for the same institution, which embeds both sector-specific 
and contagion risk components. The 𝐶𝑜𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑛 can be considered as the percentage variation of 
the survival probability (1-𝑃𝐷𝑡










It is then shown that if 𝐶𝑜𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑛,𝑡
𝑚
>0 (or <0), the total default probability of institution m 
increases (declines) after a contagion effect. In those cases in which the institution is damaged 
in terms of default probability by positive linkages within network, then the contagion is said 
to be negative (since TPD>PD, then CoRisk-in>0); on the other hand, there is a positive 
contagion when an institution obtains advantages from negative linkages with other neighbors 
(since TPD<PD, then CoRisk-in<0). 
By deriving the partial correlation coefficients between interest spreads of two institutions, m 
and n, and by controlling for the systematic component S, we get 𝜌𝑚𝑛|𝑆, and with that we can 
calculate 𝐶𝑜𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑜𝑢𝑡: 
𝐶𝑜𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑜𝑢𝑡,𝑡
𝑚 = 1 − ሺ1 − 𝑃𝐷𝑡
𝑚ሻσ 𝜌𝑚𝑛|𝑆𝑛≠𝑚  
As said, 𝐶𝑜𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑜𝑢𝑡 measures the impact exerted by the institution m on its near partners it is 
linked to. It is interesting to note that the incoming contagion is different from the outcoming 
contagion, and it is due to the different impacts of the shocks on the single institutions’ default 
probabilities. Under this perspective, CoRisk-in is a good proxy of the vulnerability of a firm, 
while the CoRisk-out is a proxy of its systematic financial importance. 
By applying this model to the Eurozone countries during last decade, it was discovered that the 
sovereign sector distress increased the systemic component more than the financial sector, and 
the propagation didn’t favor the risk sharing, but made weaker the weakest institutions and 
stronger the strongest institutions. This synthetic risk measure appeared to be quite flexible, 
because it allows to evaluate the relevance on the systemic risk of each country, of each main 
economic sector, for type of risk, both in the cross-sectional and temporal dimension. 
Ultimately, the Mahalanobis distance is deepened. Mathematically, it is the measure of the 
distance between a point A and a distribution D, in terms of standard deviations away A from 
the mean of D: if this distance is zero, then point A is at the mean of D, otherwise it is moved 
away from the mean. Kritzmann and Li re-used this mathematical measure in finance, in order 
to calculate the financial turbulence. 
A financial turbulence indicator measures the intensity of violent or unsteady movements in the 
global financial market across time, and provides some important implications for the financial 
asset allocation. Not to be confused with the concept of systemic risk measure: this is linked to 
the fragility or robustness of the financial system, and measures its susceptibility to shocks, 
before the materialization of a turbulence. The turbulence occurs when asset returns and prices 
behave in an uncharacteristic way given their historical pattern, showing extreme movements, 
decoupling of correlations and increased volatility.  
In particular, Chow et al. showed in their important works how to use the squared Mahalanobis 
distance to compute the financial turbulence, and created a model to base on it the construction 
of appropriate portfolios. The market turbulence index proposed by them is the following: 
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𝑑𝑡 = ሺ𝑦𝑡 − 𝝁ሻσ
−1ሺ𝑦𝑡 − 𝝁ሻ′ 
where 𝑑𝑡 is a scalar indicating the market turbulence for a particular time period t;𝑦𝑡 is a vector 
of observed asset returns of n assets during t; 𝝁 is the vector of historical mean returns; σ−1 is 
the inverse of the sample variance-covariance matrix of historical returns. 
The observation of the outcomes of this measure highlighted some basic features: the structure 
variance-covariance of asset returns is not constant over time; the economy oscillates between 
a steady low-volatility expansive state and a panic-driven high-volatility recessive state; during 
the turbulent periods, the return-to-risk ratio significantly reduces, since the increased volatility; 
the turbulence is always unexpected and persistent across time; there exists a mean reverting 
behavior of the variable of interest after the turbulence. Moreover, the turbulence index is much 
widespread in the financial industry, and has many usages. Portfolio managers use it to stress-
test portfolios, or to construct regime-dependent investment strategies and portfolios in such a 
way as to be unsusceptible to turbulence, and then more resilient to shocks. Finally, they can 
use it to improve some risky strategies, in order to reduce the risk exposure.  
 
Contingent claims and default measures 
On the list, the next sub-section comprises contingent claims and default measures. 
A contingent claim is a contract whose future payoff depends on the value of an underlying 
asset, “contingent” on the realization of some given uncertain event. This is also the general 
definition of derivative, like the option, an instrument that gives the right to buy or sell the 
underlying asset at a specified exercise price by a given expiration date. In finance, the 
contingent claims have been widely used to address some financial economics issues, by 
developing models and mathematical constructs, and in corporate finance as an innovative 
valuation method. In fact, it has been noted that the firm’s equity can be associated to a call 
option on firm’s assets as underlying: the contingent claims analysis (CCA), which uses the 
same derivatives pricing models, allows the evaluation of relevant items in the firm’s balance 
sheet, like equity and debt, by exploiting information from the balance sheet and the market. In 
particular, assuming a stochastic process for the market value of the firm’s total, equity is 
represented by a call option, which gives shareholders the right to acquire bank business, while 
liabilities can be symmetrically represented by a put option, which allows a bank's creditors to 
sell the assets of the institution in case of failure. 
This approach is a flexible framework applicable to many types of analyses: it allows to 
estimate sovereign risk and to analyze the impact of banking system risk on the sovereign risk; 
to estimate the relationship between macroeconomic factors and the time pattern of implied 
bank assets, distance to distress, default probability or expected losses; to project banking risks 
under stress scenarios; and to analyze the impact of the government guarantees on bank funding 
costs. 
Another application of contingent claim analysis is to measure and analyze liquidity risk and 
systemic risk by considering banks’ short-term assets and liabilities. With this information, it 
is possible to construct measures of default likelihood for each institution and then link them 
either directly or indirectly through their joint distribution. In particular, literature focused on 
the application of CCA to evaluate the systemic risk of the financial sector. By combining 
bank’s balance sheet information and forward-looking market data, new systemic risk 
measures, based on the impact of eventual government guarantee against losses related to 
banks’ debts, have been introduced. Systemic risk is modeled by evaluating the expected losses 
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of a set of too-big-to-fail institution in financial destress: variations in market prices, and 
consequent changes in firms’ perceived risk derived from its equity volatility, affect the 
individual sensitivity to common risk factors, and then the dependence structure of expected 
losses among institutions; analyzing this dependence and its effect on the joint expected losses 
helps to identify the joint tail risk of multiple entities. The ‘tail dependence’ measuring is 
fundamental to study systems with dense linkages among many institutions. These methods 
allow to identify the marginal contribution of each financial institution to the dynamics of the 
overall systemic risk and to quantify the risk transferred from banks to the government. 
It follows a brief mathematical description of the basic model. 
The CCA aims to adjust the balance sheet for risk, by assuming that at any moment t, the market 
value of a bank's assets A, is equal to the sum of the market value of the equity E, and market 
value of total debt D (which differs from the nominal value F to be paid at maturity T): 
𝐴𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡 + 𝐷𝑡 
To assess the option incorporated in the values of debt and equity, it is necessary to estimate 
the dynamic of the market asset value. Typically, it is assumed that the asset value follows a 




= 𝑟𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝐴𝑑𝑊 
As said, the equity value can be associated to the price of a call option: if, at maturity of debt, 
the asset value allows to repay the face value to debtholders, then 𝐴𝑇 > 𝐹, and the shareholders’ 
equity will get 𝐴𝑇 − 𝐹; if at T the firm defaults on its debt, due to 𝐴𝑇 < 𝐹, then debtholders 
have the first claim on residual asset 𝐴𝑇 and shareholders get nothing. The payoff of the equity 
for shareholders will be: 
𝐸𝑡 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥ሺ𝐴𝑇 − 𝐹; 0ሻ 
At this point, it has been shown that, by applying the Black-Scholes formula for European call 
option, equity value can be calculated as: 
𝐸𝑡 = 𝐴𝑡𝑁ሺ𝑑1ሻ − 𝐹𝑒
−𝑟ሺ𝑇−𝑡ሻ𝑁ሺ𝑑2ሻ 




𝐹 ቁ + ሺ𝑟 +
𝜎𝐴
2 ሻሺ𝑇 − 𝑡ሻ
𝜎𝐴ඥሺ𝑇 − 𝑡ሻ
 
𝑑2 = 𝑑1 − 𝜎𝐴ඥሺ𝑇 − 𝑡ሻ 
On the other hand, the actual value of the debt is equal to the difference between assets value 
and equity value, and re-formulating the previous formulas, the final result will be:  
𝐷𝑡 = 𝐴𝑡𝑁ሺ−𝑑1ሻ + 𝐹𝑒
−𝑟ሺ𝑇−𝑡ሻ𝑁ሺ𝑑2ሻ 
Anyway, the value of the liabilities can be measured as the difference between the value of the 
debt in a risk-free world and the expected value of the losses due to the bank's default, which is 
equal to the price of a put option on the institution's assets, 𝑃𝑡: 
𝐷𝑡 = 𝐹𝑒
−𝑟ሺ𝑇−𝑡ሻ − 𝑃𝑡 
from which: 
𝑃𝑡 = 𝐹𝑒
−𝑟ሺ𝑇−𝑡ሻ𝑁ሺ−𝑑2ሻ − 𝐴𝑡𝑁ሺ−𝑑1ሻ 
In other words, the value of the risky debt is equal to the value of the riskless bond and the 
value of a put option on the firm’s assets, with strike price equal to the face amount. Note that 
𝑁ሺ−𝑑2ሻis the risk-neutral probability that the company will default on the debt (i.e. the 
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likelihood that the value of the company will be less than the face value of debt at its maturity), 
while 𝑑2 is known as distance to default, since represents the difference between the expected 
value of the firm’s assets and the firm’s default point. The idea that corporate debt and equity 
can be viewed as derivatives written on the firm’s assets is the basis of the structural approach, 
used to analyze credit risk.  
The contribution for the calculation of the systemic risk consists of the combination of this put 
option with other data and procedures. In particular, under the hypothesis that guarantees 
against the failure provided by the government do not affect the equity value, the spreads 
observable in the Credit Default Swap market should capture the potential expected losses faced 
by the institutions. From this, the price of the put option written on the CDS, 𝑃𝐶𝐷𝑆,𝑡, is calculated 
in order to derive the fraction of the total loss due to the firm’s default coverable by the 




Of course, the public guarantee reduces the CDS spreads, which reflects the probability to 
default, already implicit in the put option. Then, 𝛼𝑡𝑃𝑡 is the fraction of the put option price 
which reflect the default risk covered by the public guarantee, while the complementary fraction 
(1 − 𝛼𝑡ሻ𝑃𝑡 represents that part of default risk not covered by the public system, and then fully 
borne by the institution. The systemic risk measure, 𝜚𝑡, can be calculated as the total losses 
incurred by the government during a systemic crisis, equal to the sum of the amount given to 








By adopting a similar framework, many other measures have been implemented, such as the 
Distress Insurance Premium (DIP). Simply, DIP is the hypothetical insurance premium needed 
to cover the risk of losses in a distressed banking system, where the distress occurs when at 
least 15% or more of total liabilities of the financial system defaulted. In particular, the systemic 
risk measure is the premium of that insurance policy which protects against losses of a 
hypothetical portfolio composed by the total liabilities in all the banking system. It is calculated 
as the risk-neutral expectation of portfolio credit losses, L, conditional on total losses equal or 
higher than its minimum value (that is a minimum share of the sector’s total liabilities): 
𝐷𝐼𝑃 = 𝔼𝑄[𝐿|𝐿 ≥ 𝐿𝑚𝑖𝑛] 
This indicator can be obtained through Monte Carlo simulations, given key variables such as 
banks’ liability value, probability of default, loss given default and correlations.  
One can notice that the definition of DIP is quite similar to that of ES (expected shortfall), since 
both of them indicate the expected loss conditional on the overcoming of a given threshold. The 
main difference is that this threshold is a percentile distribution in the ES, while it is the not 
normalized minimum value of the underlying portfolio in the DIP. 
As done for other measures, it can be useful to identify the SIFIs, by decomposing DIP into a 
sum of marginal risk contributions to the overall systemic risk (in this case the hypothetical 
insurance premium) from each institution of the banking system. The marginal risk contribution 
is the expected loss of the bank i, conditional on a large loss of the full portfolio: 
𝜕𝐷𝐼𝑃
𝜕𝐿𝑖
= 𝔼𝑄[𝐿𝑖|𝐿 ≥ 𝐿𝑚𝑖𝑛] 
It has been shown that bank’s contribution to the systemic risk is roughly linear in its default 




Illiquidity and insolvency measures tries to capture the mechanisms and the probability that 
liquidity risk arises following negative shocks on the structure of assets and liabilities of 
financial institutions, bringing to negative responses by the companies and the financial system 
as a whole. Measuring systemic risk for illiquidity and insolvency requires the study of the 
exposures of the companies and of the susceptibility to systemic propagation. 
Contrary to what happens during stable periods on the markets, during a financial crisis an 
institution selling many quantities of assets may negatively affect market conditions, generating 
the so-called market liquidity risk. The materialization of the market liquidity risk becomes 
evident by looking at five important indicators:  
• the bid-ask spread, that is the difference between the highest price that a buyer is willing 
to pay (bid price) for an asset and the lowest price (ask price) that a seller is willing to 
ask, reflects the transaction costs, as well as the tightness between demand and supply 
of a given asset; when this indicator increases, it means that the quantities the 
counterparties are willing to trade at that prices decline, and then the asset becomes 
illiquid, difficult to exchange to a fair price; 
• the trading volumes and the frequency of trading orders for each asset and for each price 
on both buy/sell side, are an indicator of the degree of market depth; they highlight the 
distance to possible scenarios of asset illiquidity; 
• the market resilience measures the capacity of a given asset market to face and to 
withstand to external shocks, and then reflects the sensitivity of assets prices to systemic 
changes, as well as the speed with which these prices revert to its equilibrium 
fundamental value after a shock; a low market resilience indicates an intrinsically riskier 
market, with more probability to face liquidity distress; 
• the market breadth is the fraction of overall market participating in up or down price 
movements, and gives an idea of the consistency of liquidity within asset classes; 
• the immediacy indicates the time needed to execute a transaction in the market, and it 
is function of the number of market makers and participants, as well as the technology 
available for the trading. 
There are also other important issues to be covered when assessing illiquidity. 
The high asymmetric information among operators along with the widespread fear to face losses 
due to market movements may bring to imitative and herding behaviors, for which smaller 
institutions imitate the larger ones, causing self-fulfilling and self-sustaining market instability. 
Moreover, the already discussed liquidity spiral might amplify this isolated liquidity risk to the 
whole system, increasing the global systemic risk: a bank facing distress will be forced to 
liquidate some assets and to accept fire sales on the market, and if the recovered funds are not 
enough, the probability to default, and then to become insolvent, becomes dramatically high. 
Important policy implication can be derived, such as the limitation of individual liquidity risk 
to prevent systemic distress.   
As said, banks are particularly exposed to funding illiquidity, given their activity of maturity 
transformation. For a systemic perspective, the interaction between the funding illiquidity and 
the asset illiquidity is quite relevant, since funding shortages feed asset fire sales which cause 
further funding shortages to other institutions, materializing the systemic propagation. 
A brief description of two important systemic risk measures follows: the “Noise as Information 
of Illiquidity” and the “Equity Market Illiquidity”.   
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The Noise as Information of Illiquidity is a deviation measure for the systemic liquidity risk 
which is based on a set of assumptions and stylized facts. First of all, the point of view from 
the treasury bonds market is taken into account, because of its importance and high liquidity, 
in order to evaluate the liquidity condition of the overall market. It is assumed that the aggregate 
liquidity is strictly connected to the amount of available arbitrage capital, that is the amount of 
extra capital that institutions accumulate to be used in case of distress in order to provide 
liquidity: during stable and calm scenarios, banks accumulate abundant capital in the form of 
liquid assets such as treasury bonds, and for this reason, arbitrage forces entirely eliminate large 
price deviations from their fundamental values. During market crises, the accumulated capital 
declines and institutions will wish liquidate positions: the aggregate liquidity quickly dries up, 
the arbitrage forces in the market becomes weaker, and the prices move far away from their 
fundamentals. In this case, temporary price deviations highlight the arbitrage capital shortage 
and the lack of systemic liquidity, while the dynamics of the arbitrage capital is reflected in the 
position and shape of the Treasury yield curve. The survey of this “noise” in the price of treasury 
bonds is the basis for a new measure of market-wide liquidity risk, and then an indicator for an 
important component of the systemic risk. In fact, given its systematic nature, this measure 
should be informative on asset returns in those markets particularly sensitive to global liquidity 
conditions. Then, noise in the treasuries market is informative about global market liquidity, 
because of its central role and its high liquidity and low credit risk, which makes the noise 
intrinsically low. 
The daily liquidity noise measure at time t, given 𝑛𝑡 the number of treasury bonds available on 










𝑖 are the observed market yields of the bond i on day t, and 𝑦𝑖ሺ𝑏𝑡ሻ are the fitted yields 
implied by a bond price model, whose 𝑏𝑡 is the vector of parameters of a parameterized forward 
curve, backed out from the data. In particular, 𝑏𝑡 are derived by minimizing the weighted (for 
duration 𝐷𝑖) sum of the squared deviations between the observed bonds prices 𝑃𝑡
𝑖
 and the fitted 
model-implied prices 𝑃𝑖ሺ𝑏ሻ: 









Measures about Equity Market Illiquidity have been proposed by Khandani and Lo (2011), 
which analyzed a trading strategy consisting of buying loser stocks and selling winner stocks, 
and then providing liquidity by correcting temporary imbalances between demand and supply. 
In particular, the performance in terms of profitability of this strategy has been observed over 
time: whenever the profitability was higher, then there was less liquidity in the market, and the 
liquidity premium of trade increased. Authors established a relationship between the illiquidity 
and the positive autocorrelation in asset returns among equity portfolios. Moreover, they found 
evidence of a significant positive autocorrelation among returns in less liquid securities 
portfolios (such as small-cap stocks, mortgage-backed securities, and so on) emerging-market 
investments. Within this framework, authors presented two types of liquidity measure. 
The first measure is the “Contrarian Strategy Liquidity Measure”, based on the simple high-
frequency mean-reversion strategy described above, where buying and selling occur over 
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lagged m-minute returns, that is portfolios are composed at time t by considering the stocks 
returns over the previous 5 (up to 60) minutes. Long positions, on those stock with the lowest 
return, and short positions, on those stock with the highest returns, are equally weighted, 
and then the overall portfolio is a neutral strategy, and rebalanced each minute. As said, cases 
with higher profitability are associable with less market liquidity, and this is reflected in the 
higher liquidity premium. Authors noted that its profitability has been decreasing for last 
decades due to the increasing number of market actors providing even more liquidity, thus 
reducing the liquidity premium. 
A second measure of market liquidity is the “Price Impact Liquidity Measure”, and is related 
to the Kyle’s “lambda”, an inverse proxy of liquidity: the higher the value of lambda the lower 
the liquidity and the market depth, and vice-versa. In particular, it measures the liquidity 
through a linear regression of the trading volume required to move the security price by one 
unit. Authors estimate this measure by exploiting information from the transactions during 
trading hours on each day, such as the sequence of intra-day returns R, prices 𝑝 and quantities 





𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑙𝑜𝑔ሺ𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑝𝑖𝑡ሻ + 𝑖𝑡 
where the sign of the logarithm indicates the sign of the position, buying (+) or selling (-). In 
particular, if R is positive, the transaction will have the sign + (net buying), while if R is 
negative, the transaction will have the sign − (net selling). The average of the estimated price 








Network analysis measures 
So far, only aggregate systemic risk measures have been discussed. Measures of an aggregate 
nature typically tend to provide the average risk or the dispersion of a dataset, and this is a 
shortcoming. Nowadays, the global economy and the financial systems are increasingly 
complex and evolving, and a single index based on the mean is not enough informative of the 
real state of the system. Unlike the macroeconomic measures, risk measures in the "Network 
Measures" group exploit tools and knowledges specifically that seems to be more appropriate 
to detect the systemic risk. In fact, they are able to explain how systemic events unfold over 
time, and to track them evolution until the realization of the systemic crisis. Then, in this 
framework, relationships and connections among institutions acquire the most importance. 
Networks models and networks measures have proved to be valid and useful in explaining the 
increased impact of shocks on the systemic stability due to the increased complexity and 
weaving of the financial system. Two fundamental elements significantly contributed to make 
relevant the role of the networks: the innovations over the last decades and the intense financial 
globalization. The innovations increased the involvement of an always higher number of new 
institutions, instruments, contracts, practices, new funds, new sectors, and above all new 
technologies, significant stuff for the determination of the systemic risk. On the other side, the 
globalization has strengthened and stepped up the network of economic relationships among 
financial institutions over sectors and over countries, as never before. As said, the bankruptcy 
of a single too-central-to-fail institutions may trigger a system crisis, due to its 
interconnectedness with a high number of operators.  
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Billio, Getmansky, Lo and Pelizzon firstly formalized the relation between the degree of 
correlation among institutions in the market and the capacity of a financial crisis to have a 
systemic scope, and that depends on the concentration of the risk, the intensity of the 
connections and the sensitivity of relevant variables to strong changes. Authors proposed many 
econometric measures of connectedness based on the Principal Components Analysis (PCA), 
which allows the detection of the commonalities among asset returns of institutions, by 
decomposing the variance-covariance matrix of returns for each financial sector. PCA is used 
as an exploratory tool of the data, since it allows to identify the intrinsic distance and links 
among units and sectors. PCA can be executed through eigenvalue decomposition (i.e. the 
factorization of a matrix into a standard form, whereby the matrix is represented in terms of its 
eigenvalues and eigenvectors; λ is an eigenvalue of (n×n) matrix A if there exists a non-zero 
vector v such that Av=λv, where v is the eigenvector of A corresponding to λ) of a covariance 
matrix. 
A known related measure that deserves to be mentioned is the Absorption Ratio, described by 
Kritzmann et al. in 2010. This measure is the fraction of the total variance of a set of N asset 
returns explained (or absorbed) by a fixed number of eigenvectors, that are the first n < N 
principal components. A high AR indicates that the market is weak and vulnerable to negative 
shocks, and then the systemic risk is high. Letting N be the number of assets (or financial 
institutions), n be the number of eigenvectors used, 𝜎𝑒
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A leading distress indicator is the difference between AR calculated for long and short 
estimation windows: 
𝛥𝐴𝑅ሺ𝑛ሻ = 𝐴𝑅ሺ𝑛ሻ𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 − 𝐴𝑅ሺ𝑛ሻ𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑔 
Another important tool for the systemic risk measurement consists in the application of 
Granger-Causality on Networks. This measure includes tests which provide information about 
the relevance of correlation degree among institutions, not conditionally on shock occurrence. 
Moreover, this approach allows as well to define the direction of the link among units, 
highlighting the source of propagation and the dynamics. The Granger causality is a statistical 
notion of causality that determines whether one time series is useful in forecasting another: 
series X is said to “Granger-causes” series Y if values of X are informative on the evolution of 
Y, and then X is useful in forecasting Y. The mathematical formulation of the test is based on 
the linear regressions of X on Y and of Y on X.  





 be the stock returns of institutions A and B, two stationary time series with zero 
mean and a linear inter-relationship described by the following autoregressive model:  
𝑅𝑡
𝐴 = ෍ 𝛼𝑗𝑅𝑡−𝑗









𝐵 = ෍ 𝜃𝑗𝑅𝑡−𝑗








where m is the maximum lag j chosen, 𝛼𝑗, 𝛽𝑗, 𝜃𝑗, 𝜆𝑗are the coefficients, and 𝑡
𝐴 and 𝑡
𝐵 are 
uncorrelated error terms, specifically two white noise with zero mean and unit variance. 𝑅𝑡
𝐵
 is 
said to Granger-causes 𝑅𝑡
𝐴
  when 𝛽
𝑗







 when 𝜃𝑗 is statistically different from zero. When both variables reciprocally Granger-cause 
each other, then there is simultaneity. The test for the Granger causality is an F-test with 
following null hypothesis:  
𝛨0: 𝛽1 = 𝛽2 = ⋯ = 𝛽𝑚 = 0
𝛨0: 𝜃1 = 𝜃2 = ⋯ = 𝜃𝑚 = 0
 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡 𝑖𝑠 𝑅𝑡
𝐵 ⇏ 𝑅𝑡
𝐴
 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡 𝑖𝑠 𝑅𝑡
𝐴 ⇏ 𝑅𝑡
𝐵 
For instance, there should not be any Granger causality between actual asset price changes and 
lagged prices under the assumption of informationally efficient market, while a positive 
Granger causality should exist in not efficient markets, because of the presence of frictions, 
transaction costs and other constraints. Moreover, the width of the Granger causality in 
evaluating the correlation among asset returns can be considered a proxy of spillover effects 
and interconnectedness among market participants: the stronger the Granger causality, the 
stronger the level of interconnections and integration among financial institutions, and then the 
relevance of an eventual systemic distress. Thus, generalizing, the identification of causal 
relationships in the sense of Granger among institutions of the financial network is a very useful 
procedure to study the propagation of the excesses of returns variability in the financial system. 
In this framework, a causality indicator can be defined: 
ሺ𝐴 ⇒ 𝐵ሻ = ቄ
1
0
 𝑖𝑓 𝐴 𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟_𝑐𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝐵
𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
This indicator variable is the basis for other five important interconnectedness measures, which 
are defined below. The generalized case will be considered: a system with N institutions that 
interact each other, generically named j and i, instead of A and B. 
1) Degree of Granger Causality (DGC): it is the percentage of statistically significant Granger-
causality relationships within a system of N institutions, for a total of N(N−1) possible 
relationships (pairs): 
𝐷𝐶𝐺 =





When DCG is higher than a given threshold K, than there is a strong interconnectedness and 
interdependence among institutions’ returns, and a systemic event is more likely to occur. This 
risk can be calculated through Monte-Carlo simulations. In particular, Monte-Carlo simulation 
is useful to understand whether Granger causal relationships among institutions are due to 
randomness. Specifically, assuming independence among financial institutions, a certain 
number of time series representing each financial institutions’ returns are simulated, and on 
each simulated relationship the test for Granger causality is performed to identify significant 
connections. By repeating this procedure many, many times, it will be possible to represent the 
resulting distribution, whose center will be the fraction of significant connections under the null 
hypothesis of no statistical relation among institutions.  
Another similar related measure is the Dynamic Causality Index (DCI), which tries to capture 
the level of interconnection among financial institutions by computing the fraction of relevant 
Granger causality relations (that is significant at p-value < 0.05) among their returns over the 
total number of relations. 
2) Number of connections: it is useful to assess the presence of Systemically Important 
Financial Institutions, because allows to survey the relevance degree of each institution by 
simply counting the number of its connections with others. Letting 𝑆 be a variable representing 
the whole system, #In be the number of institutions in the system that Granger causes the 
institution i, #Out be the number of financial institutions in the system Granger caused by a 
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given institution i, #In+Out is the sum of the two last measures. In particular, the Granger 
causality is considered to be significant if the connectivity measure exceeds a given threshold 
K, and only those cases are useful to identify risks of systemic crisis starting from a shock. 
Moreover, #In+Out gives an idea about the centrality of the institutions. 
#𝐼𝑛: ሺ𝑆 ⇒ 𝑖ሻ|𝐷𝐺𝐶≥𝐾 =
σ ሺ𝑗 ⇒ 𝑖ሻ|𝐷𝐺𝐶≥𝐾𝑗≠𝑖
𝑁 − 1
#𝑂𝑢𝑡: ሺ𝑖 ⇒ 𝑆ሻ|𝐷𝐺𝐶≥𝐾 =
σ ሺ𝑖 ⇒ 𝑗ሻ|𝐷𝐺𝐶≥𝐾𝑗≠𝑖
𝑁 − 1
#𝐼𝑛 + 𝑂𝑢𝑡: ሺ𝑖 ⇔ 𝑆ሻ|𝐷𝐺𝐶≥𝐾 =
σ ሺ𝑗 ⇒ 𝑖ሻ + ሺ𝑖 ⇒ 𝑗ሻ|𝐷𝐺𝐶≥𝐾𝑗≠𝑖
2ሺ𝑁 − 1ሻ
 
3) Sector-Conditional Connections: these measures are similar to those of point 2), with the 
only difference that the significant causality is obtained among institutions belonging to 
different sectors. Hence, the counting of the number of significant connections is conditional 
on the type of sector. Letting M be the type of sector (banks, insurers, funds, brokers, and so 
on) indexed by α,β=1,…M, it is possible to get three measures: #In-from-Other is the number 
of other types of financial institutions in the financial system that significantly Granger-cause 
institution i, #Out-to-Other is the number of other types of financial institutions in the system 
that is significantly Granger-caused by institution i, while #In+Out-Other is the sum of the last 
two. 
#𝐼𝑛. 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚.𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟: [෍ ሺ𝑆|𝛽ሻ
𝛽≠𝛼
⇒ ሺ𝑖|𝛼ሻ]|𝐷𝐺𝐶≥𝐾 =
σ σ [ሺ𝑗|𝛽ሻ ⇒ ሺ𝑖|𝛼ሻ]|𝐷𝐺𝐶≥𝐾𝑗≠𝑖𝛽≠𝛼
ሺ𝑀 − 1ሻ𝑁/𝑀
#𝑂𝑢𝑡. 𝑡𝑜. 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟: [ሺ𝑖|𝛼ሻ ⇒ ෍ ሺ𝑆|𝛽ሻ
𝛽≠𝛼
]|𝐷𝐺𝐶≥𝐾 =
σ σ [ሺ𝑖|𝛼ሻ ⇒ ሺ𝑗|𝛽ሻ]|𝐷𝐺𝐶≥𝐾𝑗≠𝑖𝛽≠𝛼
ሺ𝑀 − 1ሻ𝑁/𝑀
#𝐼𝑛 + 𝑂𝑢𝑡: [ሺ𝑖|𝛼ሻ ⇔ ෍ ሺ𝑆|𝛽ሻ
𝛽≠𝛼
]|𝐷𝐺𝐶≥𝐾 =
σ σ [ሺሺ𝑗|𝛽ሻ ⇒ ሺ𝑖|𝛼ሻሻ + ሺሺ𝑖|𝛼ሻ ⇒ ሺ𝑗|𝛽ሻሻ]ሻ|𝐷𝐺𝐶≥𝐾𝑗≠𝑖𝛽≠𝛼
2ሺ𝑀 − 1ሻ𝑁/𝑀
4) Closeness: it measures the shortest distance between a financial institution and all other 
institutions directly or indirectly reachable from it. In particular, an institution j is weakly 
causally C-connected to i if there exists a causality path of length C between i and j. Thus, there 
should exist a sequence of nodes 𝑘1,… , 𝑘𝑐−1 , where each node represents an institution, such 
that the impact from j to i, through the C nodes, is unitary:  
ሺ𝑗 ⇒ 𝑘1ሻ ∙ ሺ𝑘1 ⇒ 𝑘2ሻ ∙ ሺ𝑘𝑐−1 ⇒ 𝑖ሻ ≡ ቀ𝑗 ⇒
𝐶
𝑖ቁ = 1 
As said, C is the shortest distance from j to i, for which if 𝑗 ⇒
𝐶
𝑖 = 0 then 𝐶𝑗𝑖 = 𝑁 − 1 for all 
𝐶 ∈ [1,𝑁 − 1]: 
𝐶𝑗𝑖 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑐
൜𝐶 ∈ [1,𝑁 − 1]: ሺ𝑗 ⇒
𝐶
𝑖ሻ = 1ൠ 
Given a percentage of statistically significant Granger-causality relationships within a system 
of N institutions higher than a threshold K, the closeness measure for institution j is defined as 
an average of the number of possible shortest distances with the rest of the system S, and 







5) Eigenvector Centrality: it measures the relevance of a financial institution in a network in 
accordance with its level of connection. It assigns a scores to each financial institution based 
its centrality and importance inside the network. The measure is the eigenvector 𝑣 of the 
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adjacency matrix [𝐴]𝑖𝑗 = ሺ𝑗 ⇒ 𝑖ሻ associated with eigenvalue 1 (that is 𝐴𝑣 = 𝑣), and can be 
written as the sum of the eigenvector centralities of institutions caused by j, conditional on a 
network with a significant number of Granger-causality relationships: 






Macroeconomic measures of systemic risk try to put in relation the probability of systemic 
distress in the financial system and the dynamics of macroeconomic aggregates, as presented 
by the main economic and monetary policy models. In fact, the strict relation between the 
financial system and the so-called “real economy” is known from a theoretical perspective. A 
break in the productive economy, where firms and households operate, is reflected in the 
financial system as a shock due to the stoppage of liquidity providing from operators, bank runs 
or defaults cascade in the debt chain. On the other side, a financial crisis due to bubble bursting, 
irrational behavior or debt overhangs can easily involve other productive field of the economy, 
causing a recession. Therefore, it is possible to link financial variables, based on information 
on financial institutions, to other “real” macroeconomic variables, such as real GDP, inflation 
and public debt, in order to extrapolate common patterns useful to explain the systemic risk. 
Considering all the above-mentioned criteria, systemic risk measures should be associated with 
real macroeconomic outcomes, especially in issues of policy decisions: in order to evaluate 
variations in the distributions of crucial economic variables to change in systemic risk, it is 
important to test the ability of a given risk measure to predict shifts in the expected quantiles 
following macroeconomic shocks. By performing a similar analysis, Giglio, Kelly and Pruit 
(2015) demonstrated three important stylized facts: the systemic risk measures show a 
particularly strong association with the downside risk (the risk that actual return falls below the 
expected return, in a context of uncertainty about the size of this fall) of macroeconomic shocks; 
financial sector equity volatility is quite informative about the future real activity, much more 
than the volatility of non-financial sectors; financial market distresses precede a monetary 
policy responses, even if this response could be insufficient to slow down an increased 
downside risk. 
Any macroeconomic measure of systemic risk tries to take into account the fact that fragility 
within the financial system tends to be exacerbate during a crisis, and the instability tends to 
dramatically increase its macroeconomic impact. Therefore, macroeconomic effects of so-
called “financial frictions” take place in the system, that Brunnermeier, Eisenbach and 
Sannikov (2012) tried to analyze in their “Macroeconomics with Financial Frictions: A 
Survey”. The literature on the frictions is wide, and can be subdivided into four sections: the 
works about the role of Persistence (Carlstrom and Fuerst), Amplification (Bernanke, Gertler 
and Gilchrist) and Instability (Brunnermeier and Sannikov); the credit quantity constraints, like 
credit rationing (Stiglitz and Weiss), endogenous constraints (Geanakoplos and Fostel) and 
margin spirals (Brunnermeier and Pederson); the demand for liquid assets and bubbles; the 
financial intermediaries’ theory and the money theory. 
In general, the financial frictions are the set of difficulties and "stickiness" elements involved 
in conducting a transaction, and include both monetary and non-monetary costs. In fact, the 
overall process of making transactions includes time, effort, money, and tax for gathering 
information and performing all the operations required. For instance, buying a stock or 
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borrowing money requires a set of delicate operations such as conducting research to get 
information, determining the price, complying with all regulations and bureaucratic procedures, 
spending time to materially execute the transaction. All these financial frictions, stemming from 
the financial sector, have been identified as a key element affecting fluctuations of relevant 
economic variables (like GDP growth), that is exerting an impact on the real economy.  
Implications of financial frictions have been analyzed. A temporary adverse shock is said to be 
“persistent” if its effects last for a long time, and a long time is required for a complete 
rebuilding of the previous capital from productive agents. The persistence property is a function 
of the feedback effects of the frictions in the financial system: a negative shock affecting the 
value of a business network intensifies the present financial frictions and forces entrepreneurs 
to invest less. In particular, the persistence of a shock will be as more relevant as deeper and 
more serious is the situation of illiquidity and the necessity to fire-sell, namely the channels by 
which an initial shock is amplified. As known, fire sales depress the capital price, causing loss 
spirals (the net worth of agents further reduces), margin spirals (productive agents must reduce 
their leverage ratio) and other cuts. This is the amplification effect: the reduction in capital 
caused by negative shocks to the network reduces the cost of capital, and may bring to illiquidity 
and fire sales which further reduce the price of capital, amplifying the effect of the initial shock. 
Finally, a time dimension of the amplification effect makes it dynamic: the unexpected 
persistence of a temporary shock reduces expected future asset prices, and in turn this is 
reflected into lower actual asset prices. As a consequence, the capital of productive agents even 
further is eroded, and more fire sales are required. The presence of dynamic non-linear 
amplification effects is the main reason of the existence of wide volatility dynamics, and is the 
basis of the intrinsic unavoidable instability of the financial system. Therefore, the intrinsic 
financial instability is the consequence of endogenous risks resulting from interactions in the 
system, such as the liquidity spirals, which may cause large discontinuous drop in the prices 
and funding drying up. It is at such times that a demand for liquid assets strongly emerges. 
From the perspective of the policy maker, the macro-economic aspect is fundamental, in order 
not to implement distorted policies and regulations, and to perform a correct monitoring for the 
prevention of the system. On this topic, Borio (2010) developed a complete macro-prudential 
framework, based on four well-defined dimensions: the criterion of success of given policies in 
limiting the risk of systemic financial distress; the degree to which systemic risk should be 
tracked; the right balance between an aggregate approach and a cross-sectional sectoral view; 
the right balance between rules and discretion. 
As said, the macro-prudential perspective requires a setting of regulatory and supervisory 
arrangements suited to the system as a whole, rather than to single institutions. The essence of 
the macroeconomic view is the top-down approach, consisting of the definition of general 
standard for the entire system and, from there, the derivation of standards for the individual 
institutions. The assumption is that risk drivers depend on the distorted collective behavior of 
financial institutions, which in turn depend on risk perceptions of responses to it. Therefore, 
macroeconomic perspective investigates endogenous risks that emerges at system level. The 
objective of this approach is to limit the risks of systemic financial distress, and then to contain 
the possible risks and the costs for the real economy. In general, the final purpose of macro-
prudential policy is to promote financial stability and limits systemic risk.  




The time dimension analyzes the evolution of aggregate systemic financial risk over time, 
focusing on the central role of the pro-cyclicality of the financial system, that is the set of those 
elements and mechanisms within the economy that help to oversize the natural output 
cyclicality and fluctuations. From a policy perspective, pro-cyclicality is contrasted through 
countercyclical buffers in order to stabilize the system. 
The cross-sectional dimension analyzes the risk generation and allocation within the financial 
system at a given point in time, and in particular it studies the risks and vulnerabilities stemming 
from common exposures, interlinkages and failures. To mitigate the risks stemming from 
common exposures and interlinkages, prudential tools and requirements regarding the 
contribution of each institution to systemic risk are implemented, such that each institution pays 
for the externality its activities exert on the system. 
Finally, Borio points out the necessity to link each systemic risk measure with the purpose and 
the dimension analyzed. It is unrealistic and dangerous to base a macroeconomic policy or a 
theoretical model entirely on a single systemic risk measure, which can never capture all 
relevant aspects: the minimum distinction suggested by Borio should be between the time 
dimension and the cross-sectional dimension. In particular, according to Borio, in the time 
dimension, the ideal measure would be a robust leading indicator of financial distress, which 
allows to take remedial actions well in advance (at least over one year): they are the so-called 
early warning indicators. In the cross-sectional dimension, the ideal risk measure should be able 
to consistently quantify the individual marginal contribution of each institution to systemic risk.  
Of course, policy makers inevitably must face the trade-off between the accuracy of measures 
and models and their precision, and then between generality of information required and 
specificity of adopted measures. In general, it is believed by analysts that it is better to be 





Operational objective To limit systemic financial 
distress 
To limit financial distress of 
single institutions 
Ultimate objective To stabilize output To protect savers and 
investors 
Risk nature Endogenous risk (dependent 
on collective behavior) 
Exogenous risk (external to 
each single institution) 
Central risk source Correlations and common 
exposures across institutions; 
procyclicality  
Solvency, liquidity, leverage, 
confidence 
Prudential control Top-down Bottom-up 
 
Table 2.2: Comparison between macroeconomic and microeconomic perspectives 
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2.1.3 Systemic Risk Measures by Data Requirements 
 The complexity of the financial system consists as well of a huge set of different participants, 
market practices, tools, relationships characteristics and many other factors. At the same time, 
many important differences intervene among measures and models that try to capture different 
facets of systemic risk. In general, a correct framework for the detection and the management 
of the financial risk, both for policy makers and institutions, should consider different 
perspectives and different tools in order to be able to capture the continuous evolving structure 
of the financial system and to adequately use the most appropriate measures of systemic risk. 
Hence, it is important to consider how the changeability of financial systems should be included 
in the used approaches: a given approach suitable today might not be in the future. Furthermore, 
the practical implementation of certain systemic risk measures requires a set of precise and  
 
crucial decisions by the analysts, such as the institutions’ characteristics, the frequency and the 
timespan of the adopted measure, the levels of accuracy and granularity of the used dataset, the 
eventual necessity to transform the raw inputs of the measure. From this set of choices, it is 
Figure 2.3: Classification of systemic risk measures based on the data requirements 
Source: “A Survey of Systemic Risk Analytics” by Bisias, Flood, Lo and Valavanis, 2012 
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possible to derive another classification of the risk measures, approximatively based on the type 
and quantity of required data. The figure shown below lists the measures and the approaches in 
an increasing order of the level of detail and information of the data required to implement 
them. It can be useful both for regulators and financial institutions. 
Anyway, it is important to take into account the approximation of this classification when one 
is dealing with it: each single measure must be evaluated individually and adapted to the context 
it is applied, on the basis of its advantages and weaknesses, of the data available with respect 
to those required for the computation, of the foresight and the sensitivity of the adopted model 
to given aspect of the systemic risk. Therefore, the measure must be adequately chosen and 
adapted to the specific situation (e.g. the precise characteristics of the analyzed financial crisis).  
Under this perspective, using more approaches at the same time may be only partially a good 
choice, because it adds further difficulties and may not be fit to correctly evaluate the systemic 
risk. Below, a brief description of those sub-sections of measures not previously discussed.  
 
Forward-looking risk measures 
Backward-looking measures rely on historical data, used to estimate probabilities and size of 
future tail events, but presents some shortcomings. In particular, they seem to be inadequate in 
preparing authorities and institutions for eventual shocks that lie ahead. Furthermore, making 
portfolio decisions and policy making on the basis of past returns may contribute to the pro-
cyclicality of risk management, and then to consequent negative impacts. 
As an alternative solution, that tries to overcome these problems, it is useful to introduce the 
forward-looking measures, which extract information from current data about the possible 
evolutions of the variables of interest, and then of the systemic risk. Anyway, these measures 
should not be considered as forecasting tools, but as alternative tools for the evaluation of 
portfolio value and other patterns within the financial system, based on a forward-looking 
method. Moreover, even for these measures the non-linearity of relationships increases the 
degree of complication for their correct implementation. In order to better survey the risk 
dimension, forward-looking risk measures are oriented to future cash flows of portfolio 
positions under different scenarios, helping to focus the attention of the operators on the 
potential risk factors in the system. 
A useful example is given by the measure “option i-PoD” (Christian Capuano, 2008). It is the 
probability of default implied by option prices, that is inferred from equity options by applying 
the principle of minimum cross-entropy (Cover and Thomas, 2006). In particular, the 
probability of default is defined as the probability that the underlying asset value will fall below 
a given threshold, which is not prefixed but it is endogenously determined. It is shown how this 
framework provides robustly informative results on the implied expected evolution of balance 
sheet items, such as assets, equity and leverage. Moreover, this measure allows to determine 
also the implied asset volatility and the Greek letters, useful elements in the risk management. 
 
Stress-test measures 
The stress test is the assessment of the capacity of institutions to face economic shocks and to 
prove to robustly withstand under adverse scenarios. They are performed by public authorities 
mainly towards on SIFIs within the banking system, and try to plot ‘what if?’ scenarios, playing 
a crucial role in the systemic risk monitoring process.  
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Accordingly, the stress test tries to answer two basic questions, by taking the perspective of a 
banking portfolio: 
1) which economic and financial scenarios would lead to significant losses? 
2) how big could these losses be? 
The answer to the first question requires the identification of those possible future extreme 
circumstances that may negatively damage the value of the institutions, while the estimate of 
the expected loss at the worst-case scenario, through the usage of a portfolio loss function, is 
the answer to the second question.  
Recently, stress tests gradually became a central element of risk management, mainly for 
supervisory purposes and financial stability analysis by policy makers. For this reason, the 
development of the most important stress testing frameworks has been implemented by central 
banks and other financial supervision authorities. In the U.S. the Comprehensive Capital 
Analysis and Review Process and the Dodd-Frank-Act-Stress Tests are performed; in Europe, 
the Stress tests of the European Banking Authority is performed.  
Within this framework, the stress test measure provides a tool to evaluate the probability of big 
losses of a portfolio, of an institution or of the whole system. This risk measure is usually based 
on the assessment of that amount of capital needed to make the probability of big losses 
sufficiently small (e.g. VaR, ES). 
The ultimate role of these tests is to allow risk reducing actions, since they bring to a better 
understanding of risk factors of each bank, and it provides indications for portfolio adjustments 
in order to avoid detrimental effects in case of bad scenarios. 
As example, the 10-by-10-by-10 network-based approach is shortly described. This approach 
is based on the analysis of the risk exposures of a selected group of SIFIs under a set of distress 
scenarios: in particular, 10 designated institutions are required to report their gains or losses, in 
terms of market value and cash flows, for each one of the 10 described stressful scenarios (for 
example, the default of a counter-party, a shift in the yields curve, an increase in credit spreads, 
a variation in housing prices), and also to provide the identities of those 10 counter-parties 
whom gains and losses are the biggest in magnitude for each scenario. The institutions at the 
top are those whose failure would produce the heaviest loss for the reporting bank. This process 
will allow policy makers to assess those nodes with higher tension in terms of liquidity and 
value, and to give a shape to the systemic risk. In fact, 10-by-10-by-10 is a scenario measure 
that may help to map joint exposures of the system and to identify further SIFIs.  
 
Cross-sectional measures 
As said, two dimensions of systemic risk can be identified: the time dimension, inherent to the 
pro-cyclicality of the financial system, and the cross-sectional dimension, inherent to the 
linkages among financial institutions, which affect the sensitivity to risk spreading over the 
whole system. These measures are useful to monitor the degree of fragility of the system and 
its resilience to shocks at each point of time, trying to examine the co-dependence among 
institutions on the basis of their financial health conditional on particular circumstance. The 







2.1.4 Systemic Risk Measures by Event or Decision Time Horizon 
This last classification takes into account the time horizon with respect to given events or 
decisions related to a systemic financial distress. In particular, it is possible to identify different 
systemic risk measurement tools with respect to three temporal moments.  
 
 
1) Ex-ante measures try to capture financial signals about a potential systemic distress 
over short/medium-term period. Their objective is to provide early warning of 
Figure 2.4: Classification of systemic risk measures based on the time horizon        
Source: “A Survey of Systemic Risk Analytics” by Bisias, Flood, Lo and Valavanis, 2012 
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increasing imbalances and risks for the whole system, and a good measure of their 
performance and reliability is the ratio between the correctly predicted historical 
episodes (the signal from the systemic risk measure) and false alarms (its noise). This 
measure of signal strength relative to background noise is the signal-to-noise ratio. 
Since the core of this thesis is the implementation of an experimental early warning 
indicator for the systemic risk, the following subsection of this chapter will be 
dedicated to a deeper description of this category. 
2) Contemporaneous measures try to quantify the level of outstanding disturbance, 
confusion and uncertainty within the actual system, and the big advantage of using 
them is to allow a better and adequate asset re-allocation and a prompt view for policy 
makers during emergency situations. The reaction time is very important, since it can 
determine the fate of a firm or of the system as a whole, especially when a crisis occurs.  
3) Ex-post measures refer to the “after-the-event” situation, where probability and 
projections no longer matter, and the final outcome can be directly observed. This kind 
of measures, which the ex-post analysis is based on, is useful for many aspects: it allows 
to clearly report the events and to maintain accountability for policy makers, and in 
particular, since regulation is a repeated game, the monitoring incentives diligent 
behavior; it allows to evaluate the performance of other measures compared to what 
the regulator or institution initially projected, and to determine the accuracy of the other 
risk assessment methods; it can be used by scholars and researches to clarify certain 
events and their causes, and to identify new theoretical patterns. 
As seen, the main critical usefulness of a classification of systemic risk measurement related to 
events is the timeliness provided to the decision-making process of institutions and policy 
makers, which must decide whether, when and how to carry out a given operation on the 
financial markets. The main characteristics of the three categories are described below. 
 
Ex-ante measures of systemic risk 
Within the financial system there are many threats to financial stability, because of the existence 
of a set of unpredictable possible shocks, herding behaviors, expectations and many other 
dynamics that make the market instable and continuously changing. In this context, the 
detection and the monitoring of so many possible threats are possible just through a wide set of 
monitoring methods and ex-ante measures. In fact, these measures allow the detection of the 
systemic risk in a probabilistic sense, in order to provide an overview about increasing 
imbalances or imminent dangers inside the financial network.  
This classification identifies two further sub-groups of ex-ante measures: those consisting of 
early warnings and those based on counterfactual simulations and stress tests. 
Early warning measures are endowed with a reliable forecasting power about possible 
evolutions of the systemic risk by a given not short time horizon, in order to allow the 
identification of eventual imbalances. Therefore, these techniques attach a given probability to 
future triggering events, that in turn are based on a dataset of observations of specific systemic 
features. The next sub-section will discuss more in detail this category. 
The second subset of models, suited to analyze the systemic risk before a given adverse event, 
comprises all those measures that focus on the behavior of institutions and networks in 
hypothetical distressing conditions, trying to estimate the systemic vulnerability, intended as 
the sensibility in the institutions’ performance to an adverse combination of external factors. In 
particular, counterfactual simulations and stress tests are analysis based on a set of specific 
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scenarios, outlined through past occurred episodes, suitably built circumstances or extreme 
hypothetical situations, by considering some extreme values that given economic quantities 
may assume. At the same time, the reverse stress test can be performed in order to identify those 
circumstances and scenarios that cause certain pre-specified outcomes and level of distress for 
institutions. 
These kinds of measures are very useful also to categorize vulnerable institutions and networks. 
For example, the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP) is a stress testing conducted 
by policy makers in the U.S. to determine if the largest U.S. financial institutions have sufficient 
capital buffers to face a financial market turbulence. This stress test applies two macroeconomic 
scenarios, described in terms of GDP growth, unemployment and housing prices, one based on 
standard assumption and the other based on a negative expected circumstance. The consequent 
analysis of each institution’s risk profile, by using models, internal dataset, and various 
estimation methods, brought to the mapping of the systemic risk in different types of 
macroeconomic scenarios. 
At the same time, policy makers have recently intensified the usage of counterfactual 
simulations in order to evaluate the systemic risk due to contagion and common exposures in 
the financial market. In fact, the adverse contagion is a rare event, that occur in few extreme 
scenarios, but that can produce a very heavy negative impact on the soundness of each involved 
institution. Therefore, counterfactual simulations provide information about relevant 
institutions, whose financial strength affects the systemic financial stability, and about the 
nature of the connections, whose structure impact on the extent and the intensity of a contagion. 
Therefore, they are able to give an indication about whether or not, and how, a contagion may 
be a problem of systemic scope. Nevertheless, there are two main theoretical shortcomings of 
counterfactual simulations as systemic risk measure: they are based on too strong underlying 
assumptions, and their models present a lack of behavioral foundations. 
 
Contemporaneous measures of systemic risk 
Contemporaneous measures of systemic risk can be categorized by their declared task, in 
accordance with the necessity of the interested institution: the quantification of the fragility of 
the system, or the monitoring of the actual evolution of a financial crisis.  
Measuring financial fragility has multiple purposes: signaling the intensity of an ongoing 
distress, and in general informing about the present state of the system; identifying the 
financially weak or failing institutions, sectors and markets; allowing the implementation of 
appropriate public interventions from those authorities which have a public mandate and must 
comply with some duties of communication with the media. The focus, given the nature of the 
systemic risk, and the way it unfolds, is always to operate within compressed time frames, in 
order to properly face and work out any systemic imbalance. For that reason, these 
contemporaneous measures allow to evaluate signals about the fragility of the system on a daily 
or even intra-daily basis. Among these frequently updated measures, there are SES measure, 
CoVaR measure, Co-Risk and the contingent claims analysis. 
The second need satisfied by contemporaneous measures is the monitoring of the evolution of 
a financial crisis. In particular, they allow to track the evolution of a distress when it unfolds, 
and they are a powerful tool for policy makers dealing with a crisis, and with the necessity to 
work out appropriate policies in rapid times. For instance, they include the Mahalanobis 
distance, the Noise as Information for Illiquidity and other tools from the Principal Component 
Analysis. 
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Ex-post measures of systemic risk 
Ex-post measures of systemic risk are a fundamental component of a more general ex-post 
analysis, very useful for the identification of some weaknesses in the financial sectors and some 
defects in the regulatory and supervisory system, allowing for any important reform. Moreover, 
by deepening and quantifying the most relevant structural vulnerabilities of financial markets 
it is possible to better understand the gaps in the regulation and in the control system, and to 
remedy accordingly. For these purposes, the ex-post measurement is the starting point, and this 
is continuously evaluated, even after a systemic event: its role for a coordinated transparent 
response by policy makers and for addressing the choices of market participants, especially in 
case of panic, is fundamental. 
These measures have two further sub-categories: measures for forensic analysis and measure 
for orderly resolution. 
Forensic analysis is based on a method of investigation whose objective is to detect and record 
causes, consequences and sequence of events in cases of adversity in the financial system, in 
order to identify institutions’ liabilities (in general, it is related to courts of law for criminal 
matters). This analysis includes the usage of a set of tools and technical expertise, including the 
measurement, for the collection of information about the system working, the participants’ 
integrity and the completeness of regulation. It is a rational procedure to deal with adverse 
events, and to proceed with resulting recovery of damages, as the redefinition of the regulatory 
framework. 
The second subgroup refers to those ex-post systemic risk measures which play an important 
role for an orderly resolution of failing institutions. In particular, Brunnermeier, Gorton, and 
Krishnamurthy proposed a real “risk topography”, that is the deep and complete study of the 
shape and features of the whole financial system, seen as a network of contractual connections. 
In particular, risk topography is a network-based model, based on the inference from each 
financial institution of the “sensitivity” of their capital account and liquidity to a set of pre-
specified possible scenarios and factors (for instance, they should report the amount of profit 
and loss, and the variation of their liquidity position, stemming from a unitary change in the 
Liquidity Mismatch Index, or in the house price, or in the interest rate, and so on). The 
topography is centered on these two dimensions, capital gain and liquidity change, because they 
are considered the most significant determinants of the behavior of financial institutions during 
financial crisis. Then, a panel dataset is created by pooling all the responses from each 
institution to the same scenarios on each reporting date (quarterly or monthly). Authors 
highlighted two main advantages of this approach:  
1) it allows to enhance the regulatory risk assessment and the macro-prudential 
supervision performed both by public authorities and the same institutions, if the 
dataset is made publicly available; in particular, the analysis of the dataset may uncover 
the presence of risk and liquidity “pockets” within the financial system, that is, of 
excessive imbalances and risk exposures, unawares undertaken by each firm, that may 
result in a large systemic concern; 
2) it would provide to the researchers the complete essential data needed for current 






2.2  Early Warning Indicators for Systemic Risk 
Financial risk analysis requires a complete collection of data and the knowledge of a set of tools 
and techniques for the assessment of vulnerabilities and risks; at the same time, the monitoring 
and warning system require the detection and the analysis of causal links among those relevant 
variables determining the systemic risk. In general, the ultimate objective of an Early Warning 
System (EWS) is not to predict the exact timing of a crisis, but to estimate at each moment the 
probability of given adverse events to occur within a specific time horizon, and then to quickly 
and clearly communicate information and warnings about probable incoming dangers for the 
institutions, which can consequently respond and prudently act to protect itself with right 
policies. 
EWIs is able to anticipate extreme movements in the financial cycle, that is, as defined by Borio, 
the “self-reinforcing interactions between perceptions of value and risk, risk-taking, and 
financing constraints”. These interactions between investors’ perceptions and risk-taking give 
life to a sequence of financial expansions and contractions, which can be reflected in the 
economic cycle as well. The theoretical focus underlying this type of tools applied on the 
financial market is the endogenously determined systemic risk. In particular, the outsize 
financial booms are the right background to create the conditions of a financial crisis, with high 
risk propensity from economic agents, dangerously increasing credit supply and asset prices 
well away from assets fundamentals. Precisely, a standard EWS can be based on the setting of 
specific thresholds for the evolution of the private debt or asset prices: when the actual price 
significantly deviates from its long-run trends, overcoming prefixed threshold, it is reasonable 
to assume an ongoing increase in systemic risk, that is in probability of a financial crisis due to 
a financial bubble. Among variables that can be used for the detection of countries’ financial 
systemic risk, there are: 
• the credit-to-GDP ratio gap is the difference between the credit-to-GDP ratio and its 
long-term path; if this gap widens, then a financial imbalance is emerging, with the 
consequent increase in the systemic risk of disruption;  
• the house price gap is the deviation of inflation-adjusted property prices from their 
long-term path; its working is similar to the previous one; 
• the Debt Service Ratio (DSR) is the ratio between the debt service (interest payments 
and amortizations) and the income from the international trade; a DSRs increase signals 
a credit expansion, as credit growth is reflected into a higher debt service; 
• other ratios of the type of DSR, but based on sub-groups of debt, such as foreign 
currency debt or household debt, can be considered. 
For instance, the household debt issue has been studied in depth in recent literature. Countries 
where household debt is particularly high and increasing, such as in Netherlands, face periods 
with high consumption and a continuing GDP growth: this economic overheating can be 
detrimental for the long-run structural economic growth and for the banking system health, that 
chances a crisis. Another type of DSR considers the foreign currency debt or the cross-border 
debt, in order to evaluate the role of current account deficits or exchange rate evolution in the 
boost of systemic risk. Many studies have proven that levels of household debt and foreign debt 
are effective in surveying presence of increasing vulnerability in the system, since the 
respective indicators tend to show abnormal values over their trend during those pre-crisis 
phases in which systemic risk is increasing. These variables, even more if combined together, 
may be rather useful to extract information about probable future cumulative distress in the 
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banking system. Moreover, combining information from different variables remarkably 
improves the precision of these indicators. In fact, they showed some peaks before recent crisis, 
and for that they can be considered as good predictors of systemic risk. For all these reasons, 
policy makers have focused on studying and monitoring the household debt and the foreign 
debt as crucial variables to look at for financial stability purposes. 
In particular, policy makers should integrate EWIs within a wider and more complete analysis, 
and must be certain of the utility and robustness of the indicators. There are some specific 
properties and characteristics that EWIs should comply with to be useful in detecting the 
presence of systemic risk (Drehmann and Juselius, 2014).  
1) A statistical forecasting power of EWIs based on real time evolution of the variable of 
interest is needed for a correct implementation of time-varying macro-prudential 
policies. 
2) The timing of the signal issue is fundamental: it should emerge before a crisis, early 
enough to be effective and useful for a correct implementation of remedial policies, but 
not too early in order to avoid some detrimental and unnecessary restrictions. 
3) The stability of the signal is required to be sure of the feasibility of a new policy. In fact, 
policy makers should implement a new policy on the basis of clear long-term evolutions 
and trends of crucial variables, and not on the basis of outliers and unstable indicators. 
Therefore, EWIs should issue stable and persistent signals, reducing uncertainty on 
trends and not reducing the forecasting power when a crisis is approaching. 
4) EWI signals should be transparent, easy to interpret and linked to the financial cycle 
theory. In fact, there is evidence (Lawrence et al., 2006) that counterintuitive and not 
easily interpretable forecasts and signals are ignored by policy makers, and this makes 
EWIs less useful. Moreover, the low complexity of EWIs contributes to reducing the risk 
of overfitting. An overfitted model is a very complex statistical model which is adapted 
to observed data just because it has an excessive number of parameters with respect to 
the number of observations. In fact, even a completely wrong model can perfectly fit and 
explain dataset, but it produces unreliable predictions. 
As said, a basic element of these indicators is the critical threshold, which can be derived 
through different methodologies, and that allow to identify warning signal when the variable 
crosses it. In general, it needs to find, within a range of potential thresholds applied on a large 
panel dataset on more countries over a long time, the one which allows to significantly signal 
a warning when it is crossed. A crisis is correctly predicted if warning signals emerge whenever 
the threshold is crossed in the periods immediately preceding the crisis. It is possible to identify 
the right threshold by minimizing the noise-to-signal ratio, that is the ratio between the number 
of false alarms (warnings appearing even when no crisis occurs) and the number of correct 
warning signals (warnings appearing when the crisis occurs). In fact, being a minimization 
problem, there is an error term whatever the chosen threshold: it should be set in order to be 
able to correctly predict the highest number of crisis. The higher the number of predicted crisis, 
the higher the reliability of EWI, given the lowest number of false alarms. 
There are some caveats to consider in this framework. 
As said, the false alarms occur whenever warning signals are issued but no crisis followed. This 
does not necessarily indicate a malfunction of the indicator, since there two possibilities: either 
there are specific factors that affect the variable of interest without being linked to the systemic 
risk (and in this case the signal launched by the indicator is not significant), or the threshold is 
crossed because of a real increase of systemic risk, but the crisis does not occur since the 
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imbalance automatically disappears before the possible materialization of the crisis. Then, some 
warning signals are not necessarily succeeded by a crisis, and for that, in order to evaluate the 
performance of the EWI, it is useful to look at the fraction of crisis effectively occurred within 
a certain period of time, conditional on the breach of the threshold.  
In any case, even if the systemic risk is correctly identified by EWI, the conveyed information 
does not refer to the precise timing of the future crisis, but just to the increased probability of 
systemic distress. More precisely, EWIs are not able to signal an intensification of financial 
imbalances, but only the presence of dangerous imbalances, through a dichotomous outcome. 
Moreover, these indicators need to be interpreted with caution: their calibration is based on the 
historical evolution of the variable of interest, and for that they do not take into account more 
recent innovations in institutions and economic structure. In fact, the overall resilience to shocks 
of the system is a function of the regulatory environment (microeconomic and macroeconomic 
policies) and of the same technological and financial innovations, and this would require 
continuous re-calibrations of the indicators. Therefore, it would be better if EWIs were 
considered just a part of a more complete set of tools used to detect systemic risk and other 
vulnerabilities under different facets, and then just the first step of a broader analysis in the 
assessment of financial risk.  
Finally, there are four important shortcomings related to EWIs: 
• these indicators are constructed on historical dataset and specific relations among 
variables; the consequence is that, if a random innovation or a structural break occurs, 
a new specification of the underlying EWIs model is requires, in order to not lose the 
initial predictive power and to maintain the consistency of the indicator; 
• the heterogeneity of the financial systems across countries makes the EWIs’ intrinsic 
scheme of “one-size-fits-all” not valid; then, the thresholds set for an economy may not 
be the best one for other economies, because of countries’ specific characteristics; in 
general, it seems not possible to construct a standard indicator to be applied to countries 
based on the patterns provided by a single country, given the asymmetries of the 
systems and the impacts of adverse events; 
• EWIs are constructed to test the presence of systemic risk and vulnerabilities strictly 
referred to the economic and financial cycle, that is the endogenous alternation of 
phases of expansion and contraction within the system, and not to structural breaks and 
other random factors that may trigger a crisis without being linked to the natural cycle 
(such as those crises due to unsustainable sovereign debts, bad management of the 
monetary policy, fraudulent behaviors of important institutions); 
• since crises are rare events, there may be problems of data limitation and significance, 
even in presence of a wide coverage; the consequence is the impossibility to create a 
robust and complete framework for the application of EWIs, and hence a particular 
focus is required in the selection of dataset. 
Another fundamental point is the evaluation of the performance of the EWI, that is its 
robustness and capacity to issue right early warnings and to detect an increase of systemic risk.  
As usual in the statistical testing, two different possible kinds of errors should be analyzed: 
• type I error is the rejection of the null hypothesis when it is true; it is also known as 
"false positive", and emerges when the systemic risk has really increased, and a crisis is 
effectively oncoming, but the warning indicator fails to signal it; 
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• type II error is the acceptation of the null hypothesis when it is false; it is also known as 
"false negative" or “false alarms”, and emerges when the warning indicator signals an 
increase in systemic risk and in probability of an incoming crisis even though this risk 
is not real. 
Since the complete elimination of both kinds of errors is not possible, and since the reduction 
of one of them implies the increase of the other one, the evaluation of EWIs’ performance 
consists of the assessment of the trade-off between the error types, looking at their joint 
minimization. In particular, the procedure for the construction of a robust EWI requires the 
achievement of an optimal trade-off between the correct predictions and the false alarms: a 
perfect and totally informative EWI does not exhibit any error, and then provides the right 
positive signals whenever a crisis is really incoming, and negative signals the rest of the time. 
At the other extreme, a totally uninformative EWI provides signals without any reliability, not 
very different from the outcomes of a coin toss. In reality, plausible EWIs are between two 
extremes, and their position can be assessed through appropriate tools. For example, a common 
and useful instrument for the evaluation of EWIs’ performance is the Receiver Operating 
Characteristic (ROC) curve, that is a graphical plot representing the true positive rate (i.e. the 
probability of correct predictions) against the false positive rate (i.e. the probability of false 
alarms) for a set of thresholds. ROC curve provides a map for type I and type II errors, which 
gives indications on the informativeness of a test: by plotting the cumulative distribution 
function of probability of correct predictions in the y-axis and the cumulative distribution 
function of the probability of false alarms on the x-axis, the ROC curve is represented. The area 
under the ROC curve is a proxy of the quality of the signal issued by the indicator: for a given 
implied threshold, if this area is equal to 1, the indicator is totally informative (since its 
probability of correct predictions is 1, and its probability of false alarms is 0), while if it is equal 
to 0.50, then the indicator is totally uninformative (with a true positive rate of 50% and a false 
positive rate of 50%).   
There is a large literature on EWIs for financial system that analyzes their crucial theoretical 
aspects and tries to elaborate new frameworks and new methodologies of construction and 
calculation. Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart (1998) and Kaminsky and Reinhart (1998) 
developed operational Early Warning System for the survey of systemic risk through the 
"signal" approach. This approach is just that one described above: the evolution of a set of 
indicators is monitored in order to identify unusual paths, signaling a probable incoming crisis 
when one of them overcomes some prefixed thresholds. This approach, widely used by policy 
makers, showed to be useful in anticipating some crises (such as currency crises in 1997). 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1999) developed a multivariate empirical probability model 
for banking crises in order to monitor banking sector fragility, and created an EWS that issues 
a signal whenever a probability of a crisis crosses a specific threshold. Therefore, there are two 
basic methodologies to assess the risk of incoming crisis: the signal approach and the 
probability model. 
Davis and Karim (2008) analyzed the usefulness and the robustness of some approaches applied 
to a comprehensive dataset, and found that the most appropriate model to assess EWI signal for 
a crisis is the logit model, both at global level and a country level. Moreover, they highlighted 
the importance to take into account policy makers preferences, through a loss function, during 
the construction of an indicator and the setting of thresholds. 
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Bussiere and Fratzscher (2006) created an EWI based on a multinomial logit model, since it is 
shown that the binomial dependent variable models are not able to distinguish among more 
states of the world, like pre-crisis periods and the crisis/post-crisis periods, when the variable 
of interest undergoes an adjustment process towards a new sustainable and stable trend. By 
solving this bias, the multinomial logit model allows to improve the forecasting ability. 
As variables of interest, it is very common to consider both macroeconomic variables and 
financial variables, like it has been done by Alessi and Detken (2011), who investigated the 
relationship between short-term interest rates and bank risk, finding that unusually low interest 
rates over a long period of time make bank risk increase. They used a global measure of 
liquidity, that is the global private credit gap, for the construction of a real time signaling 
approach for asset price cycle. 
Lo Duca and Peltonen (2013) developed a new framework to assess the probability of financial 
distress, providing several important contributions to the literature. Firstly, they constructed a 
new Financial Stress Index (FSI), a country-specific composite index which tries to capture the 
beginning and the evolution of a crisis by grouping more stress measures referred to different 
segments of the financial system. In fact, when a negative shock occurs (such as a bubble burst, 
a currency crisis or a default), each segment of the financial system faces a distress, and this 
amplifies the shock all over the economy: the broader the distress, the stronger the co-
movements of financial variables and the more systemic the crisis. The considered segments of 
financial system are four: the equity market, the banking sector, the foreign exchange market, 
and the bond market. The components j of FSI, for each country i at each quarter t, are basically 
of two types, risk premia and implied volatilities: they are transformed into integers that range 
from 0 to 3, such that, when a given component value drops to the fourth quartile 𝑞𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 of the 
distribution, then it takes value 3. Therefore, the higher the value the higher the stress level, and 







FSI is useful to identify the beginning of a financial crisis. In particular, to identify systemic 
events, authors studied the relationship between the FSI and other measures of real economic 
activity. Afterwards, they created a model for the prediction of out-of-sample systemic financial 
crises by considering jointly both national and global indicators of macro-financial 
vulnerabilities in a multivariate framework. Finally, both macro-prudential indicators of 
vulnerabilities and multivariate indicators are evaluated through the usage of discrete choice 
models, and by taking into account policy makers’ preferences. In fact, many macro-prudential 
measures aim to identify and to prevent accumulating imbalances, being endowed with some 
forecasting power for systemic events. In particular, many authors (Borio and Drehmann in 
2009, or Alessi and Detken in 2009) found that global measures of liquidity are the best 
performing indicators for this purpose, since they allow policy makers to get useful information 







Theoretical Framework for New EWIs  
 
 
After having accurately presented and described the argument in the first two chapters, and 
provided a critical review of the relevant literature about the systemic risk, this third chapter 
will be dedicated to the theoretical description of framework and tools needed for the empirical 
analysis. In fact, the core of this thesis is the implementation of early warning indicators for 
systemic risk, and in particular the design of a test procedure for the survey of signals related 
to systemic risk in financial markets. This is done by performing a quantile regression on a 
Mixed-Data Sampling (MIDAS) model: these two approaches are combined to allow the 
building of this test for the identification of systemic risk, and it will consist of an application 
of the nonparametric test of Granger causality in quantile, proposed by Jeong, Hardle and Song 
(Econometric Theory, 2012). 
The purpose is to create an analytical tool that monitors the evolution of those macroeconomic 
situations where risks to financial stability become relevant. As said, the ultimate objective is 
multiple, and depends on the user’s aims: 
• to quantify the contagion risk within the financial market in order to survey SIFIs and 
their potentially dangerous interlinkages; 
• to provide signals of systemic distress from each segment of interest within the financial 
system; 
• to measure the resilience and the health of the financial system as a whole and of its key 
sectors;  
• to forecast and to anticipate crises, so that mangers can rebalance and adjust positions 
in their financial portfolios. 
However, the real advantage of an EWS is to strengthen the ability to identify incoming troubles 
within the financial system with timeliness. In general, the creation of an EWI requires the 
definition and the extent of the framework (definition of variables of interest and explanatory 
variables, data coverage across countries and markets, covered timespan), the definition of 
systemic distress and the typology of mathematical and statistical tools used in the analysis for 
the signal survey. The following sections of this chapter will describe and define the statistical 
approaches used for the design of the EWI: the quantile regression model, the MIDAS model 
and the nonparametric test of Granger causality-in-quantiles. The final part will describe in 
detail the methodology for the empirical analysis. 
 
 
3.1  Quantile Regression Models 
The quantile of order 𝜏 (or 𝜏-quantile) is that value 𝑞𝜏 of the distribution of a random variable 
𝑥 that divides it into two parts, and that includes first 𝜏*N observations in ascending order, with 
𝜏 a real number in the range [0,1] and N the number of observations. For instance, with N=50, 
the 0.1-quantile of the distribution is that value of 𝑥 that includes first 5 observations starting 
from the last one. Also, quartiles refer to those three cut quarters of the distribution, which 
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divide a dataset into four equal-sized groups; the decile is the tenth part, the median is the 0.5-
quantile and the 𝜏’th quantile is the 100*𝜏’th percentile. 
When the cumulative distribution function of the random variable 𝑥 is known, the 𝜏-quantiles 
are outputs of the quantile function: it returns the value 𝑞𝜏 of the random variable 𝑥 such that 
the probability of the variable being strictly less than 𝑞𝜏 equals the given probability, which 
corresponds to 𝜏:  
𝜏 = 𝑃𝑟ሺ𝑥 ≤ 𝑞𝜏ሻ ≡ 𝐹𝑥ሺ𝑞𝜏ሻ 
Therefore, quantile function is the inverse of the cumulative distribution function, given 𝜏:  
𝑞𝜏 = 𝐹𝑥
−1ሺ𝜏ሻ 
Quantile regression is an approach to modeling the relationship between a dependent variable 
and one or more explanatory independent variables, within a framework based on the concept 
of quantile and alternative to the more common linear regression estimated through OLS: 
whereas the method of least squares estimates the mean of the dependent variable conditional 
on a set of regressors, quantile regression estimates its conditional quantiles. In other words, 
this type of analysis allows to estimate the quantile of the distribution of 𝑦 given 𝑥, and then 
how the 𝜏th’quantile (e.g. the median) of the distribution of 𝑦 given 𝑥 changes with 𝑥. 
This type of analysis was established by Koenker and Bassett (1978), who first introduced the 
linear quantile regression and worked out a first algorithm for the computation of the proper 
coefficients. Their fundamental contribution to quantile regression was based on important past 
works in the field, mainly by Bošković, Laplace, and Edgeworth. In 1760, the mathematician 
Roger Bošković, in an attempt to confirm a suggestion by Isaac Newton, tried to estimate the 
Earth’s ellipticity by combining different measures and information on locations and latitudes 
through an alternative mathematical framework. His intuition consisted of the minimization of 
the sum of absolute deviances from respective medians, in order to obtain median regression 
slopes, and all this happened half century earlier the first formulation of the least square method 
by Legendre. Afterward, Laplace studied in deep and formalized the Bošković's ideas, and 
elaborated the so-called “method of situation”. In particular, Laplace remarked that, 
algebraically, the solution to the ellipticity problem is nothing but the computation of a 
weighted median: by minimizing the sum of absolute deviances subject to the constraint that 
the errors sum to zero, and then by imposing that the fitted line goes through the center of 
observations (average of variables), the problem becomes a regression analysis through the 
origin; by rotating the line through this artificial origin, it is possible to find that slope which 
minimizes the sum of absolute errors. In that way, Laplace suggests to estimate the intercept as 
a mean and the slope coefficient as a median. Finally, Francis Edgeworth, resuming the same 
ideas almost a century later (in 1888), gave some crucial contributions to this theoretical 
framework. He highlighted the problems related to the sample mean, whose adequacy as 
estimator heavily depends on the implausible normality assumption of data: about that, he was 
able to prove that median and mean may be very divergent under different characteristics of 
data distribution, and showed in which cases median may have smaller asymptotic variance 
than the mean. Anyway, his central work consisted of the adoption of a new geometric approach 
to median regression: he minimized the sum of absolute errors for both intercept and slope 
coefficients, discarding the Bošković -Laplace constraint of zero errors sum. Furthermore, from 
this ‘double median’ approach, he even proposed an extension for a ‘plural median’ approach 
in the multivariate case, but those few and not very powerful technological tools he had at his 
time didn’t allow him to overcome many tedious computational problems intrinsic to this 
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setting. With the widespread adoption of computers and linear programming over the last 
century, more technologically advanced and more computationally powerful tools enabled the 
completion of this approach. 
Koenker and Bassett, by resuming those previous works, started from the Edgeworth’s median 
regression estimator and ‘generalized’ it, obtaining the quantile regression estimator. 
Next subsection will present more in deep the analytical aspects of this analysis.  
 
3.1.1 Fundamentals of Quantile Regression 
Quantile regression analysis provides a very powerful explanatory and predictive statistical 
model, useful in dealing with the increasing complexity of data in a robust and flexible way. 
There are several advantages provided by the application of this type of models: on the one 
hand, they are presented as more flexible and they weaken assumptions (for instance, they fit 
conditional quantiles of the dependent variable with a general model which does not assume 
any particular parametric form for its distribution); on the other hand, they provide conclusions 
and information that no other framework is able to give (for instance, they are very useful in 
risk management since they allow to deal with problems linked to tails of conditional 
distributions or to modeling a whole conditional distribution). 
The first step is the description of the quantile regression model under an analytical point of 
view, starting from the list of required assumptions. There are three basic assumptions to be 
met for the usage of quintile regression. 
• The zero conditional quantile assumption. Similarly to the Ordinary Least Square 
estimator of the Linear Regression Model, even in the quantile regression the error term 
must not be correlated with the set of explanatory variables. In particular, as OLS 
estimator is unbiased and consistent if the model 𝔼ሺ𝑦|𝒙ሻ = 𝒙𝜷 is well-specified, that 
is if 𝔼ሺ |𝒙ሻ = 0, similarly the quantile estimator is consistent if the 𝜏-quantile of 𝜏 is 
zero at any point of the 𝒙 distribution: 
ℚሺ 𝜏|𝒙ሻ = 0 
such that ℚሺ𝑦𝜏|𝒙ሻ = 𝒙𝜷. Therefore, the unbiasedness of estimated quantiles of order 
𝜏 of the dependent variable, conditional on the vector of explanatory variables, is 
satisfied when the zero conditional quantile condition of the error term is met. 
• Linearity of the model. Even though non-linear quantile regression analyses are 
available, in this framework, for simplicity, it is assumed a linear dependence between 
the response variable and other explanatory variables. In fact, the linear relationship 
may be an accurate specification of the actual relationship among variables, especially 
if no specific form is surveyed. 
• For problems related to efficiency of the estimator, it needs to take into account very 
large samples and a very continuous response variable, as well as independence of 
observations. 
It is worth noting that these assumptions are fewer and much less stringent than those required 
by OLS estimator: the distribution of 𝑦
𝜏
 conditional on 𝒙 is not assumed to have a normal 
distribution; sample observations of dependent and independent variables are not required to 
be independent and identically distributed (I.I.D.) draws from a joint distribution, and other 
specific assumptions, like homoskedasticity, do not apply; finally, the nonzero finite fourth 
moments of observations are not required, because quantile regression is robust to outliers of 
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dependent variable (but it is less robust to outliers and extremes of the explanatory variables, 
and for these cases the weighted quantile regression becomes more appropriate). 
A further issue refers to the assumptions on the error term. As known, if the least squares 
assumptions hold and if the errors are homoscedastic, uncorrelated and have expected value of 
zero (whatever the type of distribution), then OLS is BLUE (Best Linear Unbiased Estimator), 
since it is the estimator with the lowest sampling variance within the class of linear unbiased 
estimators. In the quantile regression model, the assumption of I.I.D. errors can be useful to 
simplify the underlying mathematics, allowing quickly derivation of some asymptotic 
properties. Unfortunately, the hypothesis of I.I.D. errors is actually likely to be violated, and 
for this reason, other tools can be implemented for both the OLS estimates and quantile 
estimates: the ‘robust’ option (that is the regression performed with modified standard errors, 
robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering), or resampling techniques (such as the bootstrap). 
The basic model of ordinary quantile regression is now described. Consider a target random 
variable Y as a scalar real macroeconomic factor characterized by the following distribution 
function: 
𝐹ሺ𝑦ሻ = 𝑃𝑟 ሺ𝑌 ≤ 𝑦ሻ 
The τ-th quantile of Y, for any τ ∈ (0, 1), is its inverse probability distribution function, defined 
as: 
ℚ𝜏ሺ𝑦ሻ = 𝑖𝑛𝑓 {𝑦: 𝑃𝑟 ሺ𝑌 ≤ 𝑦ሻ ≥ 𝜏} 
that is the infimum of y such that the distribution function of y takes a value that is strictly 
greater than the prefixed order 𝜏 of quantile. The quantile function ℚ𝜏ሺ𝑦ሻ, such as the 
distribution function 𝐹ሺ𝑦ሻ, completely characterizes the random variable Y.  
The 𝜏-th sample quantiles can be seen as solutions to an optimization problem. As shown by 
Koenker, the quantile can be interpreted as the minimizer of some "check function", or "loss 
function", denoted as 𝜌
𝜏
(⋅). This different point of view based on an optimization problem is 
analogous for other statistical measures, as the mean. Indeed, given a sample {𝑦1, … , 𝑦𝑛} from 
a single distribution 𝐹ሺ𝑦ሻ, it can be shown that the sample mean is the solution to the problem: 
𝑦 = 𝑎𝑟𝑔 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝜉 σ𝑖 ሺ𝑦𝑖 − 𝜉ሻ
2 
the sample median is the solution to: 
𝒬
^
0.5ሺ𝑦ሻ = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛𝜉 σ𝑖 |𝑦𝑖 − 𝜉| 
and the sample 𝜏-th quantile is the solution to: 
𝒬
^
𝜏ሺ𝑦ሻ = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛𝜉 σ𝑖 𝜌𝜏ሺ𝑦𝑖 − 𝜉ሻ 
with quantile loss function:  
𝜌𝜏ሺ𝑢ሻ = 𝑢ሺ𝜏 − 𝐼𝑢<0ሻ 
In other words, quantiles are identified as those points 𝜉 of the domain of the function 
σ𝑖𝜌𝜏
ሺ𝑦𝑖 − 𝜉ሻ at which its values are minimized. The extension from the sample problem to the 
regression framework consists of replacing the 𝜉 by the regression function 𝑥𝑖
′𝛽𝜏, where 𝑥𝑖 is 
a 𝐾 × 1 vector of regressors, in order to minimize the total "loss" of residuals defined by 𝜌(⋅). 
Hence, the check function is an asymmetric absolute loss function that retrieves the 𝜏-th sample 
quantiles, whose 𝑢, that is the argument of the function 𝜌, is just the model residuals, namely 
the difference between the observations 𝑦𝑖 and the fitted values 𝑥𝑖
′𝛽𝜏. In particular, 𝜌(⋅) assigns 
weights τ if the error is positive and (τ − 1) if the error is negative, being I(.) an indicator 
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function equal to 1 whenever u<0, and zero otherwise. Therefore, check function gives 
asymmetric weights to the error, depending on the quantile and the sign of the error. 
 
The quantiles can be written as solutions to the optimization problem: 
?̂?𝜏ሺ𝑦ሻ = argmin𝜉∈ℝ 𝔼[𝜌𝜏ሺ𝑌 − 𝜉ሻ] 
which, by applying the analogy principle, becomes: 
?̂?𝜏ሺ𝑦ሻ = argmin𝜉∈ℝ σ𝑖=1
𝑛 𝜌𝜏ሺ𝑦𝑖 − 𝜉ሻ 
whereby, for some 𝜏 ∈ (0, 1), we have to find ?̂? = 𝑥?̂? to minimize the expected loss:  
𝔼[𝜌𝜏ሺ𝑌 − ?̂?ሻ] = ሺ𝜏 − 1ሻන ሺ𝑦 − ?̂?ሻ𝑑𝐹ሺ𝑦ሻ
?̂?
−∞




By differentiating with respect to ?̂?, the optimality condition is: 
ሺ𝜏 − 1ሻන 𝑑𝐹ሺ𝑦ሻ
?̂?
−∞
− 𝜏 න 𝑑𝐹ሺ𝑦ሻ
∞
?̂?
= 𝐹ሺ?̂?ሻ − 𝜏 = 0 
Any element of 𝑦 such that 𝐹ሺ𝑦ሻ = 𝜏 minimizes the expected loss, given the monotonicity of 
𝐹. If the solution is unique, then ?̂? = 𝐹−1ሺ𝑦ሻ, otherwise there exists a set of 𝜏-th quantiles from 
which the smallest one will be chosen. 
Given the usual linear regression model 𝑦𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖
′𝛽𝜏 + 𝑢𝑖, and the quantile restriction condition 
𝒬𝜏ሺ𝑢𝜏|𝒙ሻ = 0 described above, it is possible to re-write the distribution function of 𝑦 as: 
𝐹ሺ𝜏 − 𝑥𝑖
′𝛽𝜏|𝑥𝑖ሻ = Pr ሺ𝑦𝑖 ≤ 𝜏|𝑥𝑖ሻ 
and we get the linear conditional quantile function: 
𝒬𝜏|𝑋=𝑥ሺ𝑦𝑖ሻ =  𝑥𝑖
′𝛽𝜏 
In the Koenker and Bassett’s specification, expectation-based quantile representation is used 
for handling conditioning information sets, and the future quantiles of 𝑦𝑡+1, conditional on 
information set Ι𝑡, are functions of observables 𝒙𝒕: 
𝒬𝜏ሺ𝑦𝑡+1|Ι𝑡ሻ = 𝛽𝜏,0 + 𝜷𝝉
′ 𝒙𝒕 
Solving the optimization problem implemented on this conditional quantile function allows us 
to estimate the 𝜏-th regression quantile coefficient: 
𝛽?̂? = arg min𝛽∈ℝ𝐾σ𝑖=1
𝑛 𝜌𝜏ሺ𝑦𝑖 − 𝑥𝑖
′𝛽𝜏ሻ 
It is interesting to compare the quantile regression model with the standard linear regression 
model. As known, the standard regression model allows to estimate the conditional expectation 
of the dependent variable, that is its average response given a set of covariates: 
𝔼ሺ𝑦𝑖|𝑥𝑖ሻ =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥𝑖1 + ⋯+ 𝛽𝑝𝑥𝑖𝑝 
and the 𝛽𝑗 are estimated by solving the least squares minimization problem: 
min𝛽0,…,𝛽𝑝σ𝑖=1




Figure 3.1: Quantile Regression loss function 𝜌 
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In contrast, the conditional quantile regression model for the 𝜏-th quantile of the response 
variable, given a set of explanatory variables and the zero conditional quantile assumption, is: 
𝒬𝜏൫𝑦𝑖|𝑥𝑖൯ = 𝛽𝜏,0 + 𝛽𝜏,1𝑥𝑖,1 + ⋯+ 𝛽𝜏,𝑝𝑥𝑖,𝑝 
and the 𝛽
𝑗
 are estimated through the least absolute deviations method, which minimizes the sum 
of absolute errors: 
𝑚𝑖𝑛𝛽𝜏,0,…,𝛽𝜏,𝑝σ𝑖=1




𝜌𝜏ሺ𝑒ሻ = 𝜏𝑚𝑎𝑥ሺ𝑒;0ሻ + ሺ1 − 𝜏ሻ𝑚𝑎𝑥 ሺ−𝑒;0ሻ 
For each quantile 𝜏, the solution to this minimization problem produces a set of quantile 
regression coefficients. Moreover, they are no more constant, like in the linear regression 
model, but are now functions of the respective quantiles.  
As showed, the estimations are the result of specific optimization problems. In particular, the 
mean of a distribution is represented as that point that minimizes the average squared distance 
over population, while the quantile is that point that minimizes the same average distance, not 
squared but with weights equal to 𝜏 for points above the fitted line and (1-𝜏) for points below 
the line. To each value of 𝜏, interpretable as the proportion of the sample having values below 
the respective quantile, can be associated a specific fitted conditional quantile function, unlike 
the linear regression model. In fact, if the quantile regression model is built for 10 quantiles, 
the 10 resulting equations bring to 10 different coefficients of the explanatory variables, one 
for each conditional quantile.  
It can be noted that for different values of the 𝜏-th quantile of the response variable, the error 
terms of individual I are related, such that the distribution of 𝜏 and of 𝜄≠𝜏 are shifts of one 
another. In case of 𝜏~𝑖. 𝑖. 𝑑., the 𝜏-th quantile of the error term is not zero, but it is a constant 
𝑐 which depends on the different order considered 𝜏 and 𝜄, such that: 
𝒬𝜏൫𝑦𝑖ห𝑥𝑖൯ = 𝒬𝜄൫𝑦𝑖ห𝑥𝑖൯ + 𝑐𝜏,𝜄 
Then, under I.I.D. assumptions for the error term, the conditional quantile functions are just 
some shifts of one another, and the response variable distribution is not affected by any shape 
change. 
If we want to sum up the main difference between the linear regression model and the quantile 
regression model, it can be said that the former one focuses on the conditional mean of a 
response variable without taking into account its conditional distributional properties, that are 
“standardized” away with a set of strict assumptions, while the latter allows the complete 
analysis of the conditional distributional properties of the variable of interest. In particular, 
there are at least three features to be mentioned. 
• The inadequacy of the conditional mean from a distributional point of view. In the linear 
regression model, the mean of the distribution is used to represent its central tendency 
and describe the relative impact of some covariates, but, in cases of asymmetric 
distributions, it may be inadequate to identify both shape shifts and the right impact on 
variable of interest. Indeed, in case of symmetric distributions, mean and median 
coincide, but with skewed distribution the median becomes more appropriate to 
represent the central tendency. For these cases, the conditional median regression 
model, and, more in general, the conditional quantile regression model, provide the best 
analysis for modeling location changes.  
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• The violation of homoskedasticity assumption. In the linear regression model, the 
homoskedasticity assumption requires the variance of the response variable 𝑦𝑖, 
conditional on the explanatory variable 𝑥𝑖, to be constant for any observation i. Anyway, 
if the homoskedasticity does not hold, and there are different probability density 
functions for different values of explanatory variable, the conditional mean may become 
not useful to understand how 𝑥𝑖 affects 𝑦𝑖. The quantile regression model overcomes 
this shortcoming.  
• The violation of one-model assumption. One of the conditions of OLS estimator is that 
the data have nonzero finite fourth moments, that is large outliers are unlikely. This 
assumption is needed in order to avoid undue influence on the fitted regression line, but 
it has a cost: the necessity to eliminate eventual outliers reduces the reliability and the 
precision of the analysis, since information is lacking (this aspect becomes relevant in 
those study about social stratifications or distributions, like income distribution). The 
quantile regression model allows to evaluate any aspect of the distribution, without 
renouncing any information.   
It can be useful to summarize the main differences between linear regression framework and 
quantile regression framework, as done in the following table.  
 
Linear Regression  Quantile Regression  
It models the conditional mean 𝔼ሺ𝑌|𝑋ሻ It models the conditional quantiles  𝒬𝜏ሺ𝑌|𝑋ሻ 
Sensitive to outliers Robust to outliers 
Assumption on distribution is desirable Unknown distribution 
Computationally inexpensive Computationally intensive 
No large dataset required Large dataset required 
 
The coefficients estimation resulting from the quantile optimization problem benefits from 
many important properties, as shown by Koenker and Bassett. Several such properties of 
quantile regression estimators are defined by the concept of “equivariance”: when the data is 
altered in some predictable way, no fundamental effect on quantile estimation is expected to 
occur, that is the regression estimates should change such that the interpretation of the results 
is invariant. The classical example is the rescaling in a model for a temperature of a liquid: if 
the scientists decide to change the scale of the temperature from Fahrenheit to Centigrade, the 
model should not provide different substantial results. Authors managed to prove this. Four 
basic equivariance properties are presented below. 
Let ?̂?ሺ𝜏; 𝑦; 𝑋ሻ be the 𝜏-th regression quantile coefficient obtained from 𝑦 and 𝑋; let 𝑎 > 0 be a 
real number and 𝛾 ∈ 𝑅𝑝 be a unit basis vector; let 𝐴 be a 𝑝 × 𝑝 nonsingular matrix; finally, the 
order 𝜏 ∈ [0,1]. Then, three specific properties are showed. 
1) Scale equivariance: 
?̂?ሺ𝜏; 𝑎𝑦; 𝑋ሻ = 𝑎?̂?ሺ𝜏; 𝑦; 𝑋ሻ  
?̂?ሺ𝜏; −𝑎𝑦;𝑋ሻ = 𝑎?̂?ሺ1 − 𝜏; 𝑦; 𝑋ሻ   
2) Shift equivariance: 
?̂?ሺ𝜏; 𝑦 + 𝑋𝛾;𝑋ሻ = ?̂?ሺ𝜏; 𝑦; 𝑋ሻ + 𝛾 
3) Equivariance to reparameterization of design: 
?̂?ሺ𝜏; 𝑦; 𝑋𝐴ሻ = 𝐴−1?̂?ሺ𝜏; 𝑦; 𝑋ሻ 
Table 3.1: Comparison between Linear Regression and Quantile Regression 
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Another equivariance property is described by authors as very important to show the great 
potential of quantile regression. Let ℎሺ. ሻ be a nondecreasing monotonic function on 𝑅, and Y 
a random variable, then the quantiles of the transformed random variable ℎሺ𝑌ሻ  are simply the 
transformed quantiles of the original Y (property not always shared with the mean). This 
property is formalized in the following point. 
4) Equivariance to monotone transformations: 
𝒬𝜏|𝑥ሺℎሺ𝑌ሻሻ = ℎሺ𝒬𝜏|𝑥ሺ𝑌ሻሻ 
This property follows from observing that: 
Prሺ𝑌 < 𝑦|𝑥ሻ = Pr ሺℎሺ𝑌ሻ < ℎሺ𝑦ሻ|𝑥ሻ 
and has many important implications. When considering a transformation of the response 
variable 𝑦, such as ℎሺ𝑦ሻ (e.g. a logarithmic transformation), some important assumptions in 
linear regression model (e.g. linearity in model specification, homoskedasticity of the new 
dependent variable, or the normality assumption for residuals) may be violated, because the 
OLS estimator does not enjoy the property 4), while quantile regression estimator does. For 
instance, if a transformation of 𝑦 is performed, such as 𝐹 = 𝑒𝑦, and if 𝒬𝜏ሺ𝑦|𝑋ሻ = 𝑋𝛽𝜏, 
then: 𝒬𝜏ሺ𝐹|𝑋ሻ = 𝐹ሺ𝒬𝜏ሺ𝑦|𝑋ሻሻ = 𝑒
𝑋𝛽𝜏 . 
In the multiple regression, another basic condition, called “subgradient optimality condition” 
was analytically described by Koenker and Bassett. The details will not be covered in this 
context, but the general conclusions, since this condition crucially characterizes the quantile 
regression. As shown by authors, the observations ሺ𝑦, 𝑋ሻ are said to be ‘in general position’ if, 
for any ℎ ∈ ℋ: 
𝑦𝑖 − 𝑥𝑖𝑏ሺℎሻ ≠ 0        ∀𝑖 ∉ ℎ 
where ℎ is an index 𝑝-element subsets of the first 𝑛 integers, 𝑋ሺℎሻ is a submatrix of the 
nonsingular matrix X with rows {𝑥𝑖: 𝑖 ∈ ℎ}, and 𝑦ሺℎሻ is a 𝑝-vector with coordinates {𝑦𝑖: 𝑖 ∈
ℎ}. Then, coefficients vector in its basic form is  𝑏ሺℎሻ =  𝑋ሺℎሻ−1𝑦ሺℎሻ. If ሺ𝑦, 𝑋ሻ are in general 
position, there exists a solution to quantile regression optimization problem of the form 𝑏ሺℎሻ =
 𝑋ሺℎሻ−1𝑦ሺℎሻ, if and only if: 
ሺ𝜏 − 1ሻ𝟏𝑝 ≤ 𝜉ℎ ≤ 𝜏𝟏𝑝 
where 𝜉ℎ = σ𝑖∈ℎ𝜓𝜏ሺ𝑦𝑖 − 𝑥𝑖
′𝑏ሺℎሻሻ𝑥𝑖
′𝑋ሺℎሻ−1 and 𝜓𝜏= 𝜏 − 𝐼𝑢<0, with ℎ the complement of ℎ. 
Moreover, if the inequalities are strict, 𝑏ሺℎሻ is a unique solution. 
Finally, there is another important characteristic of sample quantile regression, that is its 
robustness: an alteration in the order statistics above the median in such way that they remain 
above the median, does not change the position of the same median. Robustness properties are 
very important for quantile estimation and inference, whose outcomes and distributions are not 
influenced by the order statistics or specific observations, but rather by the local behavior of 
the conditional distribution of the response near the specified quantile. Therefore, any of the 𝑦 
observations may be arbitrary altered without causing changes in the initial solution 𝛽?̂?. At the 
same time, there is a higher sensitivity of quantile regression estimates to the sign of the 
residuals, which matter in affecting it, and to the observations {𝑥𝑖}. Authors explained that 𝑦 
can be freely moved up or down provided that the fitted 𝜏-th quantile regression plane is not 
crossed without altering the fit, and this highlights that observations are never neglect, but they 
equally contribute in the estimation process. This property has been formalized in such a way: 
?̂?ሺ𝜏; 𝑦; 𝑋ሻ = ?̂?ሺ𝜏; 𝑋?̂?ሺ𝜏; 𝑦; 𝑋ሻ + 𝐷ሺ𝑦 − 𝑋?̂?ሺ𝜏; 𝑦; 𝑋ሻሻ𝑦; 𝑋ሻ 
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where 𝐷 is a diagonal matrix with nonnegative elements 𝑑𝑖. This is an important feature, even 
for the interpretation of the quantile regression. 
Moreover, in those cases in which conditional densities of the response variable are 
heterogenous and change with observations, there might be loss of robustness and efficiency of 
the estimator. The introduction of a suitably weighted quantile regression (WQR) model, which 
combines strengths across multiple quantile regressions by using data-dependent weights at 
different quantiles obtained from a sparsity function, may lead to an efficiency improvement. 
WQR estimates are more robust and efficient, but computationally more costly. In particular, 




𝑛 𝑓𝑖ሺ𝜉𝑖ሻ𝜌𝜏ሺ𝑦𝑖 − 𝑥𝑖
′𝛽𝜏ሻ 
where 𝑓𝑖ሺ𝜉𝑖ሻ represents the weights associated to 𝜉𝑖 for each observation 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝑛. 
Let = ሺ 1, … , 𝑛ሻ
𝑇 be a vector of random errors, 𝐹ሺ ሻ its distribution function, 𝑓ሺ ሻ its density 








−1ሻ is called “sparsity function”, or “quantile-density function, and it is the 
density of each observation 𝑖 at the quantile of interest 𝑘. Hence, the WQR estimator is more 
efficient and reliable than the simple QR estimator since the sample information is processed 
in a more effective way through the inclusion of normalized weights 𝑤𝑘






Given 𝜏 = 𝜏𝑘 , the solution to the previous optimization problem is the WQR estimate, which 





3.1.2 Interpretation and Inference in the Quantile Regression  
As said, while OLS regression is the most widely used parametric model, relying on 
assumptions not often met, quantile regression requires no particular assumption on the 
distribution of the residuals, and allow to survey different aspects of the relationship between 
the response variable and the explanatory variables. Therefore, quantile regression model and 
coefficients require a different interpretation with respect to linear regression model. 
Indeed, in a standard linear regression model, such as: 
𝔼ሺ𝑌|𝑋 = 𝑥ሻ = 𝑥′𝛽 
𝛽 is the expected change in 𝑦 due to a unit change in 𝑥, when all the other covariates are held 
constant. It is the expected value of the partial derivative of 𝑦 with respect to 𝑥𝑗: 
𝜕𝔼ሺ𝑌|𝑋 = 𝑥ሻ
𝜕𝑥𝑗
= 𝛽𝑗  
On the other hand, a quantile regression model with a monotone transformation of the 
response variable (remind the property of equivariance to monotone transformations: 
𝒬𝜏|𝑋=𝑥ሺℎሺ𝑌ሻሻ = ℎሺ𝒬𝜏|𝑋=𝑥ሺ𝑌ሻሻ), such as: 
𝒬𝜏|𝑋=𝑥ሺℎሺ𝑌ሻሻ = 𝑥′𝛽𝜏 








For example, with a logarithmic transformation:  
𝒬𝜏|𝑋=𝑥ሺ𝑙𝑜𝑔ሺ𝑌ሻሻ = 𝑥′𝛽𝜏 





The interpretation of the coefficients in the quantile regression is analogous to that in the linear 
standard regression: while in the latter, coefficients express the impact of a unit change in the 
explanatory variable on the conditional mean of response variable, in the former one, they 
express the impact on the conditional 𝜏th quantile. Typically, predictive models of socio-
economic phenomena tend to focus on the central tendency through the conditional mean of the 
variable of interest, often by assuming a steady distribution over time and over observations. 
Actually, the relationship at different points in the conditional distribution of the variable of 
interest does change within many frameworks, and quantile regression model fits very well 
with the description of it. Therefore, while the mean regression helps to understand how the 
conditional mean of 𝑦 is affected by covariates 𝑋, quantile regression helps to identify an impact 
of covariates on 𝑦 at each quantile of its conditional distribution: this allows to get a complete 
description and view about the distribution of 𝑦 conditional on each value of 𝑋, and then to 
understand the deep relationship among variables. This makes the quantile estimation method 
a very effective tool for exploration of the potential effects of a set of covariates 𝑋 on the whole 
distribution of 𝑦, not only on its mean. For this reason, unlike standard regression, the quantile 
regression allows to model a family of curves, that need to be interpreted, and to analyze 
particular segments of the conditional distributions. Moreover, it allows to test the I.I.D. error 
assumption of OLS estimator: if the slope quantile regression coefficients randomly fluctuate 
around a constant level, and at the same time the intercept systematically increases with 𝑥, then 
there is evidence of homoskedasticity (otherwise, there is heteroskedasticity). 
Quantile regression methods have been widely used in economics and finance (e.g. to study the 
impact of some specific determinants and policies on wages, on students’ performance or on 
income distribution) as a flexible statistical tool. The point is that explanatory variables are 
unlikely to affect the response variable so as to shift the entire distribution equally by a fixed 
quantity, but rather so as to hit in different ways and with different intensities each quantile 
class of the dependent variable. Such pattern can be surveyed within the quantile regression 
framework. 
It may be useful to understand the utility of the quantile regression, and the best circumstances 
to adopt it. In general, the quantile regression is a valid option whenever the conditional mean 
fails to fully and reliably capture the data pattern:  
• in case of skewed data and asymmetric distribution, it allows to study the true 
distributional relationship of variables; 
• in case of multimodal data and data with outliers, it maintains its robustness; 
• in case of heteroskedasticity, it fits very well in dealing with it. 
Therefore, quantile regression allows to get a more comprehensive analysis of the relationship 
among variables, and its biggest advantage is the robustness to outliers in the response variable. 
Moreover, it may be quite useful in those cases with high complexity of interactions but a weak 
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relationship between the means of variables (e.g. in ecology), as well as when percentile curves 
and impacts on extreme values requires a particular focus (e.g. in finance).  
In economics, the predictive quantile regression model allows to investigate potentially 
nonlinear dynamics among macroeconomic variables, without assuming a parametric 
distribution, but letting the shape of the distribution fully depend on the predictors. Indeed, the 
quantile model detects the effects of predictors on different parts of the response distribution, 
and this allows to predict the quantiles. In this regard, this model seems to be particularly 
suitable for investigating the impact of systemic risk on macroeconomic shocks’ tail, and useful 
for the issue of reliable early warning signals for systemic risks at appropriate forecasting 
horizons. 
After showing the utility of quantile regression and the characteristics in the interpretation of 
coefficients, it is necessary to understand how to elicit robust and reliable statistical conclusions 
from data analysis. In this regard, conditional quantile regression seems to offer an easier 
interpretable objective for statistical analysis. Koenker and Bassett described the relevant 
literature on the asymptotic theory of quantile regression, and used it to present reliable tools 
for inference. 
The basic asymptotic property is the consistency. Given the parametric form of the conditional 
quantile function of 𝑌: 
𝒬𝜏|𝑋=𝑥ሺ𝑌ሻ = 𝑔ሺ𝑥, 𝛽𝜏ሻ 
then, its estimator: 
𝛽?̂? = arg min𝛽∈ℝ𝐾σ𝑖=1
𝑛 𝜌𝜏ሺ𝑦𝑖 − 𝑔ሺ𝑥, 𝛽𝜏ሻሻ 
converges in probability to 𝛽𝜏: 
∥ 𝛽?̂? − 𝛽𝜏 ∥→ 0  as  𝑛 → ∞ 
In an ordinary univariate sample quantile framework, with: 
𝜉?̂? = arg min𝜉∈ℝ𝐾σ𝑖=1
𝑛 𝜌𝜏ሺ𝑦𝑖 − 𝜉𝜏ሻ 
it can be proved from the monotonicity of the sub-gradient condition that: 
𝜉?̂? → 𝜉𝜏  as  𝑛 → ∞ 
given the random sample {𝑦𝑖 , … , 𝑦𝑛} got from the distribution 𝐹 with a unique 𝜏-th quantile, 
namely 𝜉𝜏 = 𝐹𝜏
−1. The form of the distribution of 𝜉?̂? depends on the behavior of 𝜉𝜏 near 𝜏, and 
it is shown that, if density of 𝐹, 𝑓ሺ𝐹𝜏
−1ሻ, is bounded away from 0 and ∞ near 𝜏, then: 
√𝑛൫𝜉?̂? − 𝜉𝜏൯~𝑁ሺ0,𝜔
2ሻ 
with 𝜔2 = 𝜏ሺ1 − 𝜏ሻ/𝑓ሺ𝐹𝜏
−1ሻ2. 
Under I.I.D. sampling assumption, in order to have convergence, 𝜉?̂? → 𝜉𝜏, a sufficient condition 
is: 
𝐹ሺ𝜉𝜏 − ሻ < 𝜏 < 𝐹ሺ𝜉𝜏 + ሻ    for all > 0  
Under independent but not identical distributed sampling, with the sequence of random 
variables {𝑋𝑖}𝑖=1
𝑛  distributed as {𝐹𝑛𝑖}𝑖=1
𝑛 , the consistency of the 𝜏-th sample quantile holds if: 
√𝑛ሺ𝑎𝑛ሺ ሻ − 𝜏ሻ → ∞ 
√𝑛ሺ𝜏 − 𝑏𝑛ሺ ሻሻ → ∞ 
with: 
𝑎𝑛ሺ ሻ = 𝐹𝑛ሺ𝜉𝜏 − ሻ 
𝑏𝑛ሺ ሻ = 𝐹𝑛ሺ𝜉𝜏 + ሻ 
where 𝐹𝑛 = σ𝑖=1
𝑛 𝐹𝑛𝑖/𝑛. 
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In a linear quantile regression model, 𝒬𝜏|𝑥ሺ𝑌ሻ = 𝑥′𝛽𝜏, with the 𝜏-th conditional quantile 
function 𝑌|𝑥, necessary and sufficient conditions to have 𝛽?̂? → 𝛽𝜏 are √𝑛ሺ𝑎𝑛ሺ ሻ − 𝜏ሻ → ∞ and 
√𝑛ሺ𝜏 − 𝑏𝑛ሺ ሻሻ → ∞, where: 
𝑎𝑛ሺ ሻ = σ𝐹𝑛𝑖ሺ𝑥𝑖𝛽𝜏 − ሻ/𝑛 
𝑏𝑛ሺ ሻ = σ𝐹𝑛𝑖ሺ𝑥𝑖𝛽𝜏 + ሻ/𝑛 
The description of the finite sample theory of the quantile regression estimator and the 
asymptotic theory is usually preparatory to the theory of inference for the univariate quantiles. 
Koenker and Bassett described main inference tools for quantile regression: Wald tests, rank 
tests, likelihood ratio type tests and other resampling methods. 
The Wald test is designed to test for the equality of slope coefficients across quantiles, through 
the survey of inter-quantile ranges of two samples. Indeed, while linear regression model 
assumes identical conditional distributions of the dependent variable, implying no variation in 
the slope coefficients of different quantiles, the quantile regression allows them to vary across 
quantiles. In a two-sample model, with 𝑛1 observations in the first sample and 𝑛2 observations 
in the second sample, and a binary variable 𝑥𝑖 = 1 for the second sample, such that:  
𝑌𝑖 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝑥𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖 
the 𝜏-th quantile regression coefficient, 𝛽2, is the difference between the 𝜏-th sample quantiles 
of the two samples. Then, the null hypothesis requires the equality of the slope coefficients 
across 𝜏1 and 𝜏2, namely the ሺ𝜏2 − 𝜏1ሻ-interquantile ranges to be equal for each sample: 
Η0:   𝛽2ሺ𝜏2ሻ − 𝛽1ሺ𝜏1ሻ = ൫𝒬2ሺ𝜏2ሻ − 𝒬1ሺ𝜏2ሻ൯ − ൫𝒬2ሺ𝜏1ሻ − 𝒬1ሺ𝜏1ሻ൯ 
                                                  = ൫𝒬2ሺ𝜏2ሻ − 𝒬2ሺ𝜏1ሻ൯ − ൫𝒬1ሺ𝜏2ሻ − 𝒬1ሺ𝜏1ሻ൯ = 0  





where the asymptotic variance of ?̂?2ሺ𝜏2ሻ − ?̂?1ሺ𝜏1ሻ is: 













In general, there are several tests that try to capture the significance of the treatment effect in 
these two-sample models. For instance, some tests, like the Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon tests, 
survey the location shift alternatives, others survey the scale shift alternatives, and still others 
evaluate non-parametric alternatives.  
Rank-based inference, that is rank tests based on the dual quantile regression process, seems to 
be particularly useful for a wide variety of quantile regression inference problems, including 
the creation of confidence intervals for specific quantile regression coefficient estimates. 
Koenker and Bassett studied in deep the details and properties of this kind of tools for inference. 
An alternative to the Wald test and rank test for quantile regression is the likelihood ratio test, 
based on the value of the objective function under null and alternative models. Given the linear 
model 𝑦𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖
′𝛽 + 𝑢𝑖 with 𝑢𝑖~𝑖. 𝑖. 𝑑., the median regression coefficient can be tested such that: 
Η0:  𝑅𝛽 = 𝑟 
Letting ?̂?𝜏 be the value of the objective function under the unrestricted minimizing estimator 
?̂?0.5: 
?̂?𝜏 = min𝛽∈ℝ𝑝σ𝜌𝜏ሺ𝑦𝑖 − 𝑥𝑖
′𝛽𝜏ሻ 
and ?̃?𝜏 the function under the restricted estimator ?̃?0.5: 









2 ሺunder Η0ሻ  
where 𝑠0.5 is the value obtained by the sparsity function when 𝜏 =0.5, and 𝑞 is the rank of 𝑅. 
Finally, many resampling methods, like the bootstrap method, have been described in literature 
for the construction of confidence intervals for quantile estimators. These methods are very 
powerful because they allow the estimation of confidence intervals and other elements without 
special assumptions, and this is particularly useful in case of small sample sizes or when the 
asymptotic approximation on the variable of interest is difficult to elicit.  
A last point to be described concerns the goodness of fit and the model performance in the 
quantile regression framework. There are at least three important measures that are worth to be 
mentioned. 
The first measure is the coefficient of determination 𝑅2, estimated as 1 minus the ratio between 
the sum of absolute deviations in the fully parameterized models and the sum of absolute 
deviations in the unconditional quantile model (unlike the standard linear regression, where 
variances of squared deviations are taken into account):   
𝑅2 = 1 −
σ𝑖=1
𝑛 𝜌𝜏ሺ𝑦𝑖 − ?̂? − 𝑥𝑖
′?̂?𝜏ሻ
σ𝑖=1
𝑛 𝜌𝜏ሺ𝑦𝑖 − ?̂?𝜏ሻ
 
This formula measures the typical “quantile loss” in terms of absolute deviations based on 
conditioning information relative to the “losses” based on the historical unconditional quantile 
estimate. It should be noted that for the in-sample fit, 𝑅2 lies between 0 and 1, while for the 
out-of-sample fit, 𝑅2 may be negative, if an unsuitable model is worse than a constant 
unconditional quantile fit.   
A second measure is the average absolute error of prediction (𝐴𝑇𝐴𝐸), which can be interpreted 
as the mean squared error (𝑀𝐸𝑆) of the standard linear model: 
𝐴𝑇𝐴𝐸 = σ𝑖=1
𝑛 𝜌𝜏ሺ𝑦𝑖 − ?̂? − 𝑥𝑖
′?̂?𝜏ሻ/𝑁 
Therefore, the smaller the 𝐴𝑇𝐴𝐸 the better the performance. 
The last measure is the ratio of quantile exceedance (𝑅𝑄𝐸𝑋): 
𝑅𝑄𝐸𝑋 = σ𝑖=1
𝑛 𝟏𝑦𝑖<?̂?+𝑥𝑖′?̂?𝜏/𝑁 
This is a measure of calibration, and a well calibrated model has a 𝑅𝑄𝐸𝑋 close to 𝜏. 
 
 
3.2  Mixed-Data Sampling Regression Models 
The second basic class of tools needed to implement the early warning indicator is represented 
by the Mixed Data Sampling regression models, or MIDAS models, introduced by Ghysels et 
al. (“The MIDAS Touch: Mixed Data Sampling Regression Models”, 2002). MIDAS models, 
used both in macroeconomic analysis and in financial applications, are derived by combining 
elements from temporal aggregation literature and distributed lag models, with a weight 
function which tracks the high frequency lags of covariates.  
The distributed lag model, which is used to estimate current values of a response variable based 
on both the current values and the lagged values of covariates, after the aggregation of higher 
frequency values, usually takes the form: 
𝑦𝑡𝑞 = 𝑎 + 𝐵ሺ𝐿ሻ𝑥𝑡𝑞 + 𝑡𝑞  
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where 𝐵ሺ𝐿ሻ is the lag polynomial operator, and 𝑡𝑞 = 1,…𝑇𝑞. The response to high frequency 
explanatory variable is modeled using distributed lag polynomials in order to avoid the problem 
of parameters proliferation. MIDAS models are quite similar to distributed lag models, but there 
is a crucial difference: the dependent variable, sampled at lower frequencies, is regressed on 
distributed lags of the covariates, sampled at higher frequencies, and no aggregation is 
performed. In fact, variables sampled at higher frequencies contain valuable information with 
higher predictive power than that got from aggregated models. Therefore, MIDAS models are 
tightly parameterized, reduced form regression models for time series that involve processes 
and data sampled at different frequencies, where explanatory variables have higher frequency. 
This type of regression allows to address those common situations where data are not sampled 
at the same frequency, and in particular when the variable of interest is sampled at lower 
frequency. Usually, in these cases, an aggregation of higher frequency data is done in order to 
handle data at the same frequency, but this causes an information loss that makes the estimation 
less efficient. For instance, some macroeconomic data is sampled monthly (e.g. many monetary 
variables and price) while other data is sampled annually or quarterly (e.g. real GDP). If the 
analyst wants to study the relationship between inflation and economic growth, they can either 
aggregate inflation data to a quarterly sampling frequency or apply a MIDAS regression which 
combines monthly and quarterly data.  
Here, a brief description of the MIDAS model under an analytical point of view. Let 𝑌𝑡 be the 
dependent variable sampled at some interval of reference, that is a fixed sampling frequency 
(annually, monthly, etc.), and let 𝑋ሺ𝑚ሻ be the explanatory variable sampled at a higher 
frequency, namely 𝑚 times faster than the frequency of 𝑌𝑡 (e.g., if 𝑌𝑡 are annual data, and 𝑋𝑡
ሺ𝑚ሻ
 






, and given a polynomial of length 𝑗𝑚𝑎𝑥 as a weighting function, 
𝐵ሺ𝐿1/𝑚; 𝜃ሻ = σ𝑗=1
𝑗𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝐵𝑗ሺ𝜃ሻ𝐿
𝑗/𝑚, where 𝐿𝑗/𝑚 makes values of 𝑋𝑡
ሺ𝑚ሻ
lag by 𝑗/𝑚 periods, then the 
simplest linear MIDAS regression can take the form: 






For example, this MIDAS model allows to regress yearly 𝑌𝑡 on quarterly or monthly 𝑋𝑡
ሺ𝑚ሻ
, up 
to 𝑗𝑚𝑎𝑥 lags.  The parametrization of lag coefficients in 𝐵ሺ𝐿1 𝑚Τ ; 𝜃ሻ requires the usage of a 
parameter vector function 𝜃 (Almon lag function, Almon exponential lag function, Beta 
polynomial function) and a suitable information criterion (Akaike, Schwarz or Hannan-Quinn). 
Usually, the number of lags of 𝑋𝑡
ሺ𝑚ሻ
 may be really large, and one might be forced to deal with 
a huge dataset and many frequencies. Within this framework, the parameter proliferation 
problem arises: if the coefficients of the lagged polynomial were not restricted, such that 𝐵 
were not function of 𝜃, then the number of parameters to estimate would be very high, and their 
interpretation may be unfeasible. For example, to capture the impact of daily data on a 
dependent variable sampled annually, then 365 coefficients would be required. It is clear that 
some sort of restriction upon the structure of the coefficients must be applied. As said, a first 
solution is to aggregate the highest frequency data in order to have the whole dataset sampled 
with the same (lowest) frequency, at a cost of not fully exploiting all available information. For 
this reason, the coefficients of the polynomial in 𝐿1 𝑚Τ  are introduced by a known function 
𝐵ሺ𝐿1 𝑚Τ ; 𝜃ሻ of a few parameters summarized in a vector θ, and this function requires a 
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specification. Finally, 𝛽1 expresses the overall impact of lagged 𝑋𝑡
ሺ𝑚ሻ
 on 𝑌𝑡. In general, the 
MIDAS regression requires a nonlinear least squares estimation (NLS). 
A more explicit specification for the weighting function 𝐵ሺ𝐿1/𝑚; 𝜃ሻ is: 











with 𝐵ሺ1; 𝜃ሻ = σ𝑗=0
𝐽 𝑐ሺ𝑗; 𝜃ሻ = 1, where the lagged coefficients 𝜃 of 𝑐 need a parametrization. 
The smart and optimal parameterization of the lagged coefficients is one of the main key 
MIDAS features. Many types of parametrizations have been proposed in accordance with the 
number of coefficients and the function shaping: 
• the linear scheme: 
𝑐ሺ𝑗; 𝜃ሻ = 1/𝐽; 
• the hyperbolic scheme, like the normalized exponential Almon lag polynomial, 







• the not normalized Almon lag polynomial specification of order 𝑃, where the sum of 
individual weights are not equal to 1:  
𝛽1𝑐ሺ𝑗; 𝜃 = [𝜃0, … , 𝜃𝑃]ሻ = σ𝑝=1
𝑃 𝜃𝑝𝑗
𝑝 












































where Almon lags can be computed via OLS estimation after having properly 
transformed high frequency data regressors (slope coefficients can then be computed by 
rescaling weights); 
• the normalized beta probability density function, unrestricted (𝑈𝑛) and restricted (𝑅) 
cases with non-zero ሺ𝑛𝑧ሻ and zero ሺ𝑧ሻ last lag (the best fit with a high number of 
MIDAS lags): 
𝑐𝑗









𝑈𝑛,𝑧 = 𝑐ሺ𝑗; 𝜃 = [𝜃1, 𝜃2, 0]ሻ 
𝑐𝑗
𝑅,𝑛𝑧 = 𝑐ሺ𝑗; 𝜃 = [1,𝜃2, 𝜃3]ሻ 
𝑐𝑗
𝑅,𝑧 = 𝑐ሺ𝑗; 𝜃 = [1, 𝜃2, 0]ሻ 
with 𝑑𝑗 = 𝑗/ሺ𝐽 + 1ሻ; 
• the not normalized polynomial specification with step functions: 
𝛽1𝑐ሺ𝑗; 𝜃 = [𝜃1, … , 𝜃𝑃]ሻ = 𝜃1𝐼𝑗∈[𝛼0,𝛼1] + σ𝑝=2
𝑃 𝜃𝑝𝐼𝑗∈ሺ𝛼𝑝−1,𝛼𝑝] 
with 𝛼0 = 1 < 𝛼1 < ⋯ < 𝛼𝑃 = 𝐽 and 𝐼𝑗∈[𝛼𝑝−1,𝛼𝑝] = ൜
1 𝑎𝑠  𝛼𝑝−1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤𝛼𝑝
0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒             
 
In any case, the shape of the weighting function can be derived by data: weights attached to 
different lags can be hump-shaped, strongly declining or moderately increasing for different 
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values of parameters, and this flexibility is a strength point of the MIDAS framework. If the 
parametrization is based on a simple linear distributed lag function, there are no restrictions on 
the MIDAS model, which becomes U-MIDAS model (Unrestricted MIDAS model): one 
estimates the individual unconstrained coefficients by using a simple regression program. It has 
been shown that U-MIDAS model works better for small values of 𝑚 (e.g. quarterly/monthly 
data). The linear lag polynomial is: 
𝑐ሺ𝐿ሻ𝓎𝜏 = 𝛿ሺ𝐿ሻ𝑥𝜏−1
𝑚 + 𝜖𝜏 
where {𝓎𝜏}𝜏 is the disaggregated process {𝑦𝑡}𝑡, while 𝑐ሺ𝐿ሻ = 1 − 𝑐1𝐿
1 − ⋯− 𝑐𝑝𝐿
𝑝  and 
𝛿ሺ𝐿ሻ = ሺ𝛿0 + 𝛿1𝐿
1 + ⋯+ 𝛿𝑑𝐿
𝑑ሻ are the polynomials of order, respectively, 𝑝 and 𝑑. There is 
evidence that the U-MIDAS model fits quite well with data when the gap between lower 
frequency and higher frequency is not large (e.g. month to quarter). In fact, if frequency 
mismatch is small (e.g. quarterly to monthly), distributed lag function 𝐵ሺ𝐿1 𝑚Τ ; 𝜃ሻ can be 
removed, since the introduction of higher frequency variables does not increase massively the 
parameter space (as it does with daily variables). A general linear U-MIDAS model to 
implement in this case is: 
𝑦𝑡,𝜏 = 𝛽0,𝜏 + 𝛽1,𝜏𝑥𝑡,1 + 𝛽2,𝜏𝑥𝑡,2 + 𝛽3,𝜏𝑥𝑡,3 + 𝑡 
where the regressand is regressed at the quarterly frequency on the set of low-frequency 
regressors up to three months earlier. As seen, the big advantage of MIDAS model is the 
possibility to exploit the within-period information and, in the unrestricted framework, without 
dealing with the proliferation problem.  
The MIDAS model can be extended to the multivariate framework, in which 𝑛 explanatory 
variables are sampled regardless of frequencies: 





or in matrix form: 
𝑌 = 𝑋ሺ𝜃ሻ𝛽 +  
with parameters vectors 𝛽 = ሺ𝛽0, 𝛽1, … , 𝛽𝑛ሻ
′ and  𝜃 = ሺ𝜃1, … , 𝜃𝑛ሻ, the residual vector =
ሺ 1, … , 𝑇ሻ′, and the 𝑇 × ሺ𝑛 + 1ሻ matrix of explanatory variable: 
𝑋ሺ𝜃ሻ = (
1 𝐵ሺ𝑚1ሻሺ𝐿; 𝜃1ሻ𝑥1,1




ሺ𝑚1ሻ ⋯ 𝐵ሺ𝑚𝑛ሻሺ𝐿; 𝜃𝑛ሻ𝑥𝑇,𝑛
ሺ𝑚𝑛ሻ
) 
The forecasting model, which depends on forecasting horizon ℎ, can be expressed as: 




As expected, MIDAS regression is a powerful tool in the hands of analysts, because it enables 
the interdependence analysis in case of variables with different frequencies, such as the high-
frequency returns with other macro-financial data observed at lower frequencies. As it has been 
proven, the regression resulting from the aggregation of all available data to common least 
frequencies will always be less efficient than a MIDAS regression that fully exploits the 
information from 𝑋𝑡
ሺ𝑚ሻ
, and this is the big advantage of MIDAS framework. Of course, this 
framework is perfectible, and many researchers improved it and adapted it according different 
needs and circumstances. For example, Engle and Rangel elaborated in 2008 the GARCH-
MIDAS models, that allowed to incorporate information on the macroeconomic environment 
into the long-run component. In 2012, Conrad and Loch used GARCH-MIDAS model to 
investigate the relationship between the long-term market risk and the macroeconomic 
environment, showing how macroeconomic variables reflect information on market risks.  
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There are many empirical studies that link mixed data frequency variables, especially in a 
predictive regression framework. For instance, in the macroeconomics, low frequency macro 
variables, such as GDP growth, observed annually or quarterly, may be regressed on high 
frequency financial variables, such as the volatility of stock returns, observed daily. These high 
frequency variables become leading indicators of economic cycle, and MIDAS models seem to 
be quite adequate in dealing with those. In financial economics, MIDAS models have been 
implemented to link high frequency risk measures with low frequency returns. A wide empirical 
literature on predictive regression found links between low frequency excess stock returns and 
high frequency volatility predictors. 
The real novelty item proposed by this thesis is the application of the quantile regression to a 
set of variables with different sampling frequencies. Therefore, this approach should combine 
the two techniques described above, giving rise to the MIDAS quantile regression. As said, 
quantile regression models the conditional quantile of the dependent variable, describing the 
relationship at different points in the conditional distribution of the variable of interest, and 
moving the focus from the conditional mean to the full distribution. In particular, previous 
within-period information, got by a set of low-frequency explanatory variables, is used to 
estimate current values of the high-frequency variable of interest, usually published by 
statistical office with a given lag. The MIDAS quantile regression model used in these cases 
has been described by Ghysels: 




with quantile order 𝜏 ∈ ሺ0,1ሻ, sampling period of the low-frequency variable 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇, and 






MIDAS quantile regression exhibits the parameters proliferation problem as well, since many 
high-frequency regressors produce different impacts on different quantiles over time, and this 
makes data transformations unfeasible for quantile forecasting. Some authors (Lima and Menf, 
2018, or Mazzi and Mitchell, 2019) proposed alternative models to overcome the problem (e.g. 
the penalized quantile regression or the Bayesian approach).  
In the next chapter, a MIDAS quantile regression model will be treated in order to build some 
early warning indicators. In particular, high frequency information, provided by daily stock 
returns, will be employed to predict conditional quantiles of low frequency information, like 
some macroeconomic indicators, following a MIDAS quantile model: 






3.3  A Nonparametric Test of Granger-Causality in Quantiles 
The third pillar for the building of the EWI is the nonparametric test of Granger causality in 
quantile, and in particular the test presented by Jeong, Härdle e Song (Econometric Theory, 
2012).  
While a parametric test assumes that data comes from a given parametric family of probability 
distributions (e.g. a normal distribution), parameterized by mean and standard deviation, the 
nonparametric test does not assume anything about the underlying distribution. Therefore, the 
parametric test is more accurate and has greater statistical power when the assumption of 
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normally distributed data is not violated, and in general when the underlying distribution is 
known. When the data are not normal, nonparametric tests can perform better.  
The Granger causality is a statistical concept useful to understand not whether the time series 
X causes the time series Y, but whether X is able to forecast Y, that is if past values of X contain 
information useful to predict current values of Y. There are many econometric tools for 
investigating co-movements and causality between changes in two or more time series, and this 
type of analysis can provide important information about risk spillovers among financial 
markets. For instance, the Granger causality in risk allows to survey whether past history of 
highly risky events on a market is able to predict other risky events occurring on other markets. 
To test this prediction ability of a time series 𝑋𝑡 on the time series 𝑌𝑡, the Granger causality test 
in the distribution tail can be performed: 
Η0 : Pr൫𝑌𝑡 < −𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡ห𝐼𝑦; 𝑡−1൯ = Pr ሺ𝑌𝑡 < −𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡|𝐼𝑦; 𝑡−1, 𝐼𝑥; 𝑡−1ሻ 
where 𝐼𝑦; 𝑡−1 is the information set available at time 𝑡 − 1 for 𝑌𝑡. Rejecting null hypothesis 
means that time series 𝑋𝑡 does Granger-cause the time series 𝑌𝑡 in risk at level 𝛼 with respect 
to 𝐼𝑡−1, and then information from past events in 𝑋𝑡 can be used to predict occurrence of risky 
events in 𝑌𝑡. Granger causality can be investigated in mean, in variance (for the detection of 
volatility spillovers among financial markets) or in terms of the entire conditional probability 
distribution. 𝑋𝑡 is said to Granger-causes 𝑌𝑡 in mean if: 
𝔼ሺ𝑌𝑡|𝑌𝑡−1, … , 𝑌𝑡−𝑝, 𝑋𝑡−1, … , 𝑋𝑡−𝑞ሻ ≠ 𝔼ሺ𝑌𝑡|𝑌𝑡−1, … , 𝑌𝑡−𝑝ሻ 
In particular, the Granger causality in conditional mean is mostly used in research, even though 
it has a relevant shortcoming: conditional mean is just one element used for an overall summary 
about the conditional distribution, while the causal relationship in tail area may be very different 
from that in the center of the distribution. For this reason, a Granger causality detected in tail 
quantiles may produce results different from a Granger causality detected in the center of the 
distribution. Recent literature has focused on the concept of Granger causality in quantiles, 
which allows to address flaws due to non-Gaussian distributions with asymmetry, non-linearity 
and fat tails. In these cases, information content provided by the quantiles about distributions 
is wider and more precise than the information provided by the mean. 𝑋𝑡 is said to Granger-
causes 𝑌𝑡 in quantile if: 
𝒬𝜏ሺ𝑌𝑡|𝑌𝑡−1, … , 𝑌𝑡−𝑝, 𝑋𝑡−1, … , 𝑋𝑡−𝑞ሻ ≠ 𝒬𝜏ሺ𝑌𝑡|𝑌𝑡−1, … , 𝑌𝑡−𝑝ሻ 
For example, a general important result of economic research, confirmed by strong empirical 
evidence from the point of view of the mean regression, is that, on average, people with more 
education are more likely to get higher earnings over their lifecycle; however, the impact of 
higher education is not constant over conditional income distribution since, from quantile 
regression, there is evidence that high education is significantly associated with higher earnings 
mainly for the upper tails of income. The Granger causality test in quantiles tries to understand 
whether education significantly Granger-causes income over different conditional quantiles. 
The big advantage of this test is that, since the conditional quantile is insensitive to outliers, a 
set of conditional quantiles can define more in detail and more precisely the whole distribution. 
The nonparametric test for Granger causality in quantile presented by Jeong, Härdle e Song 
aims to test conditional quantile restrictions through nonparametric estimation methods in 
dependent data situations. This procedure, described below, should not be confused with that 
presented by Hong, Liu, and Wang (Journal of Econometrics, 2007): their test determines if an 
extreme downside movement of a given time series, i.e. a tail event, has predictive content for 
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(or equivalently, can be considered a lagged indicator for) an extreme downside movement of 
another time series.  
Here a formalization of the nonparametric test for Granger-causality in quantile.  
Denote 𝑤𝑡 ≡ ሺ𝑦𝑡−1, … , 𝑦𝑡−𝑝ሻ, 𝑧𝑡 ≡ ሺ𝑦𝑡−1, … , 𝑦𝑡−𝑝, 𝑥𝑡−1, … , 𝑥𝑡−𝑞ሻ and 𝑣 = ሺ𝑤𝑡 , 𝑧𝑡ሻ; the 
conditional distribution function 𝑦𝑡 given 𝑧𝑡ሺ𝑤𝑡ሻ as 𝐹𝑦|𝑧ሺ𝑦𝑡|𝑧𝑡ሻ ∗ 𝐹𝑦|𝑤ሺ𝑦𝑡|𝑤𝑡ሻ, with 𝐹ሺ𝑦𝑡|𝑧𝑡ሻ 
absolutely continuous in 𝑦 for all 𝑣; the conditional quantile functions 𝒬𝜏ሺ𝑧𝑡ሻ ≡ 𝒬𝜏ሺ𝑦𝑡|𝑧𝑡ሻ and 
𝒬𝜏ሺ𝑤𝑡ሻ ≡ 𝒬𝜏ሺ𝑦𝑡|𝑤𝑡ሻ, whereby  Pr൫𝐹𝑦|𝑧ሺ𝒬𝜏ሺ𝑧𝑡ሻ|𝑧𝑡ሻ = 𝜏൯ = 1 . Then, the hypotheses to be 
tested consist of quintile restrictions: 
Η0: Pr൫𝐹𝑦|𝑧ሺ𝒬𝜏ሺ𝑤𝑡ሻ|𝑧𝑡ሻ = 𝜏൯ = 1 
Η1: Pr൫𝐹𝑦|𝑧ሺ𝒬𝜏ሺ𝑤𝑡ሻ|𝑧𝑡ሻ = 𝜏൯ < 1 
Accepting the null hypotheses means that each variable 𝑥 does not Granger-cause 𝑦 in the 
specific 𝜏-th quantile at each specific moment. It is true iff 𝔼൫𝟏𝑦𝑡≤𝒬𝜏ሺ𝑤𝑡ሻ|𝑧𝑡൯ = 𝜏, given 
𝟏𝑦𝑡≤𝒬𝜏ሺ𝑤𝑡ሻ = 𝜏 + 𝑡 with 𝔼ሺ 𝑡|𝑧𝑡ሻ = 0. To consistently test Η0, given 𝑓𝑧ሺ𝑧𝑡ሻ the marginal 
density function of 𝑧𝑡, a proposed nonparametric test is the distance measure 𝐽: 
𝐽 = 𝔼ሺ[𝐹𝑦|𝑧ሺ𝒬𝜏ሺ𝑤𝑡ሻ|𝑧𝑡ሻ − 𝜏]
2 ∗ 𝑓𝑧ሺ𝑧𝑡ሻሻ 
whereby 𝐽 = 0 under Η0, and 𝐽 > 0 under Η1. Given 𝔼ሺ 𝑡|𝑧𝑡ሻ = 𝐹𝑦|𝑧ሺ𝒬𝜏ሺ𝑤𝑡ሻ|𝑧𝑡ሻ − 𝜏, the 
distance measure can be expressed as: 
𝐽 = 𝔼ሺ 𝑡 ∗ 𝔼ሺ 𝑡|𝑧𝑡ሻ ∗ 𝑓𝑧ሺ𝑧𝑡ሻሻ 
Estimation of each components of the test requires specific formulations based on the so-called 
kernel methods and kernel functions. Denoting the dimension of 𝑧 as 𝑚 = 𝑝 + 𝑞, the kernel 
function as 𝐾𝑡𝑠 = 𝐾ሺ
𝑧𝑡−𝑧𝑠
ℎ
ሻ with bandwidth ℎ and time dimension 𝑇, the estimated weighted 
conditional expectation 𝔼ሺ 𝑡|𝑧𝑡ሻ ∗ 𝑓𝑧ሺ𝑧𝑡ሻ is: 






And then, the test statistic is: 
𝐽 =











ሻ, it is possible to estimate all other components of the test: 






σ 𝐿𝑡𝑠 ∗ 𝟏𝑦𝑠≤𝑦𝑡𝑠≠𝑡
σ 𝐿𝑡𝑠𝑠≠𝑡
 
The asymptotic properties of the test statistic are based on two basic assumptions: 
• process {𝑦𝑡 , 𝑥𝑡}𝑡=1
𝑇  is strictly stationary and absolutely regular with a geometric decay 
rate; 
• functions 𝑓𝑦 , 𝑓𝑧 and 𝑓𝑤  are all bounded and belong to the class of functions 𝔘𝜇
𝛼, 𝛼 > 0,   
𝜇 > 0, that are ሺ𝑑 − 1ሻ-times partially differentiable for 𝑑 − 1 ≤  𝜇 ≤ 𝑑; 
• error term 𝑡 is a martingale difference process with finite fourth moments; 
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• a set of technical conditions are required in order to have a uniform convergence rate of 
the nonparametric kernel estimator of conditional cumulative density function and 
conditional quantile with mixing data (for any detail, look at the paper by Jeong, Härdle 
e Song); 
• a set of technical conditions (e.g. the order 𝑘 and 𝑙 of kernel functions 𝐾ሺ∙ሻ and 𝐿ሺ∙ሻ 
must be nonnegative) are required in order to bound estimation bias. 
Assuming the compliance of all assumptions, and defining the stochastic process 𝐿𝑡 = ሺ 𝑡, 𝑧𝑡ሻ
𝑇, 
the conditional variance of the error term 𝜎𝜀
2ሺ𝑧ሻ = 𝔼[ 𝑡








it is possible to get the following result: 
𝑇ℎ𝑚/2𝐽 ⟶ 𝑁ሺ0, 𝜎0
2ሻ in distribution 
with 𝜎0
2 = 2 ∗ ∫𝐾2ሺ𝑢ሻ𝑑𝑢 ∗𝔼ሺ𝜎𝜀
4ሺ𝑧ሻ ∗ 𝑓𝑧ሺ𝑧𝑡ሻሻ and its consistent estimator ?̂?0






𝑠≠𝑡 . Under the null hypothesis 𝑇ℎ
𝑚/2𝐽 ⟶ 𝑁ሺ0, 𝜎0
2ሻ in distribution, while 
under the alternative hypothesis 𝑇ℎ𝑚/2𝐽 ⟶ 𝑁ሺ𝜇, 𝜎1
2ሻ in distribution, with 𝜇 =
𝔼ሺ𝑓𝑦|𝑧
2 ሺ𝒬𝜏ሺ𝑧𝑡ሻ|𝑧𝑡ሻ ∗ 𝑙
2ሺ𝑧ሻ ∗ 𝑓𝑧ሺ𝑧ሻሻ, 𝜎1
2 = 2 ∗ ∫𝐾2ሺ𝑢ሻ𝑑𝑢 ∗𝔼ሺ𝜎𝑣
4ሺ𝑧ሻ ∗ 𝑓𝑧ሺ𝑧𝑡ሻሻ, 𝜎𝑣
2ሺ𝑧ሻ =
 𝔼[𝑣𝑡
2|𝑧𝑡] and 𝑣𝑡 = 𝟏𝑦𝑡≤𝒬𝜏ሺ𝑤𝑡ሻ − 𝐹ሺ𝒬𝜏ሺ𝑤𝑡ሻ|𝑧𝑡ሻ. 
The power performance of the hypothesis test for different combinations of time series length 
𝑇, quantile order 𝜏 and quantile coefficient 𝛽𝜏, such that the higher 𝛽𝜏 ∈ [0,1] the stronger the 
causality in quantile of 𝑥𝑡 on 𝑦𝑡 , have been analyzed by authors. The power of a test expresses 
the probability to correctly reject the null hypothesis when the alternative hypothesis is true: 
the higher the power, the lower the probability of making a type II error (wrongly accepting the 
null hypothesis when it is false). There are three main results: 
• the larger 𝑇 given 𝜏 and 𝛽𝜏, the larger the power, since more data allow to get a more 
consistent evidence about causality; 
• the higher 𝛽𝜏 given 𝜏 and 𝑇, the larger the power, and then the stronger the causality in 
quantile of 𝑥𝑡 on 𝑦𝑡; 
• given 𝛽𝜏 and 𝑇, power of test is usually higher for quantile orders closer to the median, 
and lower for quantile orders closer to the extremes. 
 
 
3.4  Methodology for the Empirical Analysis 
The description of the methodology is a crucial step for the construction and the development 
of EWIs. In particular, by applying more methods and models with different characteristics it 
is possible to discover the best one, that one which fits better with the ultimate purpose of an 
EWI.  
As shown, the test is an extension of the Jeong’s nonparametric test for the Granger causality 
in quantiles, in which information from time series data sampled at different frequencies is fully 
exploited. This procedure will test the following hypotheses: 
Η0: Pr൫𝐹𝑦|𝑧ሺ𝒬𝜏ሺ𝑤𝑡ሻ|𝑧𝑡ሻ = 𝜏൯ = 1 
Η1: Pr൫𝐹𝑦|𝑧ሺ𝒬𝜏ሺ𝑤𝑡ሻ|𝑧𝑡ሻ = 𝜏൯ < 1 
It has been proved that, under the null hypothesis 
𝑇ℎ𝑚/2𝐽𝑇 ⟶ 𝑁ሺ0, 𝜎0




2 can be estimated as ?̂?0





𝑠≠𝑡 . Hence, the test 
implemented for the empirical analysis has the following extended form: 















Since 𝑇ℎ𝑚/2𝐽  tends in distribution to 𝑁ሺ𝜇, 𝜎1
2ሻ under the alternative hypothesis, then 𝐽 will be 
zero if and only if Η0 is true: in this case, given the quantile order 𝜏, there is no Granger causality 
in quantiles between the two variables.   
The test creation in MATLAB, as shown in the Appendix B, requires the implementation of six 
steps. 
1. The first step is the simple calculation of the first factor of the test, 𝑤 = ඥ𝑇 ሺ𝑇 − 1ሻΤ . 
2. The second step is the creation of the error matrix 𝑡 𝑠, that is the product 
[𝟏𝑦𝑡≤?̂?𝜏ሺ𝑤𝑡ሻ − 𝜏][𝟏𝑦𝑠≤?̂?𝜏ሺ𝑤𝑠ሻ − 𝜏] for each quantile order 𝜏 and each moment 𝑡, needed to 
identify those observed values of 𝑦 exceeding their estimated conditional quantiles. 𝟏 is 
an indicator function, equal to 1 when the underlying condition is true, and zero 
otherwise. In this case, it produces a vector of 𝑇 elements (zeros and ones) for each 
quantile order. The error matrix is a (𝑇 × 𝑇 × 𝑞) matrix. 
3. The third and the most complicated step is the construction of the kernel function 𝐾ሺ. ሻ. 
A kernel distribution is a nonparametric representation of the probability density 
function of a random variable, that is estimated as a “generalization” of the histogram 
density. But unlike histograms, that figure discrete objects, a kernel distribution groups 
each single distribution applied to each observed value in order to construct a unique 
smoothed continuous probability curve, and it is very useful when there is no parametric 
distribution that fits dataset and no specific distribution assumption can be done. While 
the kernel density estimator 𝐾 is the estimated pdf of the random variable, the kernel 𝑘 
is a smoothing weighting non-negative function which defines the shape of the curve 
used to generate the pdf. The most common used kernel functions are the uniform 
function, the Epanechnikov function, the Gaussian function, the triangle function and the 
quartic function. The smoothness of the resulting density distribution is controlled by a 
smoothing parameter, called bandwidth ℎ, whose value strongly affects the final result. 
Since the resulting density is strongly sensitive to the value of ℎ, this should be chosen 
so as to optimize the trade-off between estimator bias and estimator efficiency. There are 
many optimality criteria to compute ℎ, but the most used one is the minimization of the 
mean integrated squared error (or simply some rules-of-thumb accordingly derived, such 
as Silverman’s rule, suitable with a Gaussian function).  
In the test application, the kernel function is a weighting probability function based on 
the additional information that could be embedded by the high frequency observations 
(not used for the construction of the error matrix). In particular, a multivariate kernel 
distribution function, that is the estimated pdf of a vector of random variables, is 
implemented. Since multivariate framework is applied to a random vector, it requires the 
definition of a square diagonal bandwidth matrix, with main diagonal elements (ℎ1,
ℎ2, … , ℎ𝑇), and of a product kernel 𝐾ሺ. ሻ = 𝑘ሺ𝑧1ሻ𝑘ሺ𝑧2ሻ ⋯𝑘ሺ𝑧𝑇ሻ, where 𝑘ሺ. ሻ is a one-
dimensional kernel smoothing function. The kernel smoothing functions used for the test 





𝑰ሺ−1 ≤ 𝑧 ≤ 1ሻ 







The bandwidths ℎ applied to inputs are computed from the Silverman’s rule of thumb 
for multivariate data, described in MATLAB documentation: 







for 𝑡 = 1,2,… , 𝑇, where 𝑚 is the number of lags of explanatory variable with respect to 
the dependent variable, and 𝜎𝑖 is the standard deviation of the explanatory variable in 
each period 𝑡. Given 𝐾ሺ
𝑧𝑡−𝑧𝑠
ℎ
ሻ, the last component to be defined is the input 𝑧𝑡 − 𝑧𝑠 on 
which the product kernel is applied. Four different computations have been 
implemented: in the first one, 𝑧𝑡 − 𝑧𝑠 is the difference among high frequency 
explanatory data collected over any two time periods; in the second one, the simple 
moving average of high frequency data has been implemented, instead of the pure 
observations; the third one is the exponentially weighted moving average with a window 
size of 𝑚 and decreasing coefficient 𝑙 = 0,95; the last one is the exponentially weighted 
moving average of variance, used in order to take into account the information provided 
by the variance of high frequency variables (i.e. the market risk). The formula for the 
computation of the exponentially weighted moving average 𝐸𝑊𝑀𝐴 is: 
𝐸𝑊𝑀𝐴𝑡 = 𝑙 ∗ 𝐸𝑊𝑀𝐴𝑡−1 + ሺ1 − 𝑙ሻ ∗ 𝑥𝑡 
At the end, the output required for the test is available: 𝑧𝑡 − 𝑧𝑠is divided by ℎ𝑡, then the 
Gaussian function 𝑘ሺ𝑧𝑡ሻ is applied to each value 
𝑧𝑡−𝑧𝑠
ℎ𝑡
, and the product along the time 
dimension among all 𝑘ሺ𝑧ሻ will give as output the kernel value 𝐾 needed for the test. 
4. The fourth step consists of the computation of the test numerator: it is the sum of all 
values given by the products between each kernel function value 𝐾 and the error matrix 
𝑡 𝑠, for each  𝑡 ≠ 𝑠. 
5. The fifth step consists of the computation of the test denominator, which requires just 
the quantile order, its complement and the squared values of 𝐾: 𝜏ሺ1 − 𝜏ሻ√2ඥσ 𝐾𝑡𝑠
2
𝑠≠𝑡 . 
6. The ultimate step is the computation of the test statistic 𝑇ℎ𝑚/2𝐽𝑇/ ?̂?0 by assembling all 
the pieces: 𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 = 𝑤.∗ ሺ𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑛𝑢𝑚. 𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑑𝑒𝑛. ሻΤ . The resulting value is 
compared with the critical value of 1,96: as said, the test statistic tends to a Normal 
distribution as number of observations goes to infinity, and given a significance level  
𝛼=0,05, the critical value is 1,96. If the test statistic is lower than this critical value, then 
the null hypothesis of lack of Granger causality for that specific quantile is accepted. 
Finally, this procedure is repeated for each quantile order, and all values are represented 
in appropriate figures. 
The innovative point in the application of this test comes from the estimation of ?̂?𝜏ሺ𝑤𝑡ሻ, that is 
the set of estimated quantiles of the dependent variables conditional on the lagged high 
frequency explanatory variables at any moment. ?̂?𝜏ሺ𝑤𝑡ሻ is estimated through the MIDAS 
quantile regression, applied to the following model: 
𝒬𝜏ሺ𝑦𝑡ሻ = 𝛽𝜏,0 + 𝛽𝜏,1[𝐵ሺ𝐿
1/𝑚; 𝜃ሻ𝑋𝑡
ሺ𝑚ሻ
] + 𝑒𝑡 
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The implementation of an optimization problem based on an explanatory variable weighted in 
accordance with the MIDAS approach, and in particular the search of a minimizer x of a 
nonlinear constrained multivariate function, allows the estimation of each parameter (intercepts 
and slopes), and then the estimation of the conditional quantiles of 𝑦𝑡, used for the test. In the 
MIDAS quantile regression, there are basically two relevant points to be clarified under a 
computational point of view: the definition of the optimization problem for the quantile 
regression, and the definition of the MIDAS weights to be applied to 𝑋.  
As said, the sample 𝜏-th quantiles are identified as those points 𝜉 of the domain of the function 
σ𝑖𝜌𝜏ሺ𝑦𝑖 − 𝜉ሻ at which its values are minimized: 
?̂?𝜏ሺ𝑦ሻ = arg min𝜉 σ𝑖 𝜌𝜏ሺ𝑦𝑖 − 𝜉ሻ 
in which the quantile loss function is defined as:  
𝜌𝜏ሺ𝑢ሻ = 𝑢ሺ𝜏 − 𝐼𝑢<0ሻ 
By replacing 𝜉 with the regression function 𝑥𝑖
′𝛽𝜏, where 𝑥𝑖 is a vector of 𝐾 regressors, it is 
possible to minimize the total "loss" of residuals defined by 𝜌(⋅). 𝑢 is just the model residuals, 
namely the difference between the observations 𝑦𝑖 and the fitted values 𝑥𝑖
′𝛽𝜏. Therefore, 
quantiles can be written as solutions to the optimization problem: 
?̂?𝜏ሺ𝑦ሻ = argmin𝜉∈ℝ σ𝑖=1
𝑛 𝜌𝜏ሺ𝑦𝑖 − 𝜉ሻ 
whereby, for some 𝜏 ∈ (0, 1), we have to find ?̂? = 𝑥?̂? to minimize the expected loss. 
Computationally, this procedure can be carried out on MATLAB with the functionalities 
provided by “fmincon”, that is a nonlinear programming solver which allows to find the 
minimum of a nonlinear multivariable function under a set of constraints, such as bounds, linear 
equality or non-linear inequality. It is very useful for the optimization of ratios and trade-offs 
through the setting of a criterion function, or objective function. To do that, an anonymous 
function has been used: this is a function not stored in a program file but associated to variables 
whose data type is function_handle. Therefore, the first step is to define the objective function 
in a specific M-file:  
function [fval,condQuantile] = objFun(params,y,X,q,smoother) 
in which input ‘params’ contains relevant elements, such as ‘intercept’ and ‘slope’, which 
allow to compute the conditional quantiles: 
condQuantile = intercept + slope .* (X * weights). 
On the basis of the estimated conditional quantiles, the loss is defined as: 
loss = y - condQuantile 
and so even the asymmetric loss function, needed for the implementation of regression: 
fval = loss' * (q - (loss<0)). 
Of course, there are a set of bounds, optimization options and smoothers to take into account, 
and that can be found in the Appendix B. The core part of the code is given by the numeric 
minimization: 
estParams = fmincon(@(params) objFun(params, EstY, EstX, q, smoother),... 
This method allows to get the required parameters that satisfies the optimization problem: 
estimated slopes and intercepts, in ‘estParams’, are those ‘params’ which minimize the 
constrained objective function ‘objFun’ through the usage of ‘fmincon’.  Upper bounds and 
lower bounds are previously set, and the very initial parameters are estimated by OLS. 
The second problem to deal is about the definition of the MIDAS weights to be applied to 𝑋: 
condQuantile = intercept + slope .* (X * weights) 
where weights are obtained through a function specifically created, ‘midasBetaWeights’: 
function weights = midasBetaWeights(nlag,param1,param2). 
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Inputs of this function are quite simple to describe: ‘nlag’ is the number of lags of the 
explanatory variable used to explain the low frequency dependent variable detected for the 
subsequent period; ‘param1’ (or ‘k1’) and ‘param2’ (or ‘k2’) are the first and the second 
parameter used in the one-parameter Beta polynomial, respectively. As a consequence, there is 
a specific weight attached to each lag of the independent variable. After having subtracted from 
an array of ones a linearly spaced vector 𝜓 between 0 and 1 (excluding these extremes), with 
nlag evenly spaced points, obtained values are raised to the parameter (k2-1), if k1=1, and then 
multiplied by the same spaced vector to the power of (k1-1), whenever k1≠1. Weights are 
finally divided by the sum of all weights: 
weights = weights./nansum(weights). 
Analytically, MIDAS weights 𝑤𝑘  show the following direct proportionalities: 
𝑤𝑘 ∝ ሺ1 − 𝜓ሻ
ሺk2−1ሻ  𝑖𝑓  k1 = 1 
𝑤𝑘 ∝ ሺ1 − 𝜓ሻ
ሺk2−1ሻ ∗ ሺ𝜓ሻሺk1−1ሻ  𝑖𝑓  k1 ≠ 1 
Appendix B contains the details of this function. The following figure shows the output of 
function ‘midasBetaWeights’ applied in the quantile regression between the industrial 
production index and daily stock returns of the main countries. Almost anywhere, weights 
attached to independent variables are strongly decreasing as lag increases. 
 
As widely discussed, final purpose of this thesis is to create an EWI, that is a test for the 
detection of systemic risk in an economy. Other than the description of models and tools used 
in the analysis, the selection and the specification of suitable variables and dataset are a basic 
part of the methodology. Hence, it is crucial to identify that set of variables that can be useful 
to anticipate and predict to some extent incoming risks in the economic system. In order to 
achieve this objective, there exists a stylized fact that comes to our help: in the financial 
markets, the most operators carry out transactions trying to anticipate outcomes from real 
economy and to raise more or less rational expectations about changes in financial variables. A 
financial crisis caused by endogenous systemic mechanisms will always produce some 
consequences on the real economy, i.e. on the credit supply of banks, the saving and investment 
decisions of firms and households, the buying decisions of consumers, the prices fixed by 
sellers, the quantities of goods produced by producers, and the levels of income, wealth and 
wellbeing perceived by the society. It goes without saying that an increase of systemic risk in 
Figure 3.2: MIDAS Beta weights attached to each lag 
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the financial system, that can be promptly detected by early warning indicators based on the 
evolution of specific financial variables, can be a caveat of an incoming heavier crisis, in which 
real variables are going to be strongly affected. The analysis will be performed evaluating a set 
of relationships between a high frequency variable, reflecting the market sentiment, the 
expectations, the financial stability and the possible increases of some relevant risks, and a low 
frequency variable, that reflects the macroeconomic state, in order to capture the materialization 
of the systemic risks. In particular, there are four relevant sources of systemic risk that will be 
examined. 
1. The stock market risk: the systemic impact stemming from stock price variations, stock 
financial risk, changes in the Value-at-Risk and sectorial risk (financial sector and 
industrial sector) will be firstly evaluated.  
2. The geopolitical risk, of which a big part can be approximated by changes in the crude 
oil prices, is another important source of systemic risk. 
3. The currency risk, represented by fluctuations in the exchange rates, allows to get a wide 
view about the systemic risk generated at international level. 
4. The sovereign risk, which shows a more national relevance, is the last source of systemic 
risk to be analyzed, looking at changes in the Credit Default Swap premia.   
The first relation refers to the stock market risk. Indeed, since it is considered forward looking, 
the stock market provides the most common leading indicators on future economic activity, 
widely used in the literature. While the increase of systemic risk can be analyzed starting from 
the evolution of stock prices and returns, the materialization of the same systemic risk into an 
adverse event can be measured by a macroeconomic indicator linked to the productive activity, 
such as an industrial production index. The first application of the test will be based on the 
relationship between daily stock returns 𝑟 as predictive variable, and the changes in the monthly 
Industrial Production Index 𝐼𝑃𝐼, as the affected variable: 
𝒬𝜏ሺ𝐼𝑃𝐼𝑡ሻ = 𝛽𝜏,0 + 𝛽𝜏,1𝑍𝑡−1ሺkሻ 
𝑍𝑡−1ሺkሻ = σ𝑗=0
𝐽 𝑤𝑘,𝑗𝑟𝑡−1−𝑗 
In the model above, the conditional quantiles of 𝐼𝑃𝐼, 𝒬𝜏ሺ𝐼𝑃𝐼𝑡ሻ, for each order 𝜏 and for each 
month 𝑡, are obtained through a linear quantile regression on the set 𝑍𝑡−1 of lagged variables, 
that are function of the Beta polynomial parameters k; 𝑍𝑡−1 is the set of lagged daily stock 
returns 𝑟𝑡−1−𝑗, with lag 𝑗 up to 𝐽 = 22, weighted by MIDAS weights 𝑤𝑘,𝑗. In other words, each 
country’s 𝐼𝑃𝐼, published by national statistical institutes on the 15th of each month, is regressed-
in-quantile on the 22 previous daily stock returns, occurred on the stock market of the same 
country (they are 22 because each month has on average 22 observations, since financial 
markets are closed on weekends and on holidays). Furthermore, each 𝐼𝑃𝐼 change is regressed 
on the daily returns of the previous month, and not on the 22 daily returns immediately 
preceding the date of publication (the 15th): this time horizon of 15 days (about 10 daily 
observations of 𝑟) is needed in order to take into account the delays in the publication of 
statistical bulletin, and make the estimates less biased (in other words, when a statistical 
bulletin, published on the 15th of current tth month, refers to an output of the previous (t-1)th 
month, then lagged high frequency regressor should start 15 days before the publication date). 
Stock returns (and returns of all other variables used in this analysis) are computed as simple 




− 1) ∗ 100 
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There are many studies that try to examine the relationship between current stock returns and 
future production, based on the assumption of strong predictive ability of stock markets. Indeed, 
whereas variations in 𝐼𝑃𝐼 are a good proxy of incoming changes in the overall economic 
activity, variations in the stock returns often anticipate the same variations in 𝐼𝑃𝐼. The 
underlying economic logic is easy: an increase in the industrial production of an economy is a 
symptom of an ongoing expansive phase of the economic cycle, in which most firms invest and 
sell much more, accounting revenues that are continuously increasing. Under these 
circumstances, generated cash flows increase and are expected to increase, and so also the 
profitability. Since market operators discount all the relevant information about productive 
sectors, they will anticipate higher outcome of future 𝐼𝑃𝐼 in their stock prices’ evaluations, and 
this is automatically and instantly reflected in current stock prices and returns, which go up. 
This process is probably more evident before an incoming crisis, that is a recessive phase: if, 
as a result of some negative events, market operators expect a reduction of future cash flows to 
the industrial sectors, and accordingly a reduction in the expected profitability, then they will 
adjust downwards their evaluation on stock value, causing an immediate lowering of stock 
returns. Therefore, the correlation between future industrial production and current stock 
returns is expected to be positive.  
Obviously, some flaws about the usage of this correlation for the construction of an EWI should 
be remarked: first of all, it is a correlation, not a univocal causal relationship, and variables may 
determine each other; moreover, if the services and the primary activities compose the largest 
part of GDP, then 𝐼𝑃𝐼 may not be a good proxy of the overall macroeconomic state, and may 
not be useful to totally capture the presence of systemic risk, which can be generated by other 
sectors; of course, this procedure cannot take into account increase of systemic risk caused by 
completely unpredictable exogenous source (e.g. a sudden pandemic of coronavirus disease), 
and by those factors other than expectations on macroeconomic state affecting stock market 
movements; finally, one must be careful to different measurement criteria of variables, like 𝐼𝑃𝐼, 
since it is not standardized across countries. In general, advanced economies best suits for the 
application of this test, since they are highly monetarized and have a strong industrial sector 
and many highly capitalized companies listed on the stock markets: in this case, the correlation 
between industrial production and stock market is more likely to be stronger. Anyway, it should 
be reminded that the regression is a quantile regression, and the test does note detect the 
causality in mean, but the causality in quantile: therefore, evidence from correlations in mean 
are not the object of this study. 
By the same logic as above, it is interesting to evaluate the relationship of a risk measure on the 
quantiles of the production index. For this purpose, the daily Value at Risk of stock returns used 
as regressor can be quite explicative: 
𝑍𝑡−1ሺkሻ = σ𝑗=0
𝐽 𝑤𝑘,𝑗𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡−1−𝑗 
In the Appendix A, the daily Value-at-Risk of stock returns is represented for each country. 
Because of lack of intra-daily information about stock returns, daily VaR has been estimated 
through the variance-covariance method applied with conditional volatilities inferred from a 
GARCH (1,1) model with Student-t innovations. Four basic steps have been taken. 
1. First of all, each time series of daily stock returns were demeaned, in order to have a 
set of zero mean data. 
 
 94 
2. Secondly, the parameters of a regression model with GARCH time series errors were 
estimated by using the maximum likelihood criterion, so as to fit the model to the 
response data (i.e. the return time series). In MATLAB: 
Model = garch('GARCHLags',1,'ARCHLags',1,'Distribution','t'); 
[EstMdl, estParamCov, logL] = estimate(Model, Returns). 
3. Given the fully specified conditional variance model, each daily conditional variance 
is inferred from the response data. Daily conditional volatilities are then computed. 
CondVar = infer(EstMdl, Returns); 
CondVol = sqrt(CondVar). 
4. Finally, daily Value-at-Risk with a 95% confidence level is computed through the 
parametric variance-covariance method, which is based on the assumption of normally 
distributed stock returns with zero mean: 
𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡,0.05 = −1,645 ∗ 𝜎𝑡  
The Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity process is a common approach 
used to estimate returns’ volatility in financial markets, that are characterized by 
heteroskedasticity and volatility clustering, precisely. GARCH process allows to model the 
change in variance over time as a function of the lagged residual errors from a mean process 
(or innovations, that is the stochastic part of the process) which is supposed to have a Student’s 
t distribution, and the autoregressive component given by the lagged error variance terms. 
Therefore, a GARCH model has two key components: a GARCH polynomial with degree 𝑝, 
composed of 𝑝 lagged conditional variances, and an ARCH polynomial with degree 𝑞, 
composed of 𝑞 lagged squared innovations. 𝑝 and 𝑞 are the maximum nonzero lags of each 
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A differentiation among sectors of the stock market may be useful to identify the true origin of 
the systemic risk, and to obtain an EWI based on a stronger and more specific relation. Indeed, 
the common stock market index measures the overall market performance, which is calculated 
on the set of many sectors and industries. Albeit there exists a correlation among stocks and 
sectors of a stock market, the market sentiment originated in a specific sector could become 
crucial for the anticipation of the systemic risk. The test will be also applied in order to consider 
the relevance of two leading sectors within a stock market: the financial sector and the industrial 
sector. Hence, the quantile models will consider the industrial stock returns 𝑟𝑖 and the financial 





A stronger correlation is expected to occur between industrial stock returns and Industrial 
Production Index, since value investors do take into account the evolution of industrial output 
as a relevant factor of profitability for their sectorial investments. 
Another fundamental relationship to which to apply the test of Granger causality in quantile, 
and which may allow to promptly identify an increasing systemic risk, refers to the impact of 
financial market risk on the macroeconomic stability. Indeed, financial market risk is a source 
of systemic risk, and may be able to anticipate it. The common measure for financial market 
risk, used within this framework, is the variance of demeaned stock returns, which convey very 
useful information about the current financial stability, the current expectations on future 
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macroeconomic state and the discounting of an increasing systemic risk as a factor related to 
the business cycle. Using the same notation as before, the MIDAS quantile model becomes: 




Variance of returns measures the variability of demeaned stock returns, and helps to evaluate 
the financial risk in asset allocation processes. In the Appendix A, the exponentially weighted 
moving variances of daily returns are showed for each country. These charts are useful to 
identify the most turbulent periods on each stock markets, and the most volatile markets.  
The high variability in stock returns seems to show a countercyclical behavior: during 
recessions, volatility increases much above its overall mean, while during expansions it is 
slightly lower. What really matters is to assess whether variance of stock returns may be useful 
to anticipate the business cycle: in fact, the literature confirms the existence of a correlation 
between current financial volatility and future real macroeconomic variables, such as the same 
Industrial Production Index, even if this predicting power is not likely to be stable and equally 
strong over time. Anyway, there is no doubt that stock market variability is able to convey 
information about the overall macroeconomic environment: in accordance with the efficient 
market hypothesis, any relevant information, included that about future trends of real economy 
(e.g. the production), is discounted by rational market operators during the stock evaluation 
phase, and its uncertainty is necessarily reflected in the variance of returns. There are four 
reasons why the stock market volatility might anticipate the economic activity. 
1. There exists a component of procyclicality, since the stock price volatility may directly 
affect the macroeconomic environment: an increase in stock volatility makes riskier the 
value of collateral provided by firms; this widening of market frictions reduces the 
operators’ availability to provide funds and to lend, causing a stoppage of financial 
markets, and therefore a slowdown in the economic activity. 
2. The increase of the perceived risk, due to negative events or incoming crisis, makes 
market operators more risk averse: it is reflected in the risk premia, and then in the asset 
prices, which fluctuate more. 
3. The increase of perceived risk provides a disincentive to invest and to commit money 
to longer term projects, and this may cause a slowdown of economic activities. 
4. Finally, there are some behavioral explanations, like representativeness and anchoring, 
whereby stock market movements create some beliefs from firms and households about 
the general state of an economy, and this strengthens the mutual interaction between 
financial markets and real economy. Furthermore, the participants’ preference for 
speculative trading or for long-term investments strongly depends on the type of stock 
market and its riskiness: for instance, swing trading and short-term positions are 
relatively prevailing in the riskier markets, such as emergent markets and derivatives 
markets. If this is the case, the correlation between stock market prices and 
macroeconomic variables will be much more significant in advanced economies. 
A useful variable that embeds relevant information exploitable to detect systemic risk is the 
price of crude oil, which has been considered in the literature as a leading indicator of changes 
in economic phases. The quantile model will include 𝐼𝑃𝐼 changes and changes in the crude oil 





The market sentiment and the relative balance between global demand and global supply of oil 
are the main determinants of oil price movements, and these movements cause a set of 
consequences and different impacts on the national economies. In general, demand and supply 
of oil are strongly affected by geopolitical issues and events of global significance: that’s why 
oil price changes are useful to capture increases of geopolitical risk, and then of systemic risk.  
There is not a unique direction: past research shows that oil price changes produce both negative 
and positive effects on macroeconomic variables depending on the type of economy. In 
particular, in oil importing advanced countries, a price increase tends to cause a slowdown of 
economic growth, an increase in inflation and unemployment and an overall reduction in the 
value of the financial assets; in oil importing emerging countries, in addition to above 
mentioned negative effects, a severe overall impoverishment of households and small producers 
may cause a heavy reduction in the levels of investments, consumption and well-being, other 
than an increase in the probability of capital flight, massive debt defaults and speculative 
attacks; oil exporting countries are the main beneficiary of an oil price increase, because of 
higher revenues got by oil industries, which may result in higher national income if the global 
demand is inelastic. Therefore, oil price increase implies a wealth transfer from importing to 
exporting countries, and always causes some costly resource reallocation. Historically, 
increases of oil prices has been followed by recessions and debt defaults, because of higher 
costs for households and firms, which must face declining cash flows and lower income. As 
early as in 1983, the economist J. D. Hamilton showed that, since WWII, all recessions (but 
one) occurred in U.S. has been preceded by an increase in oil price, and this confirmed the 
existence of a Granger-causality between oil prices and output. Same evidence was found for 
the 2008 financial crisis: the acceleration in oil prices during the years priors to 2008 was a 
signal of increased systemic risk, which materialized itself as the house bubble burst and the 
global economy fell into a heavy recession. Hence, the oil price is a good detector of systemic 
risk at global level, since it embeds market sentiments on global economic stability.  
Of course, there are some flaws: as said, oil price changes produce different impact on each 
country, and this makes the test results neither universal nor unambiguous. Moreover, the 
reliability of the test is function of the strength of the correlation between oil price and industrial 
production. Since oil volumes is going to decline over next decades, it is likely that oil price 
will become less relevant for global economy and global financial patterns. 
Another source of systemic risk is represented by the foreign exchange market. The exchange 
rate variations generate the so-called currency risk, which may produce heavy negative 
consequences in many economies, despite the attempts to implement and preserve a fixed 
exchange rate regime: unavoidable global shocks or nefarious public policies may be the cause 
of detrimental capital outflows, speculative attacks and currency crisis. In particular, there 
exists a non-linear significant relationship between exchange rates and industrial production of 
a country: this impact, become stronger with the globalization process, occurs mainly through 
the trade channel, and subsequent variations of prices. It is widely acknowledged that the 
depreciation of currency tends to be expansionary, while its appreciation tends to be 
contractionary. Anyway, the evidence is not unique and unambiguous, rather it is as 
complicated as the reality: short-run and long-run effects of positive and negative changes of 
exchange rate on industrial production can be distinguished, with different impact on different 
industrial sectors, and different elasticities of import and export, depending on the type of 
examined economy, its degree of openness, the management of the exchange rate regime and 
the extent of exchange rate variations. All of this without taking into account the role of 
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financial flows, and the fact that there exist some endogeneity problems, such as simultaneity 
bias. However, the existence of non-linear effects of exchange rates on the industrial 
production, because of impacts on imported and exported quantities, can be tested with our 
nonparametric test, and used as EWI. The model to be implemented will be:    
𝑍𝑡−1ሺkሻ = σ𝑗=0
𝐽 𝑤𝑘,𝑗𝑟𝑒𝑡−1−𝑗 
where 𝑟𝑒 are the lagged changes of the exchange rate for each country, expressed in terms of 
dollars. 
A last important source of systemic risk is the country risk, that is the uncertainty faced by 
investors when dealing with a specific country, and in particular the sovereign risk, that is the 
risk to lose money because of the default on sovereign debt. The institutional investors, which 
buy Treasury bonds issued by the government, tend to ask higher sovereign risk premia, 
reflected in the interest rate, whenever the fiscal sustainability seems to be compromised. 
Changes in the sovereign risk premia could be caused by dangerous fiscal policies, and may 
trigger adverse loops and heavy macroeconomic implications, through the banking channel and 
the public channel: the reduction in the value of Treasury bonds held by banks as safe assets 
and the increase in the interests paid by taxpayers are a signal of an increase in the systemic 
risk due to public system, that can finally result in an economic downturn. It is evident that 
changes in sovereign risk premia are somehow reflected in the whole financial system, and then 
in the domestic private economic system. The tricky challenge is given by the existence of 
simultaneity: on the one hand, pre-existing weaknesses of economic fundamentals gradually 
exacerbate the fiscal health, and this causes increase in the risk premium; on the other hand, 
higher risk premia asked on public bonds in turn worsen credit conditions offered by financial 
operators, and this brings to a reduction in the firms’ investments and a slowdown in the 
economic activity. There is much empirical evidence on the negative effects produced by higher 
sovereign risk: higher borrowing costs, higher risk of private capital outflows, reduction in 
private investments, lower equity prices, and finally lower industrial production. Of course, it 
is interesting to evaluate the impact of a change in the sovereign risk on different quantiles of 
the industrial production, and to detect signals of incoming distress. In order to do that, changes 
in the Credit Default Swap premium issued on government’s debts, 𝑟𝑝, are considered the 




Indeed, the CDS spread is a good measure of the sovereign risk perceived by operators, and 














Test Application: An Empirical Analysis  
 
 
After having described the theoretical framework and the main tools, and therefore the 
nonparametric test to use as Early Warning Indicator, the core part of this thesis is going to be 
presented: the practical implementation and application of the test under an empirical point of 
view. The nonparametric test for causality in quantiles needed for signals detection related to 
systemic risk is applied by means of the programming platform MATLAB, and the accurately 
selected dataset provided by the financial data platform Thomson Reuters Eikon. As already 
specified, the test is an extension of the nonparametric Granger causality-in-quantile test, 
proposed by Jeong, Hardle and Song (Econometric Theory, 2012), based on conditional 
quantile estimates of the dependent variable obtained by a MIDAS (Mixed Data Sampling) 
quantile regression.  
This analytical test could be useful to monitor the evolution of systemic risks and to identify 
incoming troubles with timeliness. Of course, information provided by an EWI should always 
be considered within a probabilistic framework, with all its own limitations and flaws, 
beginning with the fact that the future can never be foreseen with total precision. This is just a 
starting point, to be improved and to be integrated with other tools, and then to take with a grain 
of salt. 
This chapter and following Appendices will define all the elements required for a valid and 
useful empirical analysis: the dataset about countries and markets, the definition of the 
variables, the covered timespan, the definition of systemic distress under an analytical point of 
view and the main empirical findings. In the last part, conclusions will be drawn, about the 
presented work and about future possible extensions. 
 
 
4.1  Empirical Analysis: Results  
The execution of the methodology and its application with real-world data are the crucial step 
to get empirical evidence and reach a conclusion. The results of the empirical analysis are 
described and graphically presented in this paragraph, while the dataset description is reported 
in the Appendix A. 
As widely explained, the common linear framework, which models the conditional mean of a 
normally distributed response variable as a linear combination of predictor variables, is not very 
useful when there exists the possibility of nonlinear dependence among variables. Indeed, as 
showed in the following figure, linear regression between the mean monthly stock returns and 
the Industrial Production Index changes leads to unreliable results, because of a null goodness 




Misspecification problem makes any indicator and model built on those data not valid for the 
causality detection. Given an evidence of nonlinearity, the nonparametric causality-in-quantile 
test gives the most robust and reliable results, especially against outliers, breaks and jumps, 
because it evaluates each quantile of the distribution, and not only its center. As reported in the 
descriptive tables of Appendix A, both response and independent variables exhibit non-normal 
characteristics: negative values of the skewness point to higher probability of large decrease, 
while kurtosis much higher than three point to higher peaks and fatter tails. Therefore, IPI 
returns have a fat-tailed left-skewed distribution, that is a non-normal distribution which 
justifies the use of nonparametric models. The quantile regression model can be used when 
some conditions of linear regression, such as normality and linearity, are not met, and when the 
analyst is interested not in what affects the expected value of response variable, but in what 
affects its whole quantile distribution. MIDAS quantile regression allows to estimate 
conditional quantiles of industrial production in the presence of high frequency (daily) 
explanatory variables, such as stock returns. The output argument reports the results of a 
specific approach: the smoothed asymmetric loss function minimization. It is characterized by: 
• no use of specific analytic gradient in MLE; 
• no use of Global Optimization Toolbox; 
• the use of a starting smoother, that is the average absolute residuals, that allows to 
smooth the non-differentiable objective function; 
• the use of FMINCON options for numerical optimization. 
Following tables show the results of a first application of MIDAS quantile regression on the 



















Since the quantile regression is based on the minimization of an asymmetric loss function, each 
minimized function value is reported. For each coefficient (intercept, slope and the parameter 
used in the one-parameter Beta polynomial, k2), the standard error and the statistical 
significance are listed. Therefore, for Eurozone at 5th quantile order, the estimated quantile 
model is: 
𝒬0.05ሺ𝐼𝑃𝐼𝑡ሻ = −1,205 + 1,353 ∗ 𝑍𝑡−1ሺ0,96ሻ 
with 𝛽0;0.05 = −1,205 and 𝛽1;0.05 = 1,353. 
The interpretation of coefficient is quite simple, analogous to that of OLS coefficients: the 
estimated 5th percentile of European IPI change is equal to -1,205% whenever stock return rates 
were null (it is the unconditional quantile), and increases by 1,353 basis percentage points 
whenever stock return rates increased by 1% during the previous month. These relationships 
seem to be strong because the standard deviations of each parameter are very low, and the p-
values are very close to zero: coefficients at quantile order q=0,05 are significantly different 
from zero, and the relations are stable, for both Eurozone and United Kingdom. The standard 
errors of coefficients are the standard deviation of simulated parameters, obtained through a 
bootstrapping with the estimated residuals. 
In order to implement the nonparametric test, the function created on MATLAB to perform the 
quantile regression automatically computes the conditional quantiles for each quantile order, 
from 0,01 up to 0,99. An illustration is showed below: the quantile coefficients are estimated 
from the quantile model applied to IPI changes of Unites States, for the 5th percentile, the 95th 















Table 4.1: MIDAS quantile regression coefficients for Eurozone and UK, q=0,05 
US 
Table 4.2: MIDAS quantile regression coefficients for US, q=0,05; q=0,50; q=0,95 
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The unconditional th-quantile, that is the intercept, increases with the order quantile, by 
definition; the slope is more impacting for the extreme estimated quantiles, and closer to zero 
for the median. The direction is not unique: in US data, estimated quantiles of IPI changes 
increase with stock return rates for higher quantile orders, and decreases for lower quantile 
orders. It means that, when there is a heavy fall in stock returns during a given month, the 
estimated quantile distribution of IPI change for the following month is expected to be more 
asymmetric, defined over a wider range of values and with a longer left tail. All the coefficients 
are statistically significant. Hereinafter, results from regression will be figured in terms of 
estimated quantiles of IPI changes, which is the basic variable needed for the nonparametric 
test. The following figures plot the monthly observations of IPI change, together with the 5th 
percentile for both US and Eurozone. 
 
 
It is evident the different degree of statistical dispersion of observations between the two 
graphs: in US, monthly variations in IPI are more concentrated on a range of values between    
-1% and +1%, with very few outliers. This is reflected in a flatter red line representing the 
estimated conditional quantiles at q=0,05. Contrarily, a wider and more volatile picture 
characterizes the Eurozone: conditional quantiles are more sensible to the market performance, 














The median of distribution of European IPI returns, conditional on daily stock returns of MSCI 
EMU Index, is plotted in the figure above. Of course, the evolution of estimated median is 
US EUR 
Figure 4.2: IPI changes (%) and conditional quantiles (q=0,05) of US and Eurozone, 1995-2019 
EUR 
Figure 4.3: IPI changes (%) and conditional median of Eurozone, 1995-2019 
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different from the evolution of estimated mean, but it fluctuates just above zero, similarly to 
the expected value of returns. In any case, the strongest oscillation occurs in correspondence of 
the 2008 financial crisis, whatever the quantile order. 
The following charts plot observed monthly IPI changes and estimated conditional quantiles at 
q=0,05 for each country. 
Figure 4.4: IPI changes (%) and conditional quantiles (q=0,05) for all countries, 1995-2019 
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It is interesting to take a look at every relevant conditional quantile for US and Eurozone, in 
order to understand the estimated evolution of the whole conditional distribution: the 1th 
percentile, the 10th percentile, the median, the 90th percentile and the 99th percentile. 
 
 
It can be noted that the evolution of the first estimated quantile of IPI change, at q=0,01, is 
much more volatile in US than in the Eurozone, while all other conditional quantiles are more 
volatile in Eurozone. This reflects the higher dispersion in the European data about IPI change, 
and the different impacts of stock return rates on the industrial production. Moreover, it is 
evident the presence of a longer left tail in the IPI change distribution: the longer distance 
between the first estimated percentile and all other relevant estimated percentiles is a common 
characteristic of each country, as shown in the following charts. 
EUR US 




Final step consists of the application of the causality-in-quantiles test, which is justified by the 
fat-tailed non-normal distributions of variables of interest. Indeed, nonparametric causality-in-
quantiles test takes into account all quantiles of the distribution, not only the center of the 
distribution as the most common tests do: it is evident that, in many phenomena, the behavior 
in the tails is different from that of the rest of the distribution. 
Here we are going to test the Granger causality from stock returns to IPI returns quantiles of 
each country. The following tables show the test statistics and the p-values of relevant quantile 
orders for US (left side) and the results about the 5th percentile of each country (right side).  
 
Figure 4.6: IPI changes (%) and conditional quantiles (relevant q) for all countries 
Table 4.3: Results of causality test, for US and other countries (at q=0,05) 
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The reading of these tables is easy: stock returns significantly affect (or rather significantly 
correlate with) specific quantiles of the monthly industrial production whenever the test statistic 
is higher than 1,96 (or equivalently, the p-value is less than 0,05). Therefore, it is clear that US 
stock returns Granger cause IPI change at the 10th, the 20th, the 30th, and the 90th percentile, 
while they remain not useful to predict the 40th, the 50th, the 60th, the 70th and the 80th percentile. 
Furthermore, stock returns of domestic stock markets seem to be relevant to predict the 5th 
percentile in UK, Italy, Spain, Japan and Argentina.  
For an immediate understanding and visualization of Granger causality, all the results of the 
test will be graphically presented in the following figures. The vertical axis shows the test 
statistic J, the horizontal axis shows the quantile orders from 0,01 up to 0,99, and the flat red 
line represents the 5% critical value, that is 1,96. Therefore, the null hypothesis that stock return 
does not Granger cause IPI changes for a given quantile order is rejected whenever the value J 
is higher than 1,96, that is whenever the p-value is lower than 0,05.  
 
Graphically, it is possible to effectively identify and immediately evaluate relevant quantiles of 
the IPI distribution Granger-caused by stock returns movements. 
Given a critical value of 1,96 the causality-in-quantile test applied to US data does reject the 
null hypothesis roughly within the quantile range of 0,05 to 0,35 and the range of 0,80 to 0,95, 
while there is no Granger causality within the range of 0,35 to 0,80. In the Eurozone, the null 
hypothesis is rejected roughly within the quantile range [0,70; 0,95]: this means that a fall in 
the stock market returns Granger causes a significant movement in the upper quantiles of the 
IPI returns distribution, and therefore stock returns have a strong predictive power for those 
quantiles only. In any case, there is no predictive power for central quantiles, like the median: 
a confirmation of this lack of correlation is given by the null goodness of fit in the linear 
regression models, which try to estimate the expected value (that is a central measure just like 
the median) of the variable of interest (i.e. IPI returns). This means that a stock market crush 
does not necessarily imply a proportionate fall in the production, even though its probability 
distribution undergoes relevant changes, maintaining the same expected mean as before. This 
lack in the detection of an impact in the central tendency can be due to: 
US EUR 
Figure 4.7: Nonparametric Granger-causality test for all quantiles, stock returns on IPI 
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• errors in the evaluation of the overall economic performance of stocks (behavioral 
explanations, panics, bubbles, wrong evaluations of relevant information like a shock 
or new public policies); 
• recovery time of the crash in the stock market (it often happens that a sudden crash is 
followed by a fast recovery, even within the same month, and hence no change occurs 
in the industrial production); 
• other factors, such as reverse causality, expectations, time framing.  
An important conclusion for US data is that extreme reductions in industrial production are 
quite significantly predicted by changes in stock returns, and in general the noncausality part is 
longer on the central positions of the distribution.  
The next figure shows the results for all other countries. Shapes of the blue lines are very 
uneven, asymmetrical and different from country to country, but there is a clear characteristic 
common to each chart: causality is not significant, or it is at least much weaker, on the central 
quantiles with respect to external quantiles, where the relationship with stock returns tends to 
be stronger for each country. Hence, given many dissimilarities, another important conclusion 
is that the relationship on the tails, both the left and the right one, is relevant: extreme changes 
in industrial production are significantly anticipated by stock returns, while the relation with 
central tendencies is unclear and more ambiguous, and it requires further deepening.   
The left tail of the distribution of IPI returns, which corresponds to the probability of significant 
IPI decreases, is represented by lower quantiles, and, as showed by graphs on test statistics, it 
is the most relevant part of the distribution in almost every country: there exists a significant 
Granger causality in IPI return distribution of UK, Italy, Spain, Japan, Argentina, Brazil and 
South Africa roughly within the quantile range [0,05; 0,30]. At the same time, upper quantiles 





Looking at chart of Italy and UK, since the test statistic exceeds the critical value (red line) 
roughly when 0,05 ≤ q ≤ 0,22, then it stands to reason that a relevant change in total stock 
returns may reflect a change in the perception of systemic risk, and then an increase in the 
probability to deal with lower negative IPI returns (which corresponds to lower quantiles).  
The evaluation of a risk measure, like Value at Risk, on the quantiles of the production index 
provides even more interesting results. The daily Value at Risk of stock returns, estimated 
through the variance-covariance method and a GARCH volatility model, is used as the 
explicative variable instead of the same stock returns. Charts representing VaR of daily returns, 
reported in Appendix A, highlight the perfect correspondence of VaR with an extreme lower 
quantile of the distribution (as explained, the VaR is a conditional quantile). 
The next figures present results of testing whether daily Value at Risk of stock returns may 
predict IPI returns at the various quantiles. Unlike the previous figures, which showed very 
dissimilar graphs, in the case of VaR it seems that a common pattern among countries could be 
found. Indeed, the evidence of causality seems to exhibit a reverse hump-shaped pattern across 
quantiles in almost every country: the conclusion of a higher impact on extreme quantiles of 
IPI distribution, and a null impact on central positions, is confirmed again.  
In US, the test statistic exceeds the critical value roughly when q < 0,35 and 0,85 ≤ q ≤0,95 
respectively: there is no Granger causality for 0,35 ≤ q ≤0,85 and for very extreme q, even if 
the test statistic is very close to the threshold for almost the entire distribution. A very similar 
pattern is showed by UK, Germany, Spain, Japan, Argentina and South Africa. The Eurozone 
IPI is mostly affected on the left tail, while Italy IPI is mostly affected on the right tail of the 
distribution.  
 





Figure 4.9: Nonparametric Granger-causality test, VaR on IPI, all countries 
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The next figures present results of testing whether a Granger causality can be detected in 
different sectors of a stock market: industrial sector and financial sector.   




Charts for each country are various and different from each other, and it is not easy to identify 
any common patterns and to draw any conclusions. In general, there are not remarkable 
differences in Granger-causality detection between the two sectors in the Eurozone, UK, 
Germany, Italy and Spain. About other countries, the tail of IPI returns impacted by stock 
Figure 4.11: Nonparametric Granger-causality test, stock returns of financial sector 
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returns changes in accordance with the sector: for instance, industrial stock returns in US 
Granger cause IPI change in the upper quantiles of the distribution, while the financial stock 
returns Granger cause the distribution in the lower quantiles.  
Results of the next relationship refer to the impact of market risk on the industrial production.  
Moving variance of daily returns, that allows to identify the most turbulent periods on stock 
markets, is showed for each country in the Appendix A. As said, volatility increases much 
above its overall mean during recession phases, and it is slightly lower during expansive phases. 
A correlation between current stock return volatility and real macroeconomic variables, such 
as IPI, is not likely to be stable and equally strong over time, but it may still have some 
predicting power. The results from MIDAS quantile regression, showed below for US and 
Eurozone, clearly suggest that significant impacts on the IPI returns might occur at the very 
least quantiles of the distribution. 
 
 
Every conditional quantile over time seems to be equally spaced from each other, but the first 
one, that is the conditional quantile at quantile order q=0,01. Moreover, the most curves in 
correspondence of each quantile order show very similar fluctuations and equal trends: this 
means that returns variance does not correlate with some particular quantile of the IPI change 
distribution, and it is not useful to make predictions. Therefore, as we can see from illustrations 
above, daily volatility in stock market is not relevant to explain changes in the distribution of 
the IPI returns, except for its very extreme positions only. This is true for US and Eurozone at 
least: only deep changes in IPI returns could be partially predicted by stock market volatility, 
perhaps during turbulent periods, financial crisis and under persistent uncertainty. 
Anyway, as showed in the next figure, results from nonparametric Granger-causality test are 
not consistent with the theory, and are very different than as expected. This may be due to some 











Figure 4.13: Nonparametric Granger-causality test, market risk on IPI, all countries 
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The next figure present results of the Granger causality-in-quantile test between the IPI and the 
oil price. For US, IPI change is regressed on returns of WTI price, while for all other countries 
it is regressed on returns of Brent price. Further explanations about data are given in the 
Appendix A. 
Figure 4.14: Nonparametric Granger-causality test, oil price on IPI, all countries 
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In this case, interpretation of charts is as interesting as puzzling. In US, a Granger causality is 
detected around lower quantiles, roughly within the quantile range [0,05; 0,25], while there is 
no Granger causality for q < 0,05 and for q > 0,25. Moreover, there is an inexplicable low peak 
within the significant quantile range, roughly on q=0,13, for which no Granger causality exists. 
On the other side, at least over the last 25 years (the timespan of the dataset) in Europe, 
variations in the oil price did not anticipate at all changes in IPI distribution, whatever the 
quantile order: probably, the US economy tends to be more sensible to the performance of the 
petroleum industry than European economy as a whole. In any case, even in all other countries, 
the quantile range in which a Granger causality is detected tends to be quite narrow or too small 
to be somehow significant: in UK, in Germany, in Italy, in Japan, in Argentina, in South Africa. 
Spain and Brazil show the most relevant significance in extreme quintiles, while in UK oil price 
tends to affect changes in the central positions of IPI distribution. 
Results of the next relationship refer to the impact of currency risk, proxied by variations in 
exchange rates, on the industrial production. Exchange rate and exchange rate variations are 
graphically reported in the Appendix A. Even though big exchange rate variations may be cause 
and consequence of capital outflows and currency crisis, there is no linear and stable 
relationship between exchange rates and industrial production, that is affected mainly through 
the trade channel. Results are very different, depending on the country and the currency 















The results from MIDAS quantile regression on the Eurozone are showed in the graph above. 
The estimated conditional quantiles of IPI distribution seem to be more sensible to variations 
of the exchange rate USD/EUR at its lowest quantile order than at higher quantile orders. A fall 
in the European industrial production may occur after an appreciation of euro, but it is necessary 
to understand how significant this relationship is. 
The next figure present results of the Granger causality-in-quantile test between the IPI returns 
and the respective exchange rates, USD to national currency. It is evident that in the Eurozone 
there is no Granger causality-in-quantile, whatever the quantile order. Essentially, currency 
risk, given by the fluctuations in the value of the euro, is not a source of systemic risk, and this 
is probably due to the strength of European economy and the credibility of the ECB. In all other 
analyzed countries, a Granger causality is detected mainly for upper quantile orders: exchange 
EUR 
Figure 4.15: IPI changes (%) and quantiles conditional on exchange rate, Eurozone 
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rate variations Granger cause IPI change roughly for 0,70 ≤ q ≤ 0,90 in UK, for 0,70 ≤ q ≤ 0,99 
in Argentina, for 0,60 ≤ q ≤ 0,85 in Brazil, for 0,80 ≤ q ≤ 0,95 in South Africa. In Japan alone, 
the Granger causality is detected for lower quantile orders. It is interesting the case of 
Argentina, that is a country known to be financially and monetary instable and periodically hit 
by some currency crisis: the test rejects the null hypothesis almost for every quantile order, with 
the exception of very central quantiles of IPI distribution.  
The next figure present results of the Granger causality-in-quantile test between the IPI change 
and the Credit Default Swap spread change, obtained from CDS contracts on public bonds with 
maturity of 5 years. The detailed description of this variable is given in the Appendix A. In this 
case, the variations in CDS premium is the variable of interest since it should reflect variations 
in the sovereign risk. In fact, changes in sovereign risk premia are somehow reflected in the 
financial system, and then in the domestic private economic system, and for this reason the 
CDS spread may signal a higher systemic risk. 
Actual test results are as expected, in one way or another. No Granger-causality is detected in 
US, in UK, in Germany, in Brazil and in South Africa, and this is an evidence that, at least in 
those countries, the sovereign risk has not contributed in increasing the systemic risk over the 
last 25 years. On the other side, CDS spread change seems to Granger-cause some quantiles of 
IPI return distribution in Italy, Spain and Argentina: null hypothesis is rejected for higher 
quantile orders in Italy and Argentina, and for more central quantile orders in Spain. 






4.2  Conclusion 
The ultimate purpose of this thesis was to implement a new test procedure to evaluate the 
presence of systemic risk within the financial markets. In order to pursue this goal, the essay 
has been divided into two main macrostructures, as the same thesis title suggests: the first one 
includes Chapter 1 and Chapter 2, and deals with systemic risk, measurement and early warning 
indicators in general; the second one includes Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, and deals with the 
MIDAS quantile regression approach used to implement the nonparametric test. 
Chapter 1 provided an overview of the systemic risk in every basic aspect: its definition, its 
origin and the relevant literature. The leading concepts to keep in mind for the definition of 
Figure 4.17: Nonparametric Granger-causality test, CDS premium on IPI, all countries 
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systemic risk are essentially two: the probability of an unfavorable event, that is the economic 
shock, and the possible set of consequent negative impacts, that is the propagation dynamic, 
which in turn puts in trouble the whole financial system. Therefore, the systemic risk is defined 
as the probability that an entire market collapses as a consequence of the materialization of 
some specific risk combined with a strongly interconnected system. As widely explained, there 
are many possible sources of systemic risk, but all of them can be traced back to the 4 Ls: from 
alterations of losses, leverage or liquidity may stem a shock, while the degree of linkage among 
institutions expresses the potential of systemic involvement through a propagation dynamic. 
Moreover, the concepts of externality and contagion, which can derive, for instance, from a 
default or from the asset price variability, are strictly linked to the concept of propagation 
dynamic. The interdependence among institutions in the financial chain is evident if we look at 
the payments system and at the direct loans. The magnitude of a shock in the financial system 
strongly depends on the reactions of financial institutions, that counteract to the expectations 
of incoming distress, and with their choices may mitigate or amplify the contagion. The last 
paragraph of the first Chapter described the main contributions and the main conclusions 
concerning systemic risk in the literature of the past decades. In fact, a very consistent progress 
in the literature took place over the last decades because of a deeper understanding of financial 
dynamics, a wider use of more complicated and complete econometric tools and the necessity 
to provide explanations on relatively recent global phenomena and events. 
Chapter 2 presented a description of the most important tools to measure systemic risk, by 
providing a categorization of them. Indeed, the monitoring and the correct measurement of 
systemic risk has always played a central role for the institutions and all financial actors: it is 
crucial for institutions and authorities to perform unbiased evaluations through the use of 
trustworthy measures, in order to make optimal decisions for own business and to pursue public 
mandates, such as financial stability and consumer protection. The systemic risk assessment 
requires the analysis of three basic aspects: risks arising from the asset side of balance sheets, 
risks arising from the liability side and risks deriving from interactions between the two sides. 
Financial risk management aims to handle exposures to a set of risks linked to financial and 
business operations: default risk, funding risk, liquidity risk, business risk, market risk (that 
includes the equity price risk, the interest rate risk, the exchange rate risk, the commodity price 
risk). After having generally described the main characteristics of each risk, a general 
classification of all measures of systemic risk, as defined by Bisias, Flood, Lo, Valavanis 
(2012), has been reported. The proposed classification of systemic risk measures is based on 
four criteria, that reflect four different perspectives in the usage of them: the supervisory 
perspective, the research perspective, the required datatypes and the reference time horizon. 
Each category contains sub-sections of measures. For instance, among probability distribution 
measures, Value-at-Risk, Expected Shortfall, Conditional VaR, Co-Risk and Mahalanobis 
distance have been presented. Other subcategories are also described, such as illiquidity 
measures, network measures, default measures, contingent claim-based measures, 
macroeconomic measures, forward-looking measures and stress tests. All these measures allow 
the implementation of Early Warning System, whose purpose is not to predict the exact timing 
of a crisis, but to estimate the actual probability of adverse events to occur within a specific 
time horizon, and then to quickly signal warnings about probable incoming distress for the 
institutions. An efficient signal emerges whenever a threshold is crossed in the periods 
immediately preceding the crisis. Among variables used for the detection of systemic risk, there 
are the credit-to-GDP ratio gap, the house price gap, the Debt Service Ratio (DSR). 
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Chapter 3 described the theoretical framework of the main tools needed for the empirical 
analysis: Mixed Frequency Data Sampling regression model (introduced by Eric Ghysels et al. 
in “The MIDAS Touch: Mixed Data Sampling Regression Models) and quantile regression 
model (described in “Regression Quantiles” by Koenker and Bassett). The implementation of 
Early Warning Indicators for systemic risk was done by performing a quantile regression on a 
MIDAS model, and then by applying the nonparametric test of Granger causality-in-quantiles 
proposed by Jeong, Hardle and Song (Econometric Theory, 2012).  
Quintile regression requires three basic assumptions: the zero conditional quantile assumption, 
the linearity of the model, and large samples with independent observations. There is no 
assumption on the distribution since quantile regression models the conditional quantiles of the 
response variable, and therefore it is robust to outliers, differently from linear regression. The 
𝜏-th regression quantile coefficients β are estimated by solving an optimization problem on the 
conditional quantile function through the least absolute deviations method (which minimizes 
the sum of absolute errors). Regression quantile coefficients own the following properties: scale 
equivariance, shift equivariance, equivariance to reparameterization of design, equivariance to 
monotone transformations and the subgradient optimality condition. The interpretation of 
coefficients is quite simple: while the mean regression helps to understand how the conditional 
mean of y is affected by covariates X, quantile regression helps to identify an impact of 
covariates on y at each quantile of its conditional distribution. In general, the quantile regression 
is a valid option whenever the conditional mean fails to fully and reliably capture the data 
pattern: in case of skewed data and asymmetric distribution, in case of multimodal data and 
data with outliers, in case of heteroskedasticity. 
In the MIDAS models, the dependent variable, sampled at lower frequencies, is regressed on 
distributed lags of the covariates, sampled at higher frequencies. Hence, MIDAS models are 
parameterized reduced form regression models for time series that involve data sampled at 
different frequencies, where explanatory variables have higher frequency. The parametrization 
of lag coefficients requires the usage of a parameter vector function (Almon lag function, 
Almon exponential lag function, Beta polynomial function) and a suitable information criterion 
(Akaike, Schwarz or Hannan-Quinn). The smart and optimal parameterization of the lagged 
coefficients is one of the main key MIDAS features. Many types of parametrizations have been 
proposed in accordance with the number of coefficients and the function shaping. In general, 
the MIDAS regression requires a nonlinear least squares estimation. The real novelty item 
proposed by this thesis is the application of the quantile regression to a set of variables with 
different sampling frequencies: therefore, this approach should combine the two models 
described above, giving rise to the MIDAS quantile regression. 
After having estimated the conditional quantiles of the response variable, the nonparametric 
test of Granger causality in quantile was applied in order to identify Granger causality in various 
conditional quantiles of the dependent variable distribution. The tested hypotheses consisted of 
a quintile restriction: accepting the null hypotheses means that the set of lagged independent 
variables does not Granger-cause the dependent variable in the specific τ-th quantile at each 
given moment. Granger causality in quantiles is designed to deal with non-Gaussian 
distributions, with asymmetry, non-linearity and fat tails: in these cases, information content 
provided by the quantiles about distributions is more precise than the information provided only 
by the mean. 
Chapter 4 showed the empirical analysis, with a detailed presentation of the main results. First 
of all, the nonparametric test was created in MATLAB on the basis of the test procedure 
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introduced by Jeong, Hardle and Song (Econometric Theory, 2012): under the null hypothesis, 
the test statistic tends in distribution to 𝑁ሺ0, 𝜎0
2ሻ, and then it is zero if and only if the null 
hypothesis is true, that is if there is no Granger causality in quantiles between the two variables 
given a quantile order τ. In this kernel-based test, the causality detection required the estimation 
of ?̂?𝜏ሺ𝑤𝑡ሻ, that is the set of quantiles of the dependent variables, estimated through the MIDAS 
quantile regression, conditional on the high frequency lagged explanatory variables. Parameters 
are estimated as solutions to an optimization problem, for which the sample 𝜏-th quantiles are 
identified as those points 𝜉 of the domain of the function σ𝑖𝜌𝜏ሺ𝑦𝑖 − 𝜉ሻ at which its values are 
minimized. In MATLAB, the functionalities provided by “fmincon” together with a 
function_handle was used. Explanatory variables were weighted according to the MIDAS 
approach: the parametrization of lag coefficients made use of a Beta polynomial function, with 
parameters k1 and k2 and a specific weight attached to each lag. 
In the empirical analysis, the selection of suitable variables useful to anticipate increasing risks 
was based on the assumption that the most financial operators carry out transactions trying to 
anticipate outcomes from real economy and to raise more or less rational expectations about 
changes in financial variables. The analysis will be performed evaluating a set of relationships 
for more countries between a low frequency variable, reflecting the market expectations, and a 
high frequency variable, that reflects the macroeconomic state such as the industrial production. 
Examined sources of systemic risk are stock market risk (stock price variations, stock return 
volatility, daily Value-at-Risk, sectorial risk), geopolitical risk (oil price variations), currency 
risk (exchange rate variations) and sovereign risk (CDS premium variations). Main conclusions 
of the empirical analysis are listed below.  
Extreme reductions in industrial production are quite significantly Granger caused by changes 
in stock returns, while the noncausality part is longer on the central positions of the distribution. 
The relationship on the tails, both the left and the right one, is relevant: extreme changes in 
industrial production are significantly anticipated by stock returns, while the relation with 
central tendencies is unclear and more ambiguous, and it requires further deepening. 
Granger causality between VaR and industrial production seems to exhibit a reverse hump-
shaped pattern across quantiles, with a higher impact on extreme quantiles of IPI distribution, 
and a null impact on central positions. 
Granger causality detection within both financial sector and industrial sector of the stock market 
is difficult to analyze, given the heterogeneity of results. 
Results from Granger causality test on the impact of the stock return variance are very different 
than as expected, and no conclusion can be drawn.  
US economy tends to be more sensible to the performance of the petroleum industry than 
European economy as a whole. In any case, even in all other countries, the quantile range in 
which a Granger causality is detected tends to be quite narrow or too small to be somehow 
relevant. 
No Granger causality due to exchange rate is detected in the Eurozone, whatever the quantile 
order. In all other analyzed countries, a Granger causality is detected mainly for upper quantile 
orders, especially for UK data, for Argentina data and for Brazil data.  
Sovereign risk has not been a source of systemic risk over the last 25 years at least in US, in 
UK, in Germany, in Brazil and in South Africa. On the other side, CDS spread change seems 




The main finding is that some relationships present nonlinear characteristics which invalidate 
any linear specification or any test based on linearity assumption. The nonparametric causality-
in-quantiles test allows to overcome this problem by highlighting the causal effects on specific 
parts of the conditional distribution of the variable of interest. The strength of Granger causality 
may differ across the upper and lower quantiles of the conditional distribution, and for this 
reason, it should be considered the entire conditional distribution of the variations of a response 
variable, not only the center of the distribution. The same systemic risk should be detected by 
testing the significance on more external quantiles, instead of analyzing the mean of the 
conditional distribution.  
However, information provided by the EWI should always be considered within a probabilistic 
framework, since the future can never be foreseen with full precision. The proposed test is just 
a starting point, to be improved and to be integrated. In particular, further studies may focus on 
two relevant aspects of the EWI, remained unsolved. 
The first one refers to its reliability. The reliability of a test is its ability to issue signals with 
timeliness and relatively limited out-of-sample forecast errors. It can be tested by comparing 
its forecasting performance against other models through an out-of-sample validation, that is 
by using the known sample data to get the model parameters, and then by using the same model 
to make predictions about unknown data, independently from the sample. Besides, in the 
implementation of the test, other more reliable kernel functions, such as the Epanechnikov 
function, and other bandwidths, like that computed with the leave-one-out least squares cross 
validation (proposed by Racine and Li, 2004), may improve the results. 
The second aspect to be deepened refers to the strength and reliability of the MIDAS quantile 
regression analysis. In particular, econometric tools should be employed in order to investigate 
a regularity and a robustness of the relationships used in the empirical analysis. The direction 
of beta coefficients should be stable and robust, even across quantiles. Furthermore, the results 
should be more accurate by including the lagged dependent variables among the covariates in 
the MIDAS quantile model specification, instead of considering the equity-related part only.  
The causality test with conditional quantiles based on the MIDAS quantile model without the 
lagged dependent variables provides results strictly linked to the information obtained by the 
higher frequency data only. In this case, the rejection of the null hypothesis may be due to the 
lack of the lagged dependent variable to estimate the conditional quantile. The solution would 
be to estimate the conditional quantiles applying the MIDAS quantile regression on a sort of 
autoregressive distributed lag model with mixed frequency data (e.g. an ADL (1, 22), with one-
period-lagged value for IPI and the usual 22 lagged daily stock returns) in this case, the 
regression equation used to predict current values of the dependent variable is based on both 
the past values of low frequency explanatory variables and the lagged value of the response 
variable. Moreover, a further test can be applied in order to detect the relevance of each 
component of the ADL model on the final results: by comparing the results of the nonparametric 
test obtained from conditional quantiles estimated through the lagged dependent variable only 
with the results obtained from the complete ADL model, one can assess whether and how much 
both information sources, lagged dependent variable and independent variables, are relevant to 








Data Selection and Descriptive Analysis  
 
 
In this appendix, figures and tables for the descriptive analysis of the dataset will be showed. 
All data have been taken on the platform Eikon Thomson Reuters, before being elaborated with 
MATLAB. For the most variables, return rates (percentage changes), cumulative returns and 
related descriptive statistics are showed. Return rates of each variable are computed as simple 




− 1) ∗ 100 
Here the list and the description of variables used to build the Early Warning Indicators. Every 
time series has a time span of about 25 years, from 1995 until the end of 2019, except for the 
CDS premia, which start in 2008.  
• The Industrial Production Index (IPI) is a monthly economic indicator that measures the 
real output of secondary sectors of a country, relative to a base year. These indices are 
computed by national statistical offices, and for this reason they are not homogeneous 
and standardized measures, but vary across countries. Typically, they are Fisher indices 
with the weights based on periodic estimates of value added, and the value in the base 
year (e.g. 2012) arbitrarily set at 100. Their periodic variations express changes in the 
production volumes. Chosen IPIs are referred to the same countries of each stock market 
index but, as showed by figures, just ten of them are “comparable” (i.e. covering the 
whole time-span, purified by seasonality, with a base value of 100 and with similar 
composition of the examined industrial output), and then exploitable for the analysis: 
IPI USA, IPI EMU (European Monetary Union), IPI UK, IPI Germany, IPI Italy, IPI 
Spain, IPI Japan, IPI Argentine, IPI Brazil, IPI South Africa. For the analysis, the 
growth of industrial production is considered. The broadest index type is used, including 
manufacturing, energy and construction sectors. 
• The real Gross Domestic Product at constant market prices, expressed in $, may be 
useful to make up for the lack of IPI, and especially to fill the countries’ missing data. 
Anyway, it is a good alternative to IPI, since it is the most wide and important 
macroeconomic variable used to measure the market value of all the ultimate goods and 
services produced in a country over a given period. Easy to understand the reason why 
GDP and IPI do show a strong correlation, especially in industrialized and widely 
monetarized countries. Moreover, GDP is published quarterly by national statistical 
institutes, and therefore operators in the financial markets, like the stock market, have a 
larger timespan to discount all relevant information about the trends and the 
macroeconomic state. Missing countries in the dataset are Australia, Argentina, Brazil, 
Russia, India and China. The most valuable information for the analysis is given by the 
countries’ economic growth, computed as the percentage change of real GDP in each 
quarter. 
• The stock market indices, and in particular the time series of stock prices and stock 
returns, have been selected from the same provider, MSCI. The selected stock market 
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indices are: MSCI USA for United States, MSCI EMU for European Economic and 
Monetary Union, MSCI UK, MSCI Germany, MSCI Italy, MSCI Spain, MSCI Greece, 
MSCI Japan, MSCI Australia, MSCI Argentina, MSCI Brazil, MSCI Russia, MSCI 
India, MSCI China, MSCI South Africa (the first indices cover advanced economies, 
while the last 5 indices cover BRICS countries). Each MSCI Index measures the 
performance of the large and mid cap segments of the respective stock market, covering 
approximately 85% of the respective free float-adjusted market capitalization. In the 
implementation of the test, all indices have been used but those from countries without 
an acceptable production index. 
• The sectorial analysis is performed through the decomposed parts of the FTSE price 
indices of each country: financial sector and industrial sector. They are market-
capitalization weighted index representing the performance of large and mid cap stocks 
in financial sector and industrial sector, respectively. For example, industrials and 
financials have a relevant position within the FTSE USA Index: 98 and 130 
constituencies each, out of a total of 609, and 10% and 14% respectively as weights on 
the total index. Dataset is not complete for all countries: Greece, Argentina and Russia 
have missing observations, and for this reason they have been excluded. 
• The oil prices used in the test are the West Texas Intermediate spot crude oil price (or 
WTI) and the Brent crude oil price. These prices are global benchmark for oil pricing, 
and mainly differ in place of extraction and production (Texas and other U.S. countries 
for the first one, the North Sea of Northwest Europe for the second one), lightness and 
sweetness (WTI is sweeter and lighter), main trading market (the New York Mercantile 
Exchange, or NYMEX, for the first one, and the Intercontinental Exchange, in London, 
for the second one) and global relevance (WTI price is the benchmark for US markets, 
while Brent price is the international benchmark used by OPEC, and for this reason it 
seems to be more sensible to geopolitical issues). Although the transport costs of Brent 
oil are typically lower, its price is typically higher than the WTI price, but the difference 
is very small. 
• The exchange rates convey very useful information about currency risk, and then about 
a component of systemic risk which has proven in the past to be very relevant and 
disruptive for many economies. Indeed, even if many countries try to keep their 
currency value pegged to another stronger currency, it is not uncommon that some 
global shocks or some nefarious public policies may cause detrimental capital outflows, 
speculative attacks and currency crisis, which bring to an economic downturn. These 
shocks can be clearly seen on the figures representing variations of exchange rates, 
where outliers and strong changes highlight some currency devaluation or public 
intervention. Dataset on exchange rates provides the time series for national currency 
prices expressed in terms of dollars. Being the dollar the reference currency, data on 
U.S. currency value have been excluded. Moreover, since Italy, Germany, Greece and 
Spain share the same currency, they are not listed, and just the conversion euros-to-
dollar is figured. Australia is the last missing country. 
• The Credit Default Swap premium (or spread) is the annual payment made by the CDS 
buyer to the CDS seller in order to have protection against the default risk of a reference 
entity over the length of the contract. The premium is expressed in basis points (that is 
the percentage of the debt’s face value), and it is linked to the default risk on the public 
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debt issued by each national government. The spread, based on contracts issued in $, is 
a good measure of the sovereign risk perceived by operators. For example, a CDS spread 
of 80 basis points (0,8%) on the Italian Treasury bonds means that, in order to get 
protection against default risk of a public bond with $10 million par value, the CDS 
buyer must pay $80.000 a year. The CDS maturity refers to the initial length of a 
contract upon its beginning, and in general the higher the maturity, the higher the 
riskiness undertaken by the CDS seller, and the higher the premium paid by the CDS 
buyer. The CDS premium used for the analysis refers to contracts with a maturity of 5 
years. Missing countries are Greece, Japan, Australia and India. Variations in CDS 









A.1: Industrial Production Indices 
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A.3: Descriptive Statistic of IPI Change 





A.5: Frequencies of IPI Returns for each Country 
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A.6: Real GDP at Constant Market Price ($, Quarterly Data) 








A.8: Descriptive Statistic of GDP Growth Rates 
Change 
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A.9: Stock Market Indices 




   
A.11: Descriptive Statistic of Daily Returns (%) 
A.12: Descriptive Statistic of Monthly Returns (%) 







A.14: Cumulative Stock Returns (%) and Price Index Evolution 
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A.16: Value at Risk and Expected Shortfall of Daily Returns 
(%) 









A.18: Moving Variance of Daily Returns (%) 
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A.19: Price Indices - Industrial Sector 
A.20: Monthly Returns (%) – Industrial Sector 
A.21: Descriptive Statistic of Daily Returns (%) – Industrial Sector 
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A.22: Price Indices - Financial Sector 
A.23: Monthly Returns (%) – Financial Sector 
A.24: Descriptive Statistic of Daily Returns (%) – Financial Sector 
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A.26: Returns on Oil Price (%) 
A.27: Descriptive Statistic of Oil Price 
A.28: Descriptive Statistic of Returns on Oil Price 
A.25: Oil Prices 
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A.29: Exchange Rates for each Country, in terms of $ 
A.30: Variations of Exchange Rates (%) 
A.31: Descriptive Statistic of Exchange Rates 
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A.32: CDS Spread of each Country (b.p., in $) 






A.34: Descriptive Statistic of CDS Premium 










In this appendix, the implemented codes are reported. In particular, there are two main blocks 
of codes: the first one describes the function used to perform the MIDAS quantile regression 
on the dataset; the second one describes the function used to implement the nonparametric test. 
Function for the MIDAS quantile regression has been created starting from an analogous 
function written by Eric Ghysels et al., and specifically adjusted in accordance with the 
purposes of this thesis. Function for the test is the precise implementation of the mathematical 
formula described in the previous sections. 
 
% MIDAS QUANTILE REGRESSION  
function [estParams, EstY, EstYdate, EstX, EstXdate, CondQuantile, fval, 
resid, yLowFreqSim, se] = MidasQuantsimple (Y, Ydates, X, Xdates, q, Xlag, 
horizon, estStart, estEnd) 
  
% Description: 
% MIDAS quantile regression estimates the conditional quantile of n-period 
% Y, given a conditioning variable (predictor) X sampled at higher  
% frequency, with MIDAS weights; basic model is: 
%                Yt = b0 + b1*[B(L(1/m))*Xt,m] + et 
% 
% Input Arguments: 
%   Y           T-by-1 observation data for the low frequency variable,  
%               inscluding NaN, from a full time series (double) 
%                
% Ydates        T-by-1 dates (including Saturdays, Sundays and holidays) 
%               (cell, format ['01/15/1995'], mm/dd/yyyy) 
%  
%   X           T2-by-1 time series with T2>T; it is the high frequency  
%               conditioning variable (predictor), which have the same 
%               timespan of Y but much more high frequency observations 
%               (double) 
%             
% Xdates        T2-by-1 dates of high frequency variable 
%               (including Saturdays, Sundays and holidays) 
%               (cell,mm/dd/yyyy) 
%    
%   q           A scalar between zero and one that specifies the orders 
%               (i.e., alpha or tau) of the quantile 
%   
%  Xlag         A scalar integer that specifies the number of lags for the 
%               high frequency predictor, to which MIDAS weights are 
%               assigned (e.g., for regression of monthly data (y) on daily 
%               data (x), the number of lags may be 30, or 22 trading days) 
%  
% horizon       Number of (high frequency) lags from which lagged high 
%               frequency regressor starts (e.g., when a statistical 
%               bulletin of i-th month is published every 15th of following 
%               (i+1)-th month, then horizon should be 15) 
%                
%  estStart     Start date for parameter estimation  
%               (char, format yyyy-mm-dd,'1995-01-15') 
%  
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%  estEnd       Terminal date for parameter estimation  
%               (char, format '1995-01-15') 
%              
%  
% Output Arguments: 
% Note: each output variable reports the results of a specific approach: no 
% gradient, no search, yes smoother (a non-negative scalar that specifies  
% how to smooth the non-differentiable objective function; default is  
% average absolute residuals), yes options. 
% 
%  EstParams    Estimated parameters for [intercept; slope; k], 
%               where intercept and slope are the coefficients of the 
%               quantile regression, and k is the parameter in the 
%               MIDAS Beta polynomial 
%  
%   EstY        Modified output variable employed for the regression 
%   
%  EstYdate     Serial dates for the output variables 
% 
%   EstX        Modified explanatory variable employed for the regression 
%  
%  EstXdate     Serial dates for the explanatory variables 
% 
% CondQuantile  Estimated conditional quantiles. This is the fitted value  
%               of Y, given by the right-hand-side of the quantile  
%               regression model 
%                
%   fVal        Value of the non-differentiable loss function: 
%               fval = loss'*(q-(loss<0)), where loss = Y-CondQuantile 
% 
%   Resid       Residuals: residual = EstY-CondQuantile 
% 
%   YSim        Simulations of low frequency variable:  
%               ySim = condQuantile+resid 
%  
%  StandError   Standard error of each parameter [intercept; slope; k] 
% 
%  Figures representing data and estimated quantiles;  
%  Tables showing main regression outputs: coefficients, standard errors 
%  and p values of slope, intercept and parameter k. 
  
% CODES FOR FUNCTION 
% Set Data 
mask = ~isnan(Y); 
DataY = Y(mask); 
DataYdate = Ydates(mask); 
DataY = DataY(:); 
DataYdate = DataYdate(:); 
  
maskx = ~isnan(X); 
DataX = X(maskx); 
DataXdate = Xdates(maskx); 
DataX = DataX(:); 
DataXdate = DataXdate(:); 
  
DataYdateVec = datevec(DataYdate); 
DataYdateNum = datenum(DataYdateVec); 
DataXdateVec = datevec(DataXdate); 
DataXdateNum = datenum(DataXdateVec); 
estStart = datenum(estStart); 
estEnd = datenum(estEnd); 
  
% Minimum and maximum dates that data support 
minDateY = DataYdateNum(1,:); 
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minDateX = DataXdateNum(max(1,Xlag+horizon),:); 
if minDateY > minDateX 
    minDate = minDateY; 
else 
    minDate = minDateX; 
end 
  
maxDateY = DataYdateNum(end,:); 
maxDateX = DataXdateNum(end,:); 
if maxDateY > maxDateX 
    maxDate = maxDateX; 
else 
    maxDate = maxDateY; 
end 
  
% Check and set default sample period 
if estStart < minDate 
    estStart = minDate; 
end 
if estEnd > maxDate 
   estEnd = maxDate; 
end 
  
% Construct Y data 
tol = 1e-10; 
locStart = find(DataYdateNum >= estStart-tol, 1); 
locEnd = find(DataYdateNum >= estEnd-tol, 1); 
EstY = DataY(locStart:locEnd); 
EstYdate = DataYdateNum(locStart:locEnd); 
nobs = locEnd - locStart + 1; 
  
% Construct lagged X data 
EstX = zeros(nobs,Xlag); 
EstXdate = zeros(nobs,Xlag); 
for t = 1:nobs 
    loc = find(DataXdateNum >= EstYdate(t)-tol, 1); 
    if isempty(loc) 
        loc = length(DataXdateNum); 
    end 
    if loc-horizon > size(DataX,1)         
        nobs = t - 1; 
        EstY = EstY(1:nobs,:); 
        EstYdate = EstYdate(1:nobs,:); 
        EstLagY = EstLagY(1:nobs,:); 
        EstLagYdate = EstLagYdate(1:nobs,:); 
        EstX = EstX(1:nobs,:); 
        EstXdate = EstXdate(1:nobs,:); 
        maxDate = EstYdate(end); 
        break 
    else         
        EstX(t,:) = DataX(loc-horizon:-1:loc-horizon-Xlag+1); 
        EstXdate(t,:) = DataXdateNum(loc-horizon:-1:loc-horizon-Xlag+1); 




% Initial parameters estimated by OLS  
k0 = 5; 
X0 = [ones(nobs,1), EstX * midasBetaWeights(Xlag,1,k0)']; 
OLS = X0 \ EstY; 
params0 = [OLS;k0];     
resid0 = EstY - X0 * OLS; 
  
% Setting for numerical optimization 
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smoother = mean(abs(resid0)); % Smoother function 
lb = [-Inf;-Inf;0];          % Low Bounds  
ub = [Inf;Inf;100];          % Upper Bounds 
  
% Optimization options 
     options = optimoptions('fmincon','Algorithm','interior-
point','Display','off'); 
  
% Numeric minimization 
% minimize non-differentiable function by Newton method, finite-difference, 
no gradient, no search, yes smoother, yes options 
estParams = fmincon(@(params) objFun(params, EstY, EstX, q, smoother), 
params0, [], [], [], [], lb, ub, [], options);       
  
% Conditional quantiles 
% no gradient, no search, yes smoother, yes options 
[fval,CondQuantile] = objFun(estParams,EstY,EstX,q,0);  
  
% Bootstrap standard errors 
nsim = 100; 
ind = randi(nobs,[nobs,1]); 
resid = EstY - CondQuantile; 
for i = 1:nsim       %  with bootstrap standard error method: 'Residual' 
    yLowFreqSim = CondQuantile + resid(ind); 
    paramSim(:,i) = fminsearch(@(params)objFun(params, yLowFreqSim, EstX, 
q, smoother), estParams); 
end 
se = std(paramSim,0,2); 
zstat = estParams./se; 
pval = 0.5 * erfc(0.7071 * abs(zstat)) * 2; 
pval(pval<1e-6) = 0; 
  
% PLOTTING 
% Display the estimation results 
columnNames = {'Coeff','StdErr','tStat','Prob'}; 
rowNames = {'Intercept';'Slope';'k2'}; 
fprintf('Method: Smoothed Asymmetric loss function minimization\n'); 
fprintf('Minimized function value: %10.6g\n',fval); 
fprintf('Quantile order: %10.6g\n',q); 




% plot quantiles 
figure 
hold on 
plot(EstYdate, CondQuantile, 'LineWidth',0.7); 
dateaxis; 
scatter(EstYdate,EstY,'MarkerEdgeColor',[0 0 1]); 
legend('Estimated conditional quantiles','Observations'); 
xlabel('t'); 
ylabel('Y'); 





% LOCAL FUNCTIONS 
%------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
% 1) Objective function 
function [fval,condQuantile] = objFun(params,y,X,q,smoother) 
  
% Allocate parameters 
intercept = params(1); 
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slope = params(2); 
k2 = params(3); 
  
% Compute MIDAS weights 
nlag = size(X,2); 
k1 = 1; 
weights = midasBetaWeights(nlag,k1,k2)'; 
  
% Conditional quantile 
condQuantile = intercept + slope .* (X * weights); 
  
% Asymmetric loss function 
loss = y - condQuantile; 
if smoother == 0 
    % Non-differentiable loss function     
    fval = loss' * (q - (loss<0)); 
else 
    % Piecewise linear-quadratic smoothing loss function 
    maskSmall = loss < (q-1)*smoother; 
    maskBig = loss > q*smoother; 
    maskMedian = ~maskSmall & ~maskBig; 
    fvalSmall = -0.5*(q-1)^2*smoother + (q-1)*loss(maskSmall); 
    fvalBig = -0.5*q^2*smoother + q*loss(maskBig); 
    fvalMedian = 0.5/smoother .* loss(maskMedian).^2; 






% 2) MIDAS beta polynomial weights 
function weights = midasBetaWeights(nlag,param1,param2) 
  
seq = linspace(eps,1-eps,nlag); 
if param1 == 1     
    weights = (1-seq).^(param2-1);     
else 
    weights = (1-seq).^(param2-1) .* seq.^(param1-1);     
end 





% NONPARAMETRIC GRANGER-CAUSALITY IN QUANTILES TEST  
function [JJ] = Jtest(Y,X,Qy,qq) 
  
% Input Arguments: 
%    Y     Tx1 vector of dependent variables (e.g. monthly observations) 
% 
%    X     mxT matrix, with m lags of explanatory variable (e.g. absolute 
%          returns) and T periodic samples (e.g. 22 daily obs. for 12  
%          months); T must be equal to the number of observations of Y  
%          (sampled at lower frequency); time sequence goes from 
%          (1,1)->(22,1)->(1,2)->(22,2)-> and so on. 
%  
%    Qy    conditional quantiles of Y given X, obtained after running a 
%          MIDAS quantile regression between X and Y; it is a Txq matrix  
%          (usually q=99, that is 99 quantile orders, from 0.01 to 0.99 ) 
% 
%    qq    1xq vector which specifies each quantile order (it should 
%          be equally spaced) 
% 
% 
% Output Arguments: 
%    JJ    8xq matrix representing Jeong test values for each quantile 
%          order of qq; 
%          there are 8 rows, i.e. 8 different combinations of methods:  
%                    2 Kernel functions used (Gaussian and Uniform) x 
%                    4 types of inputs for the Kernel function (absolute 
%                    data; simple moving average; exponential moving 
%                    average; exponential moving variance) x 
%                    1 bandwidth (source: MATLAB documentation) 
% 
% Figures representing the combinations; they allow the immediate 
% visualization of the results, by identifying those quantiles orders in  
% which x is statistically significant, at significance level of 0.05  
% (t>1.96), to Granger-cause Y; 
% Tables showing the test statistic and the p value for the following  
% quantiles orders: q=0.01, q=0.10, q=0.20, q=0.30, q=0.40, q=0.50, q=0.60,  
% q=0.70. q=0.80. q=0.99. q=0.99. 
  
  
% CODES FOR FUNCTION 
% 0.1) Quantile orders 
q = size(qq,2); 
  
% 0.2) Time horizon 
T = size(Y,1); 
  
% 0.3) Lags 
m = size(X,1); 
  
% 1) First factor of the test 
W = sqrt(T/(T-1)); 
  
% 2) Product of epsilons (errormat) for each quantile order 
onet = []; 
for i = 1:q 
    for t = 1:T 
        if Y(t,1)-Qy(t,i)<0   
            onet(t,i) = 1; 
        elseif Y(t,1)-Qy(t,i)==0 
            onet(t,i) = 1; 
        else 
            onet(t,i) = 0; 
        end 





theta = ones(size(onet,1),size(onet,2)); 
for i = 1:q 
    for t = 1:T 
        theta(t,i) = theta(t,i)*qq(1,i);  % vector of quantile order 
    end 
end 
  
epsilont = onet-theta;                    % espilon at time t 
errormat = ones(size(epsilont,1),size(epsilont,1),size(qq,2)); 
for i = 1:q 
    errormat(:,:,i) = epsilont(:,i)*epsilont(:,i)'; % errors matrix 
end 
  
% 3.1) Kernel functions: Zt-Zs (4 methods) 
% First method: X as Z 
X11 = X(:); 
Xmean = mean(X11); 
  
In1 = []; 
ZtZs1 = []; 
for i = 1:T 
    In1 = X(:,i); 
    for j = 1:T 
        ZtZs1(:,j,i) = X(:,j)-In1; 
    end 
end 
  
% Second method: Simple Moving Average of X 
MAS = movavg(X11,'simple',m);    
MAS = reshape(MAS,m,T); 
MAS1 = MAS(:); 
MAS11 = MAS(m,:); 
  
In2 = []; 
ZtZs2 = []; 
for i = 1:T 
    In2 = MAS(:,i); 
    for j = 1:T 
        ZtZs2(:,j,i) = MAS(:,j)-In2; 
    end 
end 
  
% Third method: Exponential Moving Average of X, 'manual'  
% (fix weighting decreasing coefficient lambda = 0.95)  
MAEm0 = Xmean;     
MAEm1 = zeros(size(X11,1),1);     
lambda = 0.95;                    
for j = 1:size(X11,1)      
    MAEm1(j,:) = lambda*MAEm0+(1-lambda)*X11(j,:);   
    MAEm0 = MAEm1(j,:); 
end  
MAEm = reshape(MAEm1,m,T); 
MAEm11 = MAEm(m,:); 
  
In3 = []; 
ZtZs3 = []; 
for i = 1:T 
    In3 = MAEm(:,i); 
    for j = 1:T 
        ZtZs3(:,j,i) = MAEm(:,j)-In3; 




% Fourth method: Exponential Moving Average of Variances, 'manual' 
MAEV0 = var(X11); 
MAEV1 = zeros(size(X11,1),1);   
for j = 1:size(X11,1)       
    MAEV1(j,1) = lambda*MAEV0+(1-lambda)*(X11(j,:).^2); 
    MAEV0 = MAEV1(j,1); 
end 
MAEV = reshape(MAEV1,m,T); 
MAEV11 = MAEV(m,:); 
  
In4 = []; 
ZtZs4 = []; 
for i = 1:T 
    In4 = MAEV(:,i); 
    for j = 1:T 
        ZtZs4(:,j,i) = MAEV(:,j)-In4; 
    end 
end 
  
% 3.2) Kernel function: Bandwidth h (from MATLAB doc, 'mvksdensity') 
w = (4/((T+2)*m))^(1/(T+4)); % h for method 1 
for i = 1:size(X,2) 
    se1(:,i) = std(X(:,i)); 
end 
h1 = (se1.*w); 
  
for i = 1:size(X,2)          % h for method 2 
    se2(:,i) = std(MAS(:,i)); 
end 
h2 = (se2.*w); 
  
for i = 1:size(X,2)          % h for method 3 
    se3(:,i) = std(MAEm(:,i)); 
end 
h3 = (se3.*w); 
  
for i = 1:size(X,2)          % h for method 4 
    se4(:,i) = std(MAEV(:,i)); 
end 
h4 = (se4.*w); 
  
% 3.3) Kernel function: ZtZs/h  
for s = 1:size(ZtZs1,3)     %inputs of method 1 
    for i = 1:size(ZtZs1,2) 
        for j = 1:size(ZtZs1,1) 
            inp11(j,i,s) = ZtZs1(j,i,s)./h1(1,i); 
        end 
    end 
end 
  
for s = 1:size(ZtZs1,3)     %inputs of method 2 
    for i = 1:size(ZtZs1,2) 
        for j = 1:size(ZtZs1,1) 
            inp21(j,i,s) = ZtZs2(j,i,s)./h2(1,i); 
        end 
    end 
end 
  
for s = 1:size(ZtZs1,3)     %inputs of method 3 
    for i = 1:size(ZtZs1,2) 
        for j = 1:size(ZtZs1,1) 
            inp31(j,i,s) = ZtZs3(j,i,s)./h3(1,i); 
        end 
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    end 
end 
  
for s = 1:size(ZtZs1,3)     %inputs of method 4 
    for i = 1:size(ZtZs1,2) 
        for j = 1:size(ZtZs1,1) 
            inp41(j,i,s)=  ZtZs4(j,i,s)./h4(1,i); 
        end 
    end 
end 
  
% 3.4) Kernel function: k(ZtZs/h)  (2 functions) 
for j = 1:size(inp11,3)       % gaussian (=1) 
    [k111(:,:,j)] = gaussian(inp11(:,:,j)); 
end 
  
for j = 1:size(inp21,3)        
    [k211(:,:,j)] = gaussian(inp21(:,:,j)); 
end 
  
for j = 1:size(inp31,3)        
    [k311(:,:,j)] = gaussian(inp31(:,:,j)); 
end 
  
for j = 1:size(inp41,3)        
    [k411(:,:,j)] = gaussian(inp41(:,:,j)); 
end 
  
for j = 1:size(inp11,3)       % uniform (=2) 
    [k112(:,:,j)] = uniform(inp11(:,:,j)); 
end 
  
for j = 1:size(inp21,3)        
    [k212(:,:,j)] = uniform(inp21(:,:,j)); 
end 
  
for j = 1:size(inp31,3)        
    [k312(:,:,j)] = uniform(inp31(:,:,j)); 
end 
  
for j = 1:size(inp41,3)        
    [k412(:,:,j)] = uniform(inp41(:,:,j)); 
end 
  
% 3.5) Kernel function: K(ZtZs/h)  (product kernel) 
for i=1:size(k111,3)                     %ZtZs1 
    pK111(:,:,i)=prod(k111(:,:,i),1);    %function1 
end                                      
pK111=squeeze(pK111); 
  
for i=1:size(k112,3)                     %ZtZs1 
    pK112(:,:,i)=prod(k112(:,:,i),1);    %function2 
end                                      
pK112=squeeze(pK112); 
  
for i=1:size(k211,3)                     %ZtZs2 
    pK211(:,:,i)=prod(k211(:,:,i),1);    %function1 
end                                      
pK211=squeeze(pK211); 
  
for i=1:size(k212,3)                      
    pK212(:,:,i)=prod(k212(:,:,i),1);    %function2 




for i=1:size(k311,3)                     %ZtZs3 
    pK311(:,:,i)=prod(k311(:,:,i),1);    %function1 
end                                      
pK311=squeeze(pK311); 
  
for i=1:size(k312,3)                      
    pK312(:,:,i)=prod(k312(:,:,i),1);    %function2 
end                                      
pK312=squeeze(pK312); 
  
for i=1:size(k411,3)                     %ZtZs4 
    pK411(:,:,i)=prod(k411(:,:,i),1);    %function1 
end                                      
pK411=squeeze(pK411); 
  
for i=1:size(k412,3)                      
    pK412(:,:,i)=prod(k412(:,:,i),1);    %function2 
end                                      
pK412=squeeze(pK412); 
  
% 4.1) Numerator of the test: Product 
for i=1:size(errormat,3)           %ZtZs1 




    kee112(:,:,i)=pK112.*errormat(:,:,i); 
end 
  
for i=1:size(errormat,3)           %ZtZs2 




    kee212(:,:,i)=pK212.*errormat(:,:,i); 
end 
  
for i=1:size(errormat,3)           %ZtZs3 




    kee312(:,:,i)=pK312.*errormat(:,:,i); 
end 
  
for i=1:size(errormat,3)           %ZtZs4 




    kee412(:,:,i)=pK412.*errormat(:,:,i); 
end 
  
% 4.2) Numerator of the test: Sum of products 
for i=1:size(kee111,3)                %ZtZs1             
    kee111(:,:,i)=kee111(:,:,i)-diag(diag(kee111(:,:,i)));                




    kee112(:,:,i)=kee112(:,:,i)-diag(diag(kee112(:,:,i)));                





for i=1:size(kee211,3)                %ZtZs2            
    kee211(:,:,i)=kee211(:,:,i)-diag(diag(kee211(:,:,i)));                




    kee212(:,:,i)=kee212(:,:,i)-diag(diag(kee212(:,:,i)));                
    skee212(:,i)=sum(kee212(:,:,i),'all'); 
end 
  
for i=1:size(kee311,3)                %ZtZs3            
    kee311(:,:,i)=kee311(:,:,i)-diag(diag(kee311(:,:,i)));                




    kee312(:,:,i)=kee312(:,:,i)-diag(diag(kee312(:,:,i)));                
    skee312(:,i)=sum(kee312(:,:,i),'all'); 
end 
  
for i=1:size(kee411,3)                %ZtZs4             
    kee411(:,:,i)=kee411(:,:,i)-diag(diag(kee411(:,:,i)));                




    kee412(:,:,i)=kee412(:,:,i)-diag(diag(kee412(:,:,i)));                
    skee412(:,i)=sum(kee412(:,:,i),'all'); 
end 
  































% Correction of approximated J 
for i=1:size(qq,2)      %ZtZs1 
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    if J111(1,i)<=0 
       J111(1,i)=0; 
    else 
       J111(1,i)=J111(1,i); 




    if J112(1,i)<=0 
       J112(1,i)=0; 
    else 
       J112(1,i)=J112(1,i); 
    end 
end 
  
for i=1:size(qq,2)      %ZtZs2 
    if J211(1,i)<=0 
       J211(1,i)=0; 
    else 
       J211(1,i)=J211(1,i); 




    if J212(1,i)<=0 
       J212(1,i)=0; 
    else 
       J212(1,i)=J212(1,i); 
    end 
end 
  
for i=1:size(qq,2)      %ZtZs3 
    if J311(1,i)<=0 
       J311(1,i)=0; 
    else 
       J311(1,i)=J311(1,i); 




    if J312(1,i)<=0 
       J312(1,i)=0; 
    else 
       J312(1,i)=J312(1,i); 
    end 
end 
  
for i=1:size(qq,2)      %ZtZs4 
    if J411(1,i)<=0 
       J411(1,i)=0; 
    else 
       J411(1,i)=J411(1,i); 




    if J412(1,i)<=0 
       J412(1,i)=0; 
    else 
       J412(1,i)=J412(1,i); 















































































% Ultimate function Output 
JJ = cat(1,J111,J112,J211,J212,J311,J312,J411,J412); 
  
% Display the final results: test statistic and p value 
Test = [J211(1,1); J211(1,10); J211(1,20); J211(1,30); J211(1,40); 
J211(1,50); J211(1,60); J211(1,70); J211(1,80); J211(1,90); J211(1,99)]; 
pval = (1-tcdf(Test, T-1)); 
  
columnNames = {'Test_stat','p_value'}; 
rowNames = 
{'Q1';'Q10';'Q20';'Q30';'Q40';'Q50';'Q60';'Q70';'Q80';'Q90';'Q99'}; 
fprintf('Nonlinear Granger causality test\n'); 






%% Kernel functions 
% Gaussian function 
function [k] = gaussian(X) 
a = X.^2; 
b = (-1/2).*a; 
c = exp(b); 
k = c./(sqrt(2*pi)); 
end 
  
% Uniform function 
function [k] = uniform(X) 
c = zeros(size(X,1),size(X,2)); 
for i = 1:size(X,2) 
    for j = 1:size(X,1) 
        if X(j,i)>=-1 && X(j,i)<=1 
            c(j,i) = 1; 
        else 
            c(j,i) = 0; 
        end 
    end 
end 
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